APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 1986, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree murder and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life plus twenty-seven and a half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2000, alleging that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because: (1) count one of the indictment, charging the Petitioner with felony murder, contains no reference to the applicable statute; (2) count two of the indictment, charging him with aggravated rape, fails to state an offense because it omits the required allegation of the appropriate mens rea for aggravated rape; and (3) count one of the indictment is not signed by the district attorney general. The trial court denied the Petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief, finding that the sufficiency of an indictment cannot be properly challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding and finding that the Petitioner failed to establish that the indictment was insufficient. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish a claim for habeas corpus relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 29, 2000, a Davidson County jury convicted the defendant on one count of conspiracy to sell three hundred grams or more of a substance containing cocaine and one count of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. For the conspiracy conviction the trial court sentenced him to thirty-six years as a multiple offender, and for the possession charge the defendant received a sixteen-year sentence also as a multiple offender. In addition, the trial court fined the defendant one hundred thousand dollars on each count. The court then determined that the possession conviction should run consecutively to the conspiracy conviction resulting in an effective sentence of fifty-two years. After unsuccessfully pursuing a motion for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial motion, the defendant brings this appeal raising a variety of issues. More specifically, the defendant alleges 1) that the trial court erred by not granting him a judgment of acquittal on the amended possession count; 2) that the charge of "possession of over 26 grams of cocaine fatally varied with the conviction of possession of over 26 grams of c[o]caine with intent to sell"; 3) that the conspiracy count is void for failing "to allege an overt act in pursuit of the conspiracy"; 4) that the evidence is insufficient to support both convictions; 5) that the trial court erred in failing to provide the lesser-included instruction regarding conspiracy to sell or deliver under three hundred grams of cocaine; 6) that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender; and 7) that the trial court excessively sentenced the defendant as a result of improperly ordering that the sentences arising from this case are to be served consecutively. After considering each of these, we find that none of them merit relief and, therefore, affirm the defendant's convictions.

The defendant, Jason Hamilton, was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and attempted aggravated robbery. The victim was named Thomas Spivey. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to serve life in prison for the merged conviction. For his attempted aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a four-year sentence concurrently with his life sentence. The defendant now appeals those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his self-incriminating statement and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James F. Massengale, who had been charged with eight counts of theft of property valued at greater than $10,000, three counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000, three counts of attempted theft of property with a value greater than $10,000, and one count of burglary of an automobile, was convicted of five counts of theft over $10,000, one count of attempted theft over $10,000, and one count of burglary of a vehicle. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years, with ten years to be served in the Department of Correction and eight years to be served on probation. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The appellant, Wesley Pickett, appeals the verdict of a Shelby County jury finding him guilty of theft of a motor vehicle valued between one thousand and ten thousand dollars and two counts of vandalism causing damage over five hundred dollars. On appeal, Pickett raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After review, we find the evidence sufficient. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, James Dale Walker, pled guilty to aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent sentences of six years and two years, respectively, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the Defendant to serve his effective sentence of six years in the Department of Correction. It is from this order that the Defendant now appeals as of right. We reverse the trial court's order that the Defendant serve his sentences in total confinement and remand to the trial court for consideration of some form of alternative sentence.

The appellant, Norman Matthews, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In March 2000, Matthews pled guilty to burglary of a building and received an eight-year sentence. On appeal, Matthews argues that: (1) it was error for the post-conviction court to allow trial counsel to remain in the courtroom during the evidentiary hearing, despite invocation of "the rule" providing for sequestration of witnesses, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

The petitioner, Jesse E. Rogers, entered "best interest" guilty pleas to five counts of rape of a child. He was sentenced to twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each offense, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of five counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sixteen-year term. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that his counsel at trial was ineffective. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Timothy Wayne Grimes, of possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to eight years in a community corrections program. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offenses of simple possession and casual exchange. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding simple possession of the controlled substance. Although we hold that casual exchange is not a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver, we also conclude that the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the casual exchange inference provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419. We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.