| Rodney R. Hardin v. Royal & Sunalliance Insurance
E2001-02622-SC-WCM-CV
We granted the plaintiff's motion for review as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e) (1999 & Supp. 2002) to determine whether a trial court may reconsider an award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999) when an employee resigns and, if so, under what circumstances may the prior award be increased. After receiving a workers' compensation award and returning to his pre-injury employment, Rodney R. Hardin voluntarily resigned. Thereafter, he filed a motion requesting that the trial court reconsider his award. The trial court granted this motion and increased the plaintiff's award by 15%. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel held that, while a trial court may reconsider a previous workers' compensation award when the employee resigns, it may increase the award only if the resignation was reasonably related to the injury. The Panel found that Hardin's resignation was not reasonably related to his injury and, therefore, reversed the trial court's increase of the award. We agree with the Panel's reasoning and its conclusion.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 05/02/03 | |
| Cynthia Ellen Walker v. Advance Transformer Company,
E2001-03074-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Second Injury Fund claims the trial court erred (1) in failing to make specific finding of the extent of the employee's disability attributable to a scheduled member as a percentage of her total disability, and (2) by ordering the Second Injury Fund to pay permanent and total disability benefits to age 65 after the employer paid 6 weeks of benefits for the injury to a scheduled member. We modify in part, reverse in part and remand. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Morgan County Chancery Court is modified in part and reversed in part. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUSTICE, and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Paul G. Summers, E. Blaine Sprouse, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, The Second Injury Fund. Arthur G. Seymour, Robert L. Kahn, Frantz, McConnell & Seymour, LLP, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Advance Transformer Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts Cynthia Ellen Walker injured her left arm on June 27, 2 in the course and scope of her employment with Advance Transformer Company ("Advance"). Ms. Walker had pre- existing work-related and non-work related medical conditions, and the arm injury resulted in her permanent, total disability. Ms. Walker had received a worker's compensation award in 1993 of 2 percent to both arms for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. In 1998, she received a 1.85 permanent partial disability settlement for a 1996 injury to her left shoulder. She had undergone several other surgeries, including two cervical operations and two knee surgeries. Dr. Michael A. McKay treated Ms. Walker for the left arm injury, diagnosed as a fractured distal radius extending into her wrist joint. He assigned a 15 percent medical impairment to the left upper extremity, which translates to nine percent whole body impairment under the AMA Guides. Dr. Rodney Caldwell, Ph.D., a vocational expert, testified that Ms. Walker was already 55-6 percent vocationally disabled when she sustained the June 27, 2 injury. The trial court found that the case was governed by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-28 (a)(1). It found Ms. Walker to be permanently totally disabled and fixed the vocational disability for the injury to the left arm at 3 percent. It ordered the employer, Advance, to pay 3 percent of 2 weeks, or 6 weeks of benefits, for the left arm injury, and the remaining balance of the total disability award to be paid to age 65 by the Second Injury Fund ("Fund"). Standard of Review The standard of review in a worker's compensation case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Smith v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 14 S.W. 3d 739, 742 (Tenn. 2) Issues 1. Did the trial court err in failing to make a determination of the percentage of vocational disability attributable to Ms. Walker's last injury as a percentage of her total disability? 2. Did the trial court err in failing to properly apportion liability for Ms. Walker's permanent total disability? 2
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Frank V. Williams, Chancellor |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/02/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Phillip Howard White, Jr.
M2001-03109-CCA-R3-CD
Defendant, Phillip Howard White, Jr., was indicted on one count of felony murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and not guilty of attempted especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five years. In his appeal, Defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to refrain from sleeping; (3) the trial court erred in not granting Defendant's request for a continuance because of Defendant's physical appearance at trial; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant to twenty-five years. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Originating Judge:Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/02/03 | |
| Larry White v. Federated Mutual Insurance Company
M2002-00621-COA-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff had suffered a 16 percent loss of his left arm and 28 percent loss to his right arm and entered judgment accordingly. The trial court further ordered the defendant to hold the plaintiff harmless for any subrogation claims against him for recovery of medical bills paid by an insurance company under a policy for health care owned by the plaintiff. The defendant says the evidence does not support a finding the plaintiff was injured in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant; the court erred in not finding the last injurious rule should apply; there is no showing the plaintiff suffered any vocational disability to his arms, and that the trial court erred by finding the defendant should hold the plaintiff harmless for any subrogation claims of a health insurance policy for payment made on behalf of the plaintiff for treatment of the carpal tunnel syndrome. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J., joined. Gordon C. Aulgur and David Brett Burrow, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for the appellant, Federated Mutual Insurance Company. Tracy White Moore, Columbia Tennessee, attorney for the appellee, Larry White. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff (employee) was forty-nine years of age at the time of trial. He has a twelfth grade education and completed a three-year apprenticeship as an iron worker. Upon completing this apprenticeship, he received a card certifying him as a journeyman iron worker, which entitled him to perform all aspects of the trade including welding, structural steel, concrete work, fundamental iron, and all aspects of building metal buildings and concrete buildings. The plaintiff testified that at the time of the injury that is the cause of this action, he earned his income as a member of a trade union. At the local union hall, there was a listing of jobs he could perform if qualified and he would go out and perform the work. When he was finished with the job or laid off, he would return to the union hall for more work. This is how he came to work for Tomlin Construction Company, the company insured by the defendant. The plaintiff began working for Tomlin on March 24, 1999. He testified that while working for Tomlin between April 19, 1999, and April 26, 1999, he noticed for the first time that his hands were "going to sleep" and becoming numb and his arms began to hurt. He testified that his hands and arms had never bothered him in this manner before April 19, 1999. On May 6, 1999, while seeing his physician for unrelated treatment to his back, the plaintiff told this doctor, Dr. Darrell Rheinhart, about the problems with his hands. Dr. Rheinhart sent the plaintiff for an EMG (nerve conduction study) which was conducted on May 1, 1999. After the EMG, the plaintiff reported his injury to his supervisor at Tomlin and completed a First Report of Injury. After May 1, the plaintiff did not perform any work with his hands (such as welding or tying rebar,) for Tomlin. The remainder of his work for Tomlin involved light duty work that did not involve his hands. The last day the plaintiff worked for Tomlin was July 3, 1999. After leaving Tomlin, the plaintiff continued to work full-time performing welding work for other companies through his trade union. The plaintiff continued seeing physicians about his hand problems as he continued to work as an iron worker. He testified that during this time, his hand condition got no worse but got no better. At the recommendation of these physicians, the plaintiff had carpal tunnel release surgery performed on his right hand on November 9, 1999, and on his left hand on December 11, 1999, by a Dr. Schmidt in Nashville. The plaintiff testified that these surgeries relieved the numbness and tingling in his hands, but that he lost much of his hand strength as a result of the surgeries. He testified that he believed that thirty to forty percent of jobs that formerly would have been available to him are now not available to him due to the loss of strength in his hands. The work the plaintiff did at Tomlin required extensive use of his hands especially the bending and tying of rebar. Rebar is a rod used to strengthen concrete walls. To tie rebar, the worker must use a large pair of pliers to twist wire onto the bar and to bend or shape the bar. The plaintiff was doing this work for Tomlin from four to six hours a day. In addition to this, the plaintiff used an -2-
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Robert L. Holloway, Judge |
White County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/01/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Harold L. Green
E2000-00616-SC-R11-CD
We granted Harold L. Green's application pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine the duration of the trial court's authority to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. On October 8, 1999, Green pleaded guilty to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant and was, thereafter, sentenced by the Criminal Court of Anderson County. On November 5, 1999, Green filed a motion to withdraw the previously entered guilty plea; the trial court granted the motion. The State appealed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. After granting the State's request for appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. We find that the trial court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion to withdraw the guilty plea continued for thirty days after the plea was entered. Accordingly, we reinstate the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for any further proceedings that may be appropriate.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge James B. Scott, Jr. |
Anderson County | Supreme Court | 05/01/03 | |
| William Williams vs. Marla Barnes-Mason
E2002-01442-COA-R3-CV
Primary residential custody was awarded to mother. Father appealed. We affirm.
Originating Judge:Mindy Norton Seals |
Hamblen County | Court of Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| Jack Parks vs. Chuck Rich
E2002-02014-COA-R3-CV
Jack H. Parks sued Chuck Rich, the owner of an apartment complex. Parks initially complained of a back injury resulting from his jumping off a first floor balcony railing, and irritation to his body caused by a bug spray applied in his apartment unit, both of which incidents occurred at the complex. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals, contending that summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to the bug spray matter and that the trial court erred with respect to certain discovery matters. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Jean A. Stanley |
Washington County | Court of Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| Dept of Children's Srvcs. vs. L.F.
E2002-02209-COA-R3-JV
The trial court terminated the parental rights of L.F. ("Mother") with respect to her minor child, D.F. (DOB: January 28, 1994) ("the child"). Mother appeals, essentially arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's dual findings, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that statutory grounds for termination exist and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Dwight E. Stokes |
Sevier County | Court of Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| In Re: Adoption of Samuel Downey, et.al. vs. Catherine Downey
E2002-01972-COA-R3-CV
The Trial Court approved adoption of three minor children by sister of biological mother. Mother appealed, insisting Georgia Court decree terminating her parental rights to the children was defective. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Originating Judge:W. Frank Brown, III |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| Manny T. Anderson v. State of Tennessee
M2002-00641-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping on September 10, 1998, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years at 35% for each count of aggravated assault and as a Range I, standard offender to eight years at 30% for the aggravated kidnapping charge, with the sentence suspended and the petitioner placed on eight-year probation. As a result of a probation violation, the trial court, on September 14, 2001, revoked probation and amended the judgments so that the sentence to be served for aggravated kidnapping was modified to eight years at 100%. Challenging the amendment, a pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on January 2, 2002, which was denied as being untimely. On appeal, the petitioner argues that, because the one-year statute of limitations began to run at the time of entry of the amended judgment for the kidnapping conviction, his post-conviction petition was timely. We agree and reverse the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| Jewell Winningham v. Findlay Industries,
M2002-02059-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the trial court erred in denying her application for reconsideration pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(2). As discussed below, the panel has concluded that, under the circumstances, the claimant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether she is entitled to an increased award. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated and Case Remanded JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C. J., and BEN H. CANTRELL, SP. J., joined. Sonya Henderson, Thomas, Henderson & Pate, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jewell Winningham Kenneth M. Switzer, Ruth, Howard, Tate & Sowell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Findlay Industries MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. Winningham, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered when a heavy box of materials fell on top of her while she was working for the employer, Findlay Industries. Her alleged injuries included a crushed left hand with lacerated fingers, a fractured left knee and strains to her neck, back and shoulder. At trial, the claimant contended her award of permanent partial disability benefits should exceed two and one-half times her medical impairment rating for the injury because, although she had returned to work at an hourly wage equal to or greater than what she was receiving at the time of the injury, her actual wages were less than before because she was unable to work as many hours. A medical expert estimated her permanent medical impairment to be 18 percent to the whole body, as a result of her injuries. The special judge found the return to work issue "moot" and awarded permanent disability benefits based on 4 percent to the body as a whole, an amount less than two and one-half times the claimant's medical impairment rating. That judgment was filed on May 26, 2. No appeal was taken and the judgment became final. Thereafter, the claimant petitioned the court for reconsideration pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 5-6-241(a)(2) and a "Motion to Clarify" the final judgment. The motion to clarify was argued before a different special judge. At that motion hearing, the court considered the first special judge's testimony that he did not intend to preclude reconsideration by characterizing the return to work issue as moot. Notwithstanding that undisputed testimony, the special judge dismissed the application for reconsideration "based upon the judgment order of May 26, 2." The claimant has appealed. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without any presumption of correctness. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 and 6 specify the post trial motions available to a party who is dissatisfied with a final decision. Motions to clarify are not included. The rules of civil procedure are applicable to actions to recover workers' compensation benefits. Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. 1997). In addition, the courts are not at liberty to issue advisory decisions. We conclude, therefore, that there is no such thing as a motion to clarify. Under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act, the right of an employee who suffers a work-related injury to recover compensation benefits from his employer is governed by the statutes in effect at the time of the injury. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998). Such statutes are part of the contract of employment and the rights and responsibilities of such injured employee and his employer can only be ascertained from a consideration of those statutes as construed by the courts. Hudnall v. S. & W. Constr. Co. of Tenn., Inc., 6 Tenn. App. 743, 451 S.W.2d 858 (1969). The entire workers' compensation system of law is statutory. Vinson v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tenn. 1983). The Act is in the nature of an insurance policy and an action to recover the benefits provided therein is an action on a contract. Woods v. City of LaFollette, 185 Tenn. 655, 661, 27 S.W.2d 572, 574 (1948). It must be interpreted in a manner designed to protect workers and their families from the economic devastation that can follow on-the-job injuries. Nance v. State Ind., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. 2). Where an injured worker is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits to the body as a whole and the pre-injury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was receiving at the time of the injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may receive is two and one-half times the medical impairment rating pursuant to the provisions of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment or the Manual for Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical -2-
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Originating Judge:James L. Weatherford, Senior Judge |
Warren County | Workers Compensation Panel | 04/30/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Danyelle Dewain Parker
M2002-01172-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner, Danyelle Dewain Parker, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Originating Judge:Judge Steve R. Dozier |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| William K. Robison v. State of Tennessee
M2002-01928-CCA-R3-PC
The Appellant, William K. Robison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Hickman County Circuit Court. Robison is currently serving an effective sentence of fifteen years as a result of his guilty pleas to aggravated assault, setting fire to personal property, escape and theft over $10,000. On appeal, Robinson argues the post-conviction court erred in finding that: (1) he received effective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Finding no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Originating Judge:Judge Timothy L. Easter |
Hickman County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| Randall Eugene Best v. State of Tennessee
E2002-00668-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner, Randall Eugene Best, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Originating Judge:Judge Carroll L. Ross |
Monroe County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/30/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Maurice Whitlock
E2002-01388-CCA-R3-CD
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony and received a three-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his three-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to grant the defendant probation or alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Originating Judge:Judge Stephen M. Bevil |
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/29/03 | |
| In Re: Crystal Michelle Moats
E2002-01635-COA-R3-JV
This is a paternity case. Following DNA testing, the parties agreed that Randy L. Garner ("Father") is the biological father of Crystal Michelle Moats (DOB: August 13, 1985) ("the child"). The issues remaining before the trial court were "current support, past due support, and medical payments." Following a bench trial, the court addressed these issues. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court awarded Mother $1,000 as support for the child from her date of birth to the date of filing of the paternity petition, i.e., September 18, 2000. Mother appeals, contending that the trial court erred in setting the amount of retroactive support for the period prior to the filing of the petition. We vacate the trial court's award of $1,000 and remand for further proceedings.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:William T. Denton |
Blount County | Court of Appeals | 04/29/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Dwayne A. Williams
W2002-00829-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to twenty years incarceration. The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Judge Bernie Weinman |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/29/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Cleophis King
W2001-01151-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Judge John P. Colton, Jr. |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/29/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:R. Jerry Beck |
Sullivan County | Supreme Court | 04/29/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. George Mears
M2000-01663-CCA-R3-CD
Following a jury trial, Defendant, George Mears, was found guilty of theft of property of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000, a Class D felony. In his motion for a new trial, Defendant raised one issue, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Defendant contended that his counsel failed to adequately investigate and develop all available defense strategies and failed to adequately prepare for trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial. The trial court concluded that Defendant's counsel should have interviewed two witnesses prior to the day of trial but that Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's delayed interviews. As to all other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court found that Defendant failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Originating Judge:Judge J. S. Daniel |
Cannon County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/29/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:R. Jerry Beck |
Sullivan County | Supreme Court | 04/29/03 | |
| Susan Green v. Leon Moore
M2002-00889-SC-R11-CV
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the thirty (30)-day notice of appeal period, articulated in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) ("Rule 4(a)"), began to run when the appellees filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the final claim between all parties in this action, or when the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all parties in this action had been adjudicated. The Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day period commenced on the date the appellees filed the notice of voluntary dismissal and concluded that the appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the thirty-day notice of appeal period commenced on the date that the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all the parties had been adjudicated. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the intermediate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:Robert E. Lee Davies |
Williamson County | Supreme Court | 04/29/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:R. Jerry Beck |
Sullivan County | Supreme Court | 04/29/03 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Edward Clay and Timothy B. Clay
M2002-01319-CCA-R3-CD
The co-defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to sell "ecstasy," a Schedule I controlled substance. After a sentencing hearing, each received a sentence of eight years to be served in split confinement, with all but eight months on probation. The co-defendants contend that the trial court erred in not granting them full probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Judge Don R. Ash |
Rutherford County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 04/29/03 | |
| In Re: Estate of James H. Williams
M2000-02434-COA-R3-CV
This case began as four separate cases which were consolidated. All four cases arose from the divorce of James Hollister Williams and Kathyrn L. H. Williams, his untimely death, and the probate and distribution of assets in his sizeable estate. The trial court upheld the validity of the divorce by denying Ms. Williams relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, awarded several annuities to Ms. Williams based on her status as the named beneficiary, ordered her to pay the estate taxes resulting from those annuities, and approved part of a claim filed by Ms. Williams against the Estate, but denied part. We affirm the decisions of the trial court upholding the validity of the divorce and awarding the annuities to Ms. Williams, but vacate the order granting the Estate a judgment against Ms. Williams for the estate taxes on the annuities. We also affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the trial court with respect to the claim against the Estate, and hold that the entire claim should have been denied.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Originating Judge:Jeffrey S. Bivins |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 04/28/03 |
