APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Blount County grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of simple possession or casual exchange of Lorazepam, a schedule IV controlled substance, and on one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver an E felony amount of marijuana, a schedule VI controlled substance. After unsuccessfully seeking suppression of the items seized in the search involved in this case, the defendant waived his right to a trial by jury. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty as charged. The trial court later sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the simple possession offense and eighteen months for the possession with intent to sell or deliver offense. Though otherwise placed on supervised probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve sixteen days of these sentences on eight consecutive weekends. The defendant subsequently filed a new trial motion alleging that the trial court erred in not suppressing the aforementioned evidence and that the proof is insufficient to support the E felony conviction. The trial court denied this motion, and the defendant appeals the denial to this Court raising the same issues. After a review of the record and relevant authorities, we find that the defendant's suppression claim has merit though the sufficiency allegation does not. Because of our finding regarding the suppression matter, we must reverse and remand the defendant's convictions.

A Williamson County jury convicted the defendant, Brigitte Pauli, of three counts of theft of property over $60,000, one count of theft of property over $1,000, and one count of forgery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years and ordered the defendant to pay $4,458,203 as restitution. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in prohibiting the defendant from questioning a witness regarding an alleged prior bad act by another witness; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the values and costs of producing various products; (4) the state made an untimely and improper election of offenses; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the state to present the testimony of a rebuttal witness; (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; and (7) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon our review, we merge the three counts of theft over $60,000 into one conviction and remand for a redetermination of restitution. Otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A building contractor agreed to make certain repairs to a residence and procured a performance bond as required by the Metro Government. To obtain the bond the contractor was required to execute an indemnity agreement favorably to the bonding company. The homeowner complained of the quality of the contractor's workmanship, and the Codes Department of the Metro. Government determined that certain remedial action should be taken by the contractor in order to achieve compliance with the building code. The contractor declined to do so, insisting that the problems complained of were caused by the homeowner; whereupon, the bonding company engaged another contractor to make the repairs, and filed this action against the initial contractor for indemnification. The Circuit Court ruled in favor of the bonding company. We affirm.

The appellant, Debra Foster, pled guilty to seven counts of attempt to obtain possession of a controlled substance by fraud, Class D felonies. She received an effective sentence of eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dexter Lee Spence, entered a guilty plea to second degree murder. The trial court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the sentence was excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Robin A. Conner, pled guilty to robbery, and the Blount County trial court sentenced her to three years' incarceration as a Range I standard offender. The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Betsy F. Speer, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of driving under the influence. The appellant subsequently acknowledged that she was guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court sentenced the appellant to the mandatory forty-five days in jail, followed by a probationary period of ten months and fourteen days. The trial court also revoked the appellant's driver's license for a period of two years and imposed a seven hundred fifty dollar ($750) fine. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State failed to comply with her Rule 16 motion for discovery. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a boundary line dispute. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants to establish common boundary lines and to recover for timber cut from their land. One of the defendants counterclaimed for damages to his land. The trial court found that the defendants' proposed boundary line was the correct boundary line, but granted the plaintiffs a perpetual easement over the defendants' land. The trial court declined to award the plaintiffs compensation for the cut timber. On appeal, one of the defendants argues that the trial court erred in denying a motion to produce findings of facts, erred in granting a perpetual easement across the defendants' land, and erred in failing to grant the defendants damages. The plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in failing to award them damages and discretionary costs. We reverse the award of a perpetual easement since the record does not indicate that such relief was sought, and affirm the remainder of the trial court's decision.

The petitioner appeals after being denied post-conviction relief. She originally pled guilty to three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and received a forty-five-year sentence. She alleges that her guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered. She further alleges that her trial counsel knew that her co-defendant made exonerating statements, and she would not have pled guilty if she had known of her co-defendant's exonerating statements. After careful review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court's findings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendants appeal the action of the trial court denying a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04
motion seeking to set aside a previous grant of summary judgment. We have determined that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion and therefore affirm the judgment.

The appellant, Jamie H. Jones, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of five counts of forgery and received a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including the sufficiency of the evidence, the correctness of the trial court's rulings, the propriety of the sentences imposed, and the denial of the appellant's motion for new trial. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an insurance case. The mother and the father were covered by an automobile insurance policy that excluded coverage for certain family members who were residents of the same household as the insureds. The mother was pregnant with a viable fetus. She was at fault in an automobile accident in which she and the fetus died. On behalf of the deceased fetus, the father filed a wrongful death action against the mother's estate. On a motion for partial summary judgment, the father sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the insurance company was obligated to provide coverage for the deceased fetus. The trial court found that the insurance policy's family exclusion provision was ambiguous. Consequently, it construed the policy in favor of the father, finding that the fetus was not considered a resident of the father's household and that the insurance company was required to provide coverage for the deceased fetus. After a trial, the father was awarded damages plus prejudgment interest. The insurance company and the administrator ad litem of the mother's estate appeal. The insurance company argues that the fetus was excluded from coverage. The administrator ad litem of the mother's estate asserts that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. We reverse, finding that the fetus was a resident of the mother's household, and consequently a resident of the father's household, and that the insurance company was therefore not obligated to provide coverage for the fetus. The award of prejudgment interest is reversed as well.

Aggrieved that the lower court denied post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner, Jeffrey Whitaker, appeals and claims that his convictions resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary guilty pleas. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this divorce Husband appeals the type and amount of alimony awarded Wife at the end of a twenty-three year marriage. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings and the trial court acted within its discretion in applying relevant legal principles, we affirm.

After a thirty-six year marriage, Wife filed for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, inappropriate marital conduct, and adultery. The trial court granted the divorce to Wife, divided the marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $425 per month. Husband appeals. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's decision, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher Alan White, appeals as of right his conviction by a Blount County Circuit Court jury for aggravated assault and the resulting ten-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument required a mistrial, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.

Came the appellants, THURMAN L. WHITSEY and CHARLIE MAE WHITSEY, by counsel, and the state, by the Attorney General, and this case was heard on the record on appeal from the Criminal Court of Davidson County; and upon consideration thereof, this court is of the opinion that our original judgment entered April 23, 2003, should be vacated; that there is reversible error in the judgments of the trial court relating only to the weapons offense under Count 5; and the case should be remanded for a re-sentencing determination relating to appellant, Charlie Mae Whitsey.

While I concur in the majority’s opinion finding that grounds for termination of Hall’s parental rights as to R.L.H. have been established by clear and convincing evidence, I dissent as to the majority’s conclusion that termination of Hall’s parental rights is in the best interests of the minor child. I recognize that the evidence is certainly not favorable to Hall in some particulars, including the fact that her sole support is derived from social security, that she has no prospects of employment in the near future, her past failure to provide a safe and suitable home for the minor child in the face of abuse, her impaired mental condition, and the fact that Hall had no suitable residence for the child at the time of trial. However, this court must balance this evidence with the situation as it pertains to R.L.H. R.L.H. is a special needs child who has specific learning, speech, and behavioral problems. All reports indicate that R.L.H. is in need of continued counseling and therapy. Under the current arrangement, R.L.H. resides in a therapeutic foster home under the care of trained foster parents. This foster home has served as a stable and supportive environment for the minor child since approximately July 2000.

We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the appellant (father) in this post-divorce case failed to present evidence of a material change of circumstances justifying a change of custody of the parties’ two minor children. The Chancellor granted a change in custody from the appellee (mother) after finding that there was a material change in circumstances that presented a substantial risk of harm to the children. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no material change of circumstances that presented a threat of substantial harm to the children. After reviewing the record and applying our recent decision in Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002), we conclude that a material change of circumstances occurred after the initial custody determination and that the modification of custody was in the best interest of the children. Although the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Kendrick in this case, and therefore applied an incorrect legal standard, we affirm the result reached by the Chancery Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the Chancery Court is reinstated.d.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant brings this appeal and contends the following: (1) The participation of a special prosecutor, hired by the victim's family, is a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights; (2) The trial court erroneously denied defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the driver of the vehicle containing the victim, Fernando Hawkins; (3) The trial court failed to give a curative instruction after Detective Hawkins stated that he obtained a warrant for first degree murder of the defendant; (4) The trial court failed to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of facilitation of second degree murder; and (5) The trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petition to alter Respondent Utility's boundary was sustained by County Executive and Trial Court. On appeal, we vacate and remand with instructions.

The Appellant, Romey Stone, appeals the decision of the Grainger County Circuit Court revoking his placement in the community corrections program and ordering service of his original sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Stone argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on unreliable evidence in revoking his community corrections sentences, and (2) he was denied due process based upon the lack of a "neutral and detached" fact-finder. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In a dispute over corporate ownership and management, the Trial Court awarded Judgment for compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys fees. On appeal, we affirm the compensatory damages and attorney fees award, but reverse punitive damage award.