APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following questions from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern Division: (1) Whether the following acknowledgment on a deed of trust is valid under Tennessee law: State of Tennessee County of Bradley

This appeal arises from a complaint filed against the Appellants in the Chancery Court of Williamson County for negligence, breach of contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act relating to the construction of and failure to repair a new home. The Appellants were insured by the Appellee. Following a jury trial, the jury found that the Appellants breached the construction contract. The jury also found that the Appellants were guilty of negligence and engaged in willfully deceptive or unfair actions. The jury returned a verdict against the Appellants for $98,500.00. The Chancery Court of Williamson County doubled the damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and awarded attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $303,248.55. The Appellee paid $48,500.00 in satisfaction of the judgment. The Appellants filed a complaint against the Appellee in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The complaint alleged that the Appellee breached its obligation to pay the balance of the judgment, acted in bad faith by denying coverage to the Appellants, and willfully and knowingly violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Appellee's motion for summary judgment. The Appellants appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Defendant, Arthur R. Simpson, was indicted for the offense of aggravated assault, allegedly committed by causing the victim to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by the use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the trial court charged the jury with aggravated assault, as alleged, and also charged the jury as to lesser-included offenses of felony reckless endangerment and misdemeanor assault. The jury found Defendant guilty of felony reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to serve one year in the workhouse, which was suspended and he was placed on probation. Defendant appeals, with his sole issue being that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of felony reckless endangerment. While we find that the evidence presented would be sufficient to support a conviction for felony reckless endangerment, if that offense had been charged, we hold that under the supreme court's decision of State v. Moore, 77 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2002), felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment. Therefore, the conviction must be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial on the charge of misdemeanor assault.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. He argues trial counsel's failure to investigate and present an alibi defense deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel at his original trial. We find no merit to his argument and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Linnell Richmond, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for his convictions, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence arising out of the same criminal episode. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court upon finding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on: (1) the "natural and probable consequence rule" in relation to the charges of attempted first degree murder; and (2) robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. The State appealed to this Court, and we granted the application. We hold that: (1) it was harmless error by the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule in relation to the charge of attempted first degree murder; and (2) it was likewise harmless error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the defendant's convictions are reinstated. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment.

The defendant, Christopher Shane Mahoney, pled guilty to two counts of money laundering, a Class B felony, and one count of conspiracy to engage in money laundering, a Class C felony, receiving a three-year sentence and two eight-year sentences, and to promoting prostitution, a Class E felony, receiving a two-year sentence. All sentences were to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of eight years. He timely appealed, arguing that he was improperly sentenced, both as to the lengths of the sentences and the trial court's not placing him on probation or community corrections. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Linnell Richmond, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years for his convictions, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence arising out of the same criminal episode. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court upon finding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on: (1) the "natural and probable consequence rule" in relation to the charges of attempted first degree murder; and (2) robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. The State appealed to this Court, and we granted the application. We hold that: (1) it was harmless error by the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule in relation to the charge of attempted first degree murder; and (2) it was likewise harmless error by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery as a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the defendant's convictions are reinstated. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment.

The defendant, Takeita M. Locke, was tried and convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the death of Chuck Newman. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed both convictions. We granted this appeal to determine if the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of felony murder, namely: second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Additionally, with respect to her conviction for especially aggravated robbery, the defendant maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (especially aggravated robbery), aggravated robbery, and robbery. After examining the facts and the law relevant to these issues, we hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide was reversible error. We also hold that the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and robbery was erroneous, but such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated rape, both Class B felonies, and theft, which the trial court merged with the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to fifteen years for aggravated robbery and twenty years for attempted aggravated rape. The sentences were imposed consecutively. The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated robbery because the victim's belief was unreasonable that the defendant was armed; the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of attempted aggravated rape because the victim learned that the defendant was, in fact, unarmed prior to the rape; and his sentence of thirty-five years is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal in a Board of Professional Responsibility case. A hearing committee found that the petitioner violated four disciplinary rules arising out of client representation, imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law, and ordered the petitioner to complete courses in ethics and civil procedure at an accredited law school before applying for reinstatement. The chancery court upheld the hearing committee's findings and conclusions with respect to the violations, but reduced the suspension to 60 days and vacated the requirement for law school education. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the chancery court properly affirmed the hearing committee's findings with regard to the petitioner's violations of the disciplinary rules, but we modify the length of the suspension to four months and the condition for reinstatement by requiring the petitioner to complete six hours of continuing legal education in ethics and twelve hours of continuing legal education in courses related to civil trial practice or civil litigation, in addition to the three hours of ethics and twelve hours of general credit required annually of attorneys in this State. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed as modified.

The defendant, Takeita M. Locke, was tried and convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the death of Chuck Newman. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed both convictions. We granted this appeal to determine if the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of felony murder, namely: second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Additionally, with respect to her conviction for especially aggravated robbery, the defendant maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (especially aggravated robbery), aggravated robbery, and robbery. After examining the facts and the law relevant to these issues, we hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide was reversible error. We also hold that the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and robbery was erroneous, but such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Petitioner was denied habeas corpus relief by the trial court. He now appeals, claiming the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and in failing to appoint counsel to assist him with his habeas corpus claim. We affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Woodson Carter Criner, was convicted in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI) and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be suspended after serving one hundred twenty days in jail and a fine of one thousand one hundred dollars. The state appeals, claiming that the defendant's DUI sentence is illegal because the defendant was convicted of felony DUI. Although we hold that the trial court could sentence the defendant to less than one year for a Class E felony, we remand the case to the trial court to clarify whether the defendant was convicted of felony or misdemeanor DUI, review the defendant's sentence, and reenter the judgment.

The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary and assault. The Defendant received a sentence of six years for the aggravated burglary conviction and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction. The trial court ordered that the six-year sentence for aggravated burglary be served concurrently with the sentence for assault, but consecutively to a sentence for evading arrest from another case. The Defendant's effective sentence in this case is six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence for aggravated burglary and the manner of service of his sentences. Although the trial court misapplied certain enhancement factors, we conclude that the sentences imposed are appropriate and affirm the judgments of the trial court.