APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Mark A. Griffin, was convicted by a jury in the Anderson County Criminal Court of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant raises several evidentiary questions, contests the jury charge, and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Robert Wayne Herron, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of felony possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, simple possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  In this appeal, Herron contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior drug activity in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support these convictions. After review, we find these contentions are without merit. Although not raised as error, we find Herron’s multiple convictions for simple possession and felony possession, stemming from a single cocaine possession, violate principles of double jeopardy. The misdemeanor cocaine conviction is, therefore, merged with the felony cocaine conviction. We remand for entry of judgments of conviction consistent with this holding. Herron’s convictions for felony possession with intent to deliver and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia are affirmed.

The Defendant, Lester E. Elliott, was convicted by a jury of driving in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. He was sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction for this offense. The Defendant now appeals as of right, arguing that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Allen Dale Cutshaw, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

While serving a sentence in a community corrections program, the defendant was indicted and arrested on two counts of selling and delivering cocaine. His community corrections status was revoked upon proof of the indictment and arrest alone. The defendant claims that proof of an indictment and arrest, standing alone, is insufficient to support a revocation of a community corrections sentence. We agree and reverse the judgment from the trial court.

The appellants, Branden Haney and Lawrence Davis, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; one count of possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Haney as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with the sentence to be suspended and served in a community corrections program. The trial court sentenced Davis as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration, with the sentence to be suspended and served in a community corrections program "after [one] year split confinement in [the] Cocke County Jail." Pursuant to their plea agreements, Haney and Davis reserved the right to appeal certified questions of law challenging the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to six counts of forgery over $1000, a Class D felony, and four counts of forgery, a Class E felony, with the sentences to be set by the trial court. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to the maximum terms of four years for each forgery over $1000 conviction and two years for each forgery conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The trial court denied the defendant's request for full probation or split confinement. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to place its findings on the record and by denying probation or a sentence of split confinement. Based on our review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder and five counts of reckless endangerment. A Davidson County jury found the Defendant guilty of second degree murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder and five counts of reckless endangerment. After merging the Defendant's convictions for second degree murder and felony murder, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to thirty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to the life sentence. The trial court merged the five reckless endangerment convictions and sentenced the Defendant to three years to be served concurrently with the other sentences. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses; (2) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress a photographic lineup; (3) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the Defendant's convictions; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective; and (5) that the trial court improperly assumed that as a matter of law, the sentences in this case must be served consecutively to a prior federal sentence. Concluding that the trial court committed reversible error (the State concedes), by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of premeditated murder, felony murder and attempted first degree murder, we reverse those three convictions and remand Counts 1, 2, and 3 to the trial court for a new trial. We affirm the conviction for reckless endangerment in Count 4 and the three year sentence imposed in that count. We also remand Count 4 for the trial court to determine whether the sentence imposed in Count 4 should be served concurrently with or consecutively to the Defendant's federal sentence.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of theft of property over ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and sentenced to four years and six months in the county workhouse. She contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Supreme Court remanded this case to determine the issue of whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to twelve years for the facilitation of aggravated robbery. The defendant was classified as a Range II offender. Twelve years is outside the range of a Range II offender, Class C felony. We conclude that the sentence is proper in that it does not exceed the range for a Class C felony. Offender classification ranges are non-jurisdictional and may be exceeded. We affirm this sentence.