APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, John Wesley Johnson, was indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury for one count of desecration of a venerated object, to wit: a place of burial, a class A misdemeanor. He was convicted by a jury, sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, placed on probation, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,574. The appellant, proceeding pro se, filed an untimely notice of appeal. This court, upon motion of the appellant, waived timely filing
of the appeal; accordingly, the appeal is properly before this court. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues: (1) “w[h]ether the trial court reviewed the record”; (2) “w[h]ether the (State) conspira[cy] used their position to withhold facts in order to receive a conviction”; (3) “w[h]ether the public officers used the court to reach their gold”; and  (4) “w[h]ether the trial court erred in its review of the records and facts of law as to this case.” Upon review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely discover the existence of another individual who was questioned regarding the aggravated assault and for failing to interview or cross-examine the victim of the assault. After review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court imposed an agreed sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that she did not enter a voluntary and knowing guilty plea and alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her plea. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Henderson County Circuit Court jury found the defendant, Olivia Washburn, guilty of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, Class B felonies, and assessed two separate $25,000 fines. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, imposed an eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and merged the fines so that the defendant was ordered to pay a total of $25,000. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding both that her statement to law enforcement officers was voluntary and that the evidence against her was sufficient, as well as in allowing into evidence a videotape not produced to the defense. These assignments are without merit. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant's statement without considering whether the probative value of the numerous references to other drug offenses outweighed their prejudicial effect. The judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial.

Originally charged in an indictment with the offense of attempted first degree murder, the Defendant, Genee Hardin Snow, Sr., entered into a negotiated plea agreement wherein he pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence following a sentencing hearing. Additional charges of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and possession of a weapon in a public place were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve nine (9) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Arguing that he should have received the minimum sentence of eight (8) years, and that he should have been ordered to serve the sentence on probation or some other form of alternative sentence, Defendant has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Discount Communications, Inc. purchases telephone services from BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and resells the services at an increased rate to Discount's own residential and commercial customers. Some of Discount's customers qualify for a Federal Communication Commission program called Lifeline, which provides telephone services at a reduced rate through federal and state subsidies. BellSouth and Discount got into a dispute about whether their agreement required BellSouth (1) to provide directory assistance to Discount's customers and (2) to pass the $3.50 per month state subsidy through to Discount. The Tennessee Regulatory Authority decided that the agreement required BellSouth to provide directory assistance at no charge to Discount's customers and that BellSouth was not required to forward the $3.50 monthly charge to Discount. We affirm.

Petitioner, an inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a disciplinary hearing wherein the inmate was found guilty of assault and strong arm activity and received a deduction of one-year in good time and was upgraded to maximum security. The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the custody of Austin Bombard, a minor child, and the termination of George Bombard's parental rights on a finding of abandonment. The trial court dismissed the father's Petition for Custody and granted custody of the child to Jocelyn and Michael Baral, the child's maternal aunt and uncle. Mr. Bombard challenges the termination of his parental rights and the trial court's custody order. We affirm the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights and custody order. Costs of this appeal shall be assessed to the appellant.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as its main issue. Following a hearing, the court denied relief, and the petitioner timely appealed. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the record shows that trial counsel was ineffective and that the post-conviction court showed bias in its ruling and incorrectly limited his proof at the hearing. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Frederick Beauregard, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In May of 1997, Beauregard was convicted of the rape and incest of his thirteen-year-old daughter. He received an effective sentence of nine years for the convictions. Beauregard's convictions and sentences were later affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Beauregard, 32 S.W.3d 681 (Tenn. 2000). On February 13, 2001, Beauregard timely filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief which was amended following appointment of counsel. Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied Beauregard's petition.

From this denial, Beauregard now appeals asserting that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the following respects: (1) trial counsel was inadequately prepared for trial; (2) trial counsel failed to properly investigate, interview or call material witnesses at trial; (3) trial counsel failed to discuss trial strategy or the theory of the case with Beauregard; (4) trial counsel failed to review the jury list with Beauregard; (5) trial counsel failed to develop testimony with regard to the chain of custody of the rape kit and its reliability; and (6) trial counsel failed to provide expert proof to rebut the State's DNA expert. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant of rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to ten years, with 100% of his sentence to be served. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to convict him of rape, in admitting a statement he made to the police, in admitting evidence of the victim's mental capacity, in denying his Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 motion, and in failing to instruct the jury as to assault. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal challenges the dismissal of a defendant. The circuit court granted John Cook's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 motion for involuntary dismissal and found that he did not personally guarantee the debt of Bennett Hill Spring, LLC when he signed the Credit Application as "Operations Manager." Appellant challenges the circuit court's decision to grant the motion which dismissed John Cook as an individual defendant. As discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court granting John Cook's motion for involuntary dismissal. The circuit court was correct that, from a reading of the contract as a whole, it is not apparent that John Cook personally guaranteed payment by signing the Credit Application.

The defendant was convicted by a Lincoln County Circuit Court Jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years, three months in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that the State's peremptory challenge of the only African-American member of the venire was exercised on race-neutral grounds. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffrey Douglas Stratton, pleaded guilty to seven counts of theft involving checks that he had forged. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, the defendant was sentenced to four years on each count, and two of the sentences were to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court was to determine the manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed fully incarcerative sentences to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals this sentencing determination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Gatewood, was indicted for first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder, for which he was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-three years imprisonment. In his appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in not granting a continuance because of a missing witness, in not instructing as to the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide and that his sentence was excessive. Although issues one and three are without merit, we agree that the jury should have been instructed as to the lesser offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

The Trial Court dismissed plaintiff's action, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02, for failure to pay costs which had been assessed as a sanction. On appeal, we affirm, as modified.

The Appellant, Holly Fant, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Gibson County Circuit Court. Fant pled guilty, under an "open" plea agreement, to aggravated assault and, following a hearing, was sentenced to a term of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Fant now appeals, asserting that the trial court failed to comply with the relevant sentencing principles and, therefore, erred in not granting her a non-incarcerative sentence. Because we find that the trial court failed to place on the record discernable enhancing or mitigating factors as is statutorily required, and failed to include findings with regard to the denial of an alternative sentence, the judgment is reversed and this case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was illegal because: (1) he was improperly sentenced as a persistent offender; (2) his sentence was improperly enhanced because he did not receive the State's notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment; (3) the record of his prior criminal convictions relied upon to sentence him was inaccurate; and (4) his counsel was ineffective. The trial court denied the Petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Because the Petitioner has failed to allege grounds that would warrant habeas corpus relief, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jimmy L. Slatton, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and agreed to a six-year sentence. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and imposed incarceration in the Department of Correction. From this determination, the defendant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.