APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant pled guilty to forgery and agreed to a sentence of eighteen months, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied her request for alternative sentencing based on her lack of potential for rehabilitation and her lack of honesty at the sentencing hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was charged with driving on a revoked license and misdemeanor evading arrest. The jury found him not guilty of driving on a revoked license and guilty of evading arrest. The defendant contends on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse of her seventeen-month-old daughter. The defendant contends on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and the trial court erred in allowing testimony by Dr. Lazar concerning the effects of acetone. We conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the conviction, and any error in admitting the testimony of Dr. Lazar concerning the effects of acetone was harmless. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Timothy Wakefield, pled guilty to DUI, fourth offense, and was sentenced to two years in confinement, suspended after service of 150 days. The Defendant was placed on community corrections. A petition for the revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence was subsequently filed and granted. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant full credit for the time that the Defendant had served in the community corrections program. We conclude that the trial court erred and remand to the trial court to modify its judgment to reflect ninety-eight days of credit for time served.

A Hardin County jury convicted the appellant of four counts of aggravated assault and one count of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective twelve-year sentence. In this appeal, the appellant argues: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions and sentences for aggravated assault. However, because felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, the jury was improperly instructed on that offense. Accordingly, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for felony reckless endangerment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Insured, Plaintiff/Appellant, filed suit under a policy of commercial insurance alleging a loss by theft that was covered by the policy. Defendant/Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) Motion to Dismiss based upon expiration of the two year period in which suit could be brought under the terms of the policy. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and we affirm the action of the chancellor.

Capital defendant Detrick Cole appeals as of right his sentence of death resulting from the October 2000 murder of Santeife Thomas. A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of premeditated first degree murder. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, i.e., the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more violent felony offenses; determined that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances; and imposed a sentence of death. The defendant now appeals, presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support premeditated first degree murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in permitting the state to introduce a photograph of the victim while he was alive; (3) whether the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of post-mortem photographs of the victim; (4) whether the fingerprinting of the defendant in the presence of the jury at the penalty phase was constitutional error; (5) whether the trial court erroneously prohibited the defendant from introducing hearsay evidence during the penalty phase; (6) whether the trial court's instructions to the jury as to the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance were contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona; (7) whether there is a reasonable probability that the instruction on victim impact evidence coerced the death sentence from the jury; (8) whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more violent felony offenses; (9) whether the jury verdict form was clear as to whether the jury found the aggravating circumstance relied upon by the state; (10) whether the Tennessee death penalty statutory scheme is constitutional; and (11) whether the sentence of death imposed in this case is disproportionate. Upon review, we question, but need not determine, whether the trial court in the penalty phase had the authority under Apprendi and Ring to find the defendant's prior felony convictions were crimes of violence and to instruct the jury that these prior convictions were crimes of violence; however, we conclude that if there were error, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we discern no error of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's conviction for first degree murder and the jury's imposition of the sentence of death.

Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Obion County, Defendant, Richard Dilling, was convicted of misdemeanor reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days, with all but 30 days to be suspended. He now appeals, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jasper Turner, was convicted of identity theft, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to twelve years incarceration as a career offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him, and contends that it was plain error for the trial court to allow the State to refer to the victim being attacked at the time the victim’s wallet and credit cards were taken. After a thorough review of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Calvin Reginald Edwards, entered a plea of guilt to simple possession of marijuana, explicitly reserving a certified question of law challenging the legality of an investigatory stop. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). Because the stop was based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion, the judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Carolyn Diane Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In addition to a challenge of the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the petitioner alleges that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

This case involves the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-1425, which governs occupancy taxes on hotels and motels. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the lower court found the statute constitutional. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the finding of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and felony evading arrest. The trial court ordered the sentences for the offenses committed in Loudon County to be served consecutively to a sentence for robbery in Knox County. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentencing because the defendant was on probation when the current offenses were committed. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellant, Reginald D. Hughes, was convicted by a Williamson County jury of felony evading arrest and misdemeanor possession of cocaine. As a result of these convictions, Hughes was sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. The single issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Teresa Gail Presson, appeals from the Dickson County Circuit Court's order revoking her probation that she received upon her guilty plea to theft of property valued more than $10,000 but less than $60,000. The defendant contends that although she violated her probation, the trial court erred by ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Anderson Peek, of four counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, three counts of rape, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of robbery, and three counts of aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ninety-nine years in prison. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the trial court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The Appellant, Frank Crittenden, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Crittenden pled guilty to eight counts of aggravated rape and, following a sentencing hearing, received an effective one-hundred-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the single issue presented for our review is whether Crittenden was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.