APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jessie Jones, appeals as of right his conviction by a Shelby County jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends (1) that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense and (2) that attempted second degree murder is not an offense in Tennessee. Although we hold that attempted second degree murder is an offense, we reverse the conviction because the failure to instruct on self-defense is plain error. We remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

This second appeal in this dispute involves the trial court's modifications of a special master's report regarding the liabilities of the parties after the dissolution of their partnership. The special master reported that one partner, Mr. Eslinger, owed the other partner, Mr. Parks, $10,051.30. Mr. Parks objected, and the trial court modified the special master's report, awarding Mr. Parks an additional $45,427.04, and ordered that Mr. Eslinger pay the costs of the special master. Mr. Eslinger now appeals the trial court's modifications and award of costs. Because the record does not support the trial court's modifications, we reverse and reinstate the master's findings as amended. We modify the award of the costs of the special master.

The petitioner, Crystal Rena Sturgill, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court's denying her post-conviction relief from her convictions for three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of Class D felony theft. Essentially, she contends (1) that her guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, (2) that due process was violated by the mass sentencing procedure, and (3) that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, state employees, were subjects of a Reduction In Force ("RIF") and appeal the order of the chancery court dismissing their petition for review of the Commissioner of Personnel's decision that their respective positions were correctly resolved in the RIF.

The plaintiff filed this action in the Chancery Court of Houston County seeking to quiet title to a parcel of property located there. The court granted the defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, and imposed sanctions pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. Although the appellant raises legitimate issues as to the grounds cited for dismissing the complaint, we nevertheless affirm, finding that the complaint conclusively shows that the plaintiff has no colorable title to the subject property.

The Defendant was indicted for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and  theft of property valued over $500. The Defendant pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated rape and to aggravated robbery.  Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven years for facilitation of aggravated rape and to eleven years for aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court ordered that the two sentences run concurrently. However, the trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively to prior sentences in Humphreys and Dickson Counties. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Frankie Donald Releford, appeals his effective eight-year sentence of incarceration. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced him to confinement following his guilty pleas to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for resale, a Class B felony; possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony; possession of dihydrocodeinone, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant contests the manner of service of his sentences, contending that the trial court erroneously denied him probation or an alternative sentence. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

After the defendant, Jeremy Rodriques McPhearson, pled guilty to several unrelated offenses, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of eleven years to be served on supervised probation. When the defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and trespass, the state filed a probation violation warrant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Department of Children’s Services filed petition to terminate parental rights of mother of abused, dependent and neglected minor child. Department’s termination petition was based on allegations of abandonment, mother’s failure to substantially comply with a permanency plan, the removal of the child for at least six months with little likelihood that the conditions causing removal would be remedied, and the best interests of the child. Juvenile Court granted petition terminating mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed and Remanded
 

Mortgage Management Inc. (“Mortgage Management”) sued Eller Media Company (“Eller”) claiming ownership of two billboards located on land purchased by Mortgage Management. Mortgage Management filed a motion for partial summary judgment and submitted proof showing it had purchased the land upon which the billboards were located at a foreclosure sale in 1993. Eller responded to the motion for partial summary judgment by claiming it was the owner of the billboards and submitting proof in support of its position. The Trial Court granted Mortgage Management’s motion for partial summary judgment and, after a trial on damages, awarded Mortgage Management a judgment in the amount of $149,721.14. We hold there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to who owns the billboards. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated; Case Remanded
 

The defendant, Byron Looper, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He timely appealed, presenting as issues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of witnesses who would have testified as to his location following the homicide, violating his right to due process; (2) the trial court erred in keeping under seal the psychological records of one of the State's witnesses; and (3) the evidence did not support application of the aggravating factor that the homicide was committed because the victim was a state official. Following our review, we affirm the conviction and the imposition of life without the possibility of parole.

The Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell; reckless driving; two counts of driving with a suspended, cancelled, or revoked license; possession of cocaine; aggravated assault; and felony evading arrest. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years and ordered him to serve his sentence on probation. The Defendant's probation officer subsequently filed a probation violation report, and following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly relied on rebuttal testimony as substantive evidence at the hearing and thus that the court improperly revoked his probation. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm the trial court's decision to revoke probation in this case.

The defendant, Chad Crabtree, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies. The trial court imposed concurrent twenty-five-year sentences. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by denying his access to certain records regarding the victim and the lead investigator; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support one of his convictions; (3) that the trial court was not impartial; (4) that a witness for the state improperly bolstered the credibility of the victim; and (5) that the sentence was excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.