APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellants, Ricky Brandon and Jimmy W. Brandon, were convicted by a Coffee County jury of misdemeanor assault. In this direct appeal of their convictions, the Appellants argue that they received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and, as such, their convictions should be vacated. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

The Shelby County Criminal Court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief filed by the petitioner, Melvin Johnson, as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations. In this appeal, the sole issue before this court is whether the petitioner's allegation that he was housed in a therapeutic community with limited access to legal information tolls the statute of limitations. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Willie Joseph Lagano, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Gregory Key, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury on two counts of aggravated sexual battery. During a hearing on several pretrial motions, defense counsel, Darrell Scarlett, advised the trial court of a joint business venture between himself and Detective Lawson, an investigating officer in the case. The court entered an Order disqualifying Defendant's attorney from further representation, finding that the relationship constituted an appearance of impropriety. Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendant appeals the trial court's disqualification of his attorney and argues that he waived any conflict or appearance of impropriety after full disclosure.

The Defendant, James E. Swiggett, was convicted by a jury in 1992 of first degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. James Swiggett, No. 03C01-9209-CR-00312, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 766 (Knoxville, Nov. 23, 1994), perm. appeal den. (Tenn. 1995). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which petition was denied by the trial court as barred by the statute of limitations. This ruling was affirmed on direct appeal. See James E. Swiggett v. State, No. 03C01-9804-CR-00161, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 422 (Knoxville, May 4, 1999), perm. appeal den. (Tenn. 1999). The Defendant then filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, claiming grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the instant petition on the grounds that a prior petition had already been filed. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Nelson Edward Meeks appeals the sentence imposed for three convictions for third offense driving under the influence, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked license. He claims that the lower court erred in (1) failing to consider the statutory sentencing principles and considerations, and (2) imposing a sentence not authorized by law. Because we disagree in both respects, we affirm.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and for one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. The Defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of aggravated kidnapping and of one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive maximum sentences totaling thirty-seven years. The Defendant now appeals his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors, that the trial court improperly imposed maximum sentences for both convictions, and that the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Although the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement factors, we conclude that it properly considered other enhancement factors which warranted sentencing the Defendant to consecutive maximum terms. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

Antonio M. Miller appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Miller is presently serving an effective nineteen-year sentence for convictions of second-degree murder, six counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of felony drug possession. He claims that two of his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The lower court ruled against the petitioner, and upon review of the record, we affirm that ruling.

The Defendant, Roy L. Denton, was convicted by a jury of DUI and public intoxication. The Defendant now appeals as of right, raising the following issues: whether the trial court should have dismissed the indictment; whether the trial court should have stayed the proceedings; whether the trial court should have suppressed evidence; whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence proffered by the Defendant; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant's conviction of DUI; whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during trial; whether the trial court should have granted the Defendant's motions for mistrial and/or new trial; whether the Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and whether the trial court erred with respect to advising the Defendant about his right to appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William A. Marshall, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation of a two-year sentence for sexual battery. Because we disagree with the trial court's view of whether the defendant satisfied a condition of his probation by "completing" a sexual offender treatment program, we reverse the revocation and dismiss the warrant.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, William Roy Gray, was found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, and resisting arrest, a class B misdemeanor. He received consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and six months, respectively, to be served in jail. However, approximately two months later, the trial court entered an order allowing the Defendant to serve his sentences at home due to the Defendant's poor health. The court revoked this order based on the Defendant failing to comply with the conditions of his release from jail and the Defendant being arrested for theft. Moreover, the court ordered that the Defendant not be given credit for the portion of his sentences that he served at his home. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the order of the trial court denying him credit for the time he served outside of jail serves to increase his sentence and to effectively punish him twice for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant claims it was error for the trial court to sentence him to the Department of Correction for three years, then order one-year split confinement with the balance on Community Corrections. The defendant contends that a one-year split confinement sentence will require him to serve 1.2 months longer in confinement than a three-year sentence at 30% to the Department of Correction. We conclude the sentence imposed did not violate the principles of sentencing and, accordingly, affirm the judgment from the trial court as modified.

The defendant appeals his jury conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. He argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We find this issue is waived because the defendant has failed to include a trial transcript in the record. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.