APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendants, Irvin Lee Franklin and Jerry Lorenze Sandridge, were each convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated robbery. In this direct appeal, both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant Franklin further contends that double jeopardy principles require the reversal and dismissal of one of the convictions. We find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination that each of these Defendants committed an aggravated robbery. However, because the facts and circumstances of this offense support only one conviction for aggravated robbery as to each Defendant, we modify the other aggravated robbery convictions to aggravated assault and remand for resentencing on that offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Grover Donnell Cowart, was originally convicted by a jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery; the jury acquitted the Defendant of additional charges of aggravated rape. On direct appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for retrial the Defendant’s conviction of attempted first degree murder. See State v. Grover Donnell Cowart, No. 03C01-9512-CR-00402, 1999 WL 5174, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 8, 1999). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief with respect to the judgment of especially aggravated robbery, alleging that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Earl Junior Pike, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged that his appointed trial counsel was ineffective for not allowing him to testify at trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirm.

The Appellant, Gary Wallace, seeks review of the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to the Tennessee Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 and the court’s refusal to permit him to reopen his 1994 petition for post-conviction relief. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in both respects.

The appellant, Leslie Darrell Debord, pled guilty in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to two counts theft of property over one thousand dollars ($1000), Class D felonies, and three counts of theft of property over ten thousand dollars ($10,000), Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the appellant's sentence, ordering the appellant to serve 104 days in the Cumberland County Jail on consecutive weekends and the remainder in a community corrections program. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant reserved the right to appeal certified questions of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Demond Gardner, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree, premeditated murder. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously ruled that the state could question him about the significance of his tattoo, (3) the trial court erred in admitting inflammatory and prejudicial photographs of the victim, and (4) the trial court erred in allowing improper and prejudicial argument by the prosecutor. We affirm the trial court=s judgment of conviction.

The appellant, Frankie Lee Woodard, was indicted on October 29, 1999, by the Robertson County Grand Jury on one count of theft of property over $500. The appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now appeals contending that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for theft of property over five hundred dollars and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the value of the stolen item. After a review of the record before this Court we find these issues have no merit and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, as next friend of Francisco Valencia, filed two causes of action against Valencia's employer, the defendant, Freeland and Lemm Construction Company. The first is an action in tort alleging that the employer acted with "substantial certainty" in causing Valencia's death. The other action is a claim for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law. The trial court dismissed the tort claims. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that in the absence of proof that the employer acted with the "actual intent" to injure Valencia, the plaintiff's exclusive remedy lay within the provisions of the workers' compensation statute. We granted review in order to determine whether the judicially-created exception to the exclusive remedy requirement of workers' compensation law, which requires "actual intent," should be broadly interpreted to include an employer's conduct that is "substantially certain" to cause injury or death. Under the exception as currently construed, the plaintiff cannot sustain a tort action against the employer unless he can prove the employer acted with "actual intent." Therefore, in the absence of an allegation of "actual intent," the plaintiff is limited to his workers' compensation remedies. It is this result that the plaintiff urges us to change. We must decline to interpret the exception as the plaintiff urges. Accordingly, the provisions of the workers' compensation statute are the exclusive remedy for employees to obtain relief from employers for injuries occurring in the course and scope of employment, unless "actual intent" to injure has been established.

The defendants, Sandra Kay Webb and Tabitha Nicole Webb, were convicted of forty-seven counts of cruelty to animals and each was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, with incarceration for sixty days and a prohibition from either owning animals for ten years. In addition, the defendants were ordered to pay $39,978.85 in restitution to the Jackson-Madison County Humane Society and to perform fifty hours of community service work, and each defendant was fined a total of $5000. Soon afterwards, the trial court found that each had possessed animals since their convictions and revoked their community corrections sentences. On appeal, the defendants argue that their convictions should be reversed because the search warrant affidavit was defective, as was its execution; the affiant was untruthful in the affidavit; the animal cruelty statute is unconstitutionally vague; animal shelter records, utilized by the State during the trial, were hearsay and should not have been allowed; the evidence was insufficient, failing to prove either that the defendants acted knowingly or intentionally or failed to provide necessary care; the humane society was not entitled to restitution; the defendants should not have been required to serve their sentences in incarceration or prohibited for ten years from possessing animals; their community corrections sentences should not have been revoked; and the court should not have ordered that their dogs be forfeited. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as to forty-seven of the counts, but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to show that the defendants were acquitted of Count 8 and for an evidentiary hearing as to the payment of restitution.

The Defendant was charged with and convicted of burglary. The trial court sentenced him to three years' incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and (2) that the State did not establish a proper chain of custody concerning the stolen property in this case. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that legally sufficient evidence was presented at the Defendant's trial to support his conviction and thus that the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. We also conclude that a proper chain of evidence was established for the recovered property in this case and thus that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the property into evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.