APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jamie Lou Haneline, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of a police officer regarding a statement made by the Defendant; and (3) whether the trial court erred by enhancing the Defendant’s sentence based upon the offense having been committed to gratify the Defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Steve E. Todd, pled guilty in 1994 to two counts of rape of a child, receiving concurrent twenty-three-year sentences as a Range I offender. He filed a post-conviction petition in 1995 alleging, inter alia, that at the time of his pleas of guilty he had not understood that his sentences would be served without the possibility of parole. Counsel, appointed to represent him, filed an amended petition, which the post-conviction court dismissed following an evidentiary hearing. This court reversed the dismissal and remanded the matter for additional findings to be made. Following the remand, the post-conviction court granted the petition, concluding that the guilty pleas had not been knowing. The State appealed and, following our review, we reverse the order of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for another evidentiary hearing.

The appellant, Bobby Blackmon, appeals from the lower court's denial of his motion to modify and correct an illegal sentence or in the alternative petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Finding no error in the summary dismissal of the appellant's motion or petition, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Brandon Ronald Crabtree, was found guilty of (1) selling marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance in an amount of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds, a Class E felony, and (2) selling a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to two years for each conviction, and the trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. The trial court also determined at the sentencing hearing that Defendant was then (or at that time) on probation for a prior conviction and that Defendant was in violation of that probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered the original sentence of eighteen months to run consecutively to the sentences imposed for the two felony convictions for an effective sentence of five and one-half years. In his appeal, Defendant does not contest his conviction for selling a Schedule VI controlled substance. However, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance. Defendant also challenges the length of his sentences arguing that the trial court failed to follow the principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and failed to properly weigh mitigating and enhancing factors. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance and affirm the trial court's judgments as to Defendant's sentences.

Petitioner, Charles Roy Cole, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Madison County. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William Andrew Dixon, was convicted in 1981 of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and our supreme court determined that his sentence was void, remanding for resentencing and concluding that he should have been sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On remand, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to life with parole, and he appealed the resentencing, arguing that only a jury could impose the sentence. We conclude that the directive of our supreme court was that the punishment should be life with the possibility of parole and that the court could set this punishment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant was indicted for one count of rape of a child and for two counts of child abuse and neglect. A jury convicted the Defendant of all three counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for rape of a child and to four years for each count of child abuse. The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that insufficient evidence was presented to convict him of the charged offenses, (2) that the trial court erred by admitting a note found at the scene and attributing it to the Defendant, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kathryn L. Byrd, was convicted by a jury of one count of theft over $1,000. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. The Defendant now appeals, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence; claiming reversible error because the State was not required to elect the offense for which it was seeking a conviction; and contesting the trial judge's order of consecutive sentencing. We affirm the Defendant's conviction. We reverse the imposition of consecutive sentences and order the Defendant's sentences to run concurrently.

In September 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempted rape, three counts of reckless endangerment, three counts of forgery, and three counts of theft of property. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of nine years, with eleven months and twenty-nine days of confinement followed by eight years of probation. The Petitioner served approximately six months of his sentence in jail and was released on probation. In December 1999, the trial court revoked the Petitioner's probation on seven of the ten felony charges based upon the Petitioner's acquisition of new charges, failure to pay restitution, failure to attend counseling, and violation of curfew. The Petitioner did not appeal the trial court's revocation of his probation. In September 2002, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing, and this appeal ensued. Concluding that the Petitioner has failed to state a proper claim for post-conviction relief and that the post-conviction petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Brandon Charles Cain, was convicted by a jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises two evidentiary issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he gave to law enforcement officers; and (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to show the jury a videotape in which the victim's injuries were depicted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rita Ellis, was convicted upon a jury verdict of theft under the value of five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. She was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, but her sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation. She was fined two hundred and fifty dollars. The Defendant presents two issues for review, which she states as follows: (1) failure of counsel to request recording of proceedings denied right of effective appeal; and (2) appellant denied ability to properly argue that verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery and criminal attempt to commit second degree murder for his role with a codefendant in robbing and shooting the owner of a Memphis jewelry store. He was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of twenty-three years at 100% for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and twelve years at 30% for the attempted second degree murder conviction. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following four issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the victim's identification testimony; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for a special jury instruction; (3) whether the trial court committed plain error in its instruction of the definition of "knowingly"; and (4) whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he raises two issues: whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this direct appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in revoking his probation and requiring him to serve his four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.