APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Gene Shelton Rucker, Jr., for felony murder and aggravated arson in connection with a fire that took the life of an individual who resided in the apartment structure that was burned. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated arson, as charged. The defendant now appeals his convictions and sentence. Specifically, the defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (2) that setting fire to personal property is a lesser-included offense of aggravated arson and should have been included in the charge to the jury; (3) that the instruction on the knowing mens rea element of aggravated arson was incorrect; (4) that the state violated the defendant's due process rights by advancing impermissibly inconsistent positions relative to the defendant and an indicted co-defendant; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (6) that his sentence should not have been enhanced on the basis of prior convictions that were not proven by certified copies of the underlying judgments. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentence.

Petitioner, Jason M. Weiskopf, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Jason M. Weiskopf, No. W2000-02308-CCA-RM-CD, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, October 11, 2000). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner raises one issue for our review: whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Petitioner’s diminished capacity. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Sharon J. Breeden, appeals the revocation of her probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David Jennings, pled guilty to burglary, a Class D felony; theft over $1,000, a Class D felony; vandalism, a Class D felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of three years, fined a total of $400, and ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Grady Paul Daverson, of driving under the influence, fourth or subsequent offense. In this appeal, the defendant argues his arrest was illegal; therefore, the trial court erred by not suppressing the evidence against him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Robert Daniels, appeals as of right the Johnson County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this pro se appeal, the petitioner contends that he should be granted habeas corpus relief because his judgment of conviction for especially aggravated robbery is void. The state contends that the trial court properly dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

We granted permission to appeal to determine the applicable statute of limitations in this action against a laboratory that analyzes blood for purposes of providing evidence in paternity cases. The trial court ruled that the case was "governed by the applicable one year statute of limitations" in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 28-3-104 and 29-26-116, which refer to injuries to the person and medical malpractice claims, and dismissed the action because the suit was filed outside the one-year limitation. The intermediate court applied the three-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for recovery of monetary damages for injuries to personal property and, thereby, reversed the trial court's ruling. We conclude that this action sounds in negligence rather than medical malpractice. Further, we conclude that the economic loss sustained by the plaintiff is an injury to property rather than to the person. Thus, we hold that the three-year statute of limitations for injury to personal property applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Ricky Lynn Frazier, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition. In this appeal, he argues that the Department of Correction has failed to properly apply the jail credits he earned prior to the entry of his guilty plea. Because the proper avenue for review of the application of sentence reduction credits is the Administrative Procedures Act, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Michael Pittman, appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition after his conviction for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Joy Nelson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. She was classified as a Range I offender. She agreed to a sentence of forty years, which is outside the range of a Range I offender, Class A felony. We find that the sentence is proper because the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it.

A Gibson County jury convicted the defendant, James Curtis Westbrook, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a Range II multiple offender to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to require the state to reveal the identity of its confidential informant; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in permitting law enforcement officers to testify regarding footprint comparisons; (4) the trial court erred in permitting the state to treat a witness as a hostile witness; and (5) his sentence is improper. We remand for the empaneling of a jury to fix the fine. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Hewlett Smith, was convicted at a bench trial of DUI. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the legality of his arrest and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Clarence W. Carter, was tried and convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range Two multiple offender to consecutive sentences of thirty-six and sixteen years. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the convictions and sentences. Although there are several issues in this case, we granted permission to appeal primarily to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error in sentencing the defendant as a Range Two multiple offender when the only notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment filed by the State was in relation to an indictment that was superseded by the indictment upon which the defendant was tried. Additionally, the defendant argues on appeal that the indictment for possession with intent to deliver was insufficient to charge anything more than simple possession because it failed to contain the language that the defendant possessed the cocaine "with intent to deliver." Upon review, we conclude that the notice of intent to seek enhanced sentencing was sufficient as to the possession charge, but was not sufficient as to the conspiracy charge because conspiracy was not charged in the original indictment for which notice was given. We also hold that the indictment was sufficient to charge the offense of possession with intent to deliver. Finally, we hold that the defendant's remaining arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and length of sentence are without merit. The case is therefore remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing on the conviction for conspiracy to sell cocaine.

The defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence. The defendant pled guilty to a Class E felony, possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and imposed a two-year sentence in the special needs facility of the Tennessee Department of Correction. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court, but remand for correction of the judgment to reflect a guilty plea rather than a jury verdict.

The defendant, Darrell Glen Smith, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Cocke County Circuit Court for first degree murder. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his insanity defense and (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial due to juror misconduct. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.

The Appellant, John E. Turner, appeals his conviction by a Rutherford County jury for especially aggravated robbery, a class A felony. The single issue for our review is whether the trial court erred by not suppressing Turner's statement to the police and the victim's gun, which was discovered as a result of his statement. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Appellant's statement was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Moreover, we conclude that the stolen weapon is also inadmissible unless, upon remand, the State can show either that the police had an independent, untainted source for the information leading to the gun or that the gun would have been inevitably discovered through routine police investigation. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kelvin Hobson, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to concurrent ten-year sentences. The defendant appeals his convictions, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the state to cross-examine him about prior bad acts; (3) the trial court improperly allowed state witnesses to give rebuttal testimony about his prior bad acts and his character for truthfulness; (4) the trial court improperly refused to give a curative instruction after the state shifted the burden of proof during closing argument; and (5) the trial court should have granted his new trial motion because the jury foreman mistakenly told other jurors during deliberations that the defendant would serve only probation for his aggravated sexual battery convictions. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing state witnesses to testify on rebuttal about the defendant's prior bad acts and his character for truthfulness. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.