APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant entered a guilty plea to Class D felony forgery and Class D felony theft for an agreed effective six-year sentence with the issue of alternative sentencing to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, the defendant contests the denial of community corrections. We affirm.

This case arises from commercial property leases. The defendants operated a late night dance club on premises leased from the plaintiff. The plaintiff landlord unilaterally terminated the leases, changed the locks, and filed suit to recover for damage to the premises. While several pretrial motions were pending, the trial court scheduled the final hearing. The trial court found that the defendant tenants had a week-to-week oral lease and that the tenants violated the lease by engaging in illegal activity on the premises. On appeal, the defendant tenants argue that they were not given sufficient notice prior to the final hearing. We affirm, because the record does not show that the issues raised on appeal were presented to the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of Class D felony theft over $1,000 and was sentenced to the community corrections program for an effective period of three years. The trial court subsequently revoked his community corrections sentence and resentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of four years on each count as a Range I standard offender, for an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the proof was insufficient to revoke his community corrections sentence; and (2) the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael O. Brown, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief. In his post-conviction petition, he challenged his 1996 conviction of selling cocaine by alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because the record supports the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm.

I agree with the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with its view of the trial court’s limiting the issues raised by the petitioner. The majority opinion states that the record reflects that the petitioner abandoned issues that were not mentioned at the beginning of the hearing. The majority concludes that the trial court’s request that his attorney define the issues in contention, the attorney’s response, and the state’s objection for lack of notice justified the trial court’s sustaining the state’s objection regarding the Jencks Act issue. I view neither the record nor the trial court’s discretion  to authorize the trial court’s actions regarding this issue.

The petitioner appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder, contending that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; (2) the post-conviction court erred by refusing to admit the affidavit of a deceased potential defense witness into evidence at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing; and (3) the post-conviction court and post-conviction counsel erred by their failure to comply with provisions of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and Supreme Court Rule 28. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

Elizabeth Ann Baker ("Plaintiff") is a school teacher. Plaintiff sued Steve Shepard, the principal of her school, and Sheila Pryor, another teacher. Plaintiff also sued Merrol Hyde, the director of Sumner County Schools, and Jeff Helbig, the school system's assistant director. Plaintiff claimed the four defendants ("Defendants") were liable for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy. In addition to her Answer, Pryor filed a Counter-Complaint against Plaintiff for slander. All four Defendants filed Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) Motions to Dismiss. The Trial Court granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss but did not address Pryor's pending Counter-Complaint. Plaintiff appeals. Because the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment under Tenn. R. App. P. 3, we dismiss and remand.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Shannon Lee Wood, was convicted of the July 4, 1999 aggravated child abuse of his eighteen-month-old stepdaughter, for which he received a 20-year sentence as a violent offender. Now on appeal, the defendant's sole issue is whether the convicting evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. It is, and we affirm.

This appeal arises from two detainer warrants issued on behalf of appellee Gallatin Housing
Authority (hereinafter, "GHA"), in the General Sessions Court for Sumner County against the
appellants, public housing tenants. The cases were consolidated when appellants appealed to the Circuit Court of Sumner County. The Circuit Court entered an order restoring possession of the properties to GHA, finding that the termination of the leases was based on the appellants' theft of cable services, a lease violation that was not eligible for certain grievance procedures that might otherwise be necessary for the termination of a public housing lease. After appealing the Circuit Court's decision, appellants obtained a stay which allowed them to remain in possession of the properties while their case was pending. Shortly thereafter, appellants entered into new leases with GHA. These new leases contained no terms reserving GHA's right to evict appellants in the event that their appeal failed. We find that the new leases extinguished GHA’s right to evict the appellants for their breach of the prior lease. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this cause with instructions to vacate its order restoring possession to GHA, and to dismiss GHA's cause against the appellants.

This case involves a juvenile's appeal from an adjudication of delinquency. The jury found that the juvenile was guilty of disorderly conduct as a result of his actions at the Tipton County School Board building. The jury also found the juvenile guilty of assault and resisting arrest due to his actions in the Juvenile Court of Tipton County. We affirm the jury's verdict.

The defendant, Gregory W. Gurley, pursues an appeal of a certified question of law in the wake of his guilty plea and resulting conviction of second-offense driving under the influence (DUI). In his reservation of a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of an intoximeter test; he posits that the test results are inadmissible because the officer who administered the test failed to comply with the "20-minute" requirement for breath-alcohol testing that was established in State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). Because the record supports the trial court's denial of the suppression motion, we affirm.

The trial court placed the defendant on probation for eight years. As a condition of probation, the defendant was required to complete a one-year drug rehabilitation program. When the defendant violated his probation by failing to complete the program and failing to report to his probation officer upon his discharge from the program, the State filed a probation violation report with the court. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Lavaya Demond Lee, appeals from his jury convictions of premeditated first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery in the Hamilton County Criminal Court. He received a life sentence for the merged murder conviction and a consecutive 20-year sentence for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he complains of evidentiary errors, jury-instruction errors, and error in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the convictions; however, we vacate the order imposing consecutive sentencing and impose the 20-year sentence to run concurrently with the life sentence.

The defendant, Robert S. Clark, was convicted of two counts of robbery. The trial court imposed concurrent four-year sentences. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts that there was prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and that the trial court erred by excluding certain expert testimony. Because there is no reversible error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, John L. Goodwin, III, was convicted of attempted rape and aggravated burglary. State v. John L. Goodwin, III, No. 01-C01-9108-CR-00242, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 859, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Nov. 12, 1992). The petitioner decided to waive his right to a direct appeal of his verdict and filed a post-conviction petition for review. Id. His petition was denied, and on appeal this Court found that the petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal based on erroneous advice of counsel and thus granted him an opportunity to file a motion for new trial and bring a delayed direct appeal. Id. at **3-4. The petitioner filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied, and the petitioner brought a delayed direct appeal before this Court. State v. Goodwin, 909 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). This Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but remanded the petitioner's case for re-sentencing. Id. at 45-46. The petitioner was re-sentenced, and he appealed his new sentence to this Court, as well as the trial court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus. State v. John L. Goodwin, III, No. 01C01-9601-CR-00013, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 679, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 23, 1997). We reviewed his sentence and ultimately found that the trial court properly imposed the petitioner's new sentence. Id. While this Court was reviewing the petitioner's appeal of his new sentence, he filed an "application for coram nobis and/or in the alternative to re-open post-conviction petition." John L. Goodwin, III v. State, No. M2000-0757-CCA-R28-CO, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 19, 1997) (no electronic database citation available). The trial court dismissed this pleading, and we affirmed that ruling. John L. Goodwin, III v. State, No. 01C01-9608-CR-00337 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 19, 1997) (no electronic database citation available). The petitioner then filed a motion to re-open his post-conviction petition, which was ultimately dismissed without a hearing. Id. Thus, we remanded his case for a hearing to determine the merits of what was, essentially, his post-conviction petition. The petitioner now brings the instant appeal of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging: the fairness of his post-conviction hearing; his sentence; his notice of the charges against him; the constitutionality of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(a); the alleged conspiracy between various court officers against him; the effectiveness of his counsel; and the jury instructions. After reviewing the petitioner's claims, we find that they are either waived, previously determined, or without merit.

In the majority’s opinion today, I find much with which to agree. For example, I concur in the majority’s holding that our decision in Wright v.  State, 987 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1999), did not create a per se bar against all later-arising claims alleging suppression of exculpatory evidence. I also agree with the majority that a defendant may bring such a claim, not withstanding the running of the statute of limitations under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, so long as any delay in filing the petition for relief is reasonable under all the circumstances. Finally, I agree that the Middlebrooks error here is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard recognized by this Court in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993). 

However, I write separately to respectfully express my disapproval with the majority’s reliance on Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), as authority for finding that the defendant in this case made a timely filing for post-conviction relief. I was one of two members of this Court who dissented from the decision in Workman, and I regret that it  has been used today as authority to toll the post-conviction statute of limitations for a sixteen-month period.

The defendant, Israel Michua Camacho, appeals his convictions in the Greene County Criminal Court for facilitation of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class C felony, and facilitation of possession of not less than ten pounds nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the facilitation of possession of cocaine conviction and two years for the facilitation of possession of marijuana conviction. The defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that he deserves a new trial because the state failed to provide the defense with a discoverable videotape in a timely manner. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted the fifteen-year-old Defendant, charging him with second degree murder. Following a transfer hearing, the Defendant was tried as an adult. A Hamilton County jury found the Defendant guilty of the indicted charge, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of second degree murder, (2) that the juvenile court erred by transferring the Defendant to be tried as an adult, (3) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statement, (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine two character witnesses for the defense about their knowledge of the Defendant's juvenile record, and (5) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to twenty years in the Department of Correction. Concluding that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant's prior juvenile record during the cross-examination of character witnesses for the Defendant, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

We granted review in this post-conviction capital case to address two issues: (1) whether the
trial court properly ruled that the petitioner’s claim that the prosecution suppressed exculpatory
evidence was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) whether the trial court properly determined that the jury’s reliance on the felony murder aggravating circumstance in imposing a death sentence for the offense of felony murder in violation of article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant appeals denial of Community Corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jenny Bea Huffstetler, pled guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, one count of misdemeanor assault, and one count of theft under $500. For these offenses, the Defendant received an effective sentence of three years as a Range I, standard offender. Her sentence was suspended and she was placed on intensive probation. Following a hearing on allegations that the Defendant had violated the terms of her probation, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve nine months in jail and the balance of her sentence on community corrections. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I fully concur in the majority decision but feel compelled to write separately to respond to the dissent’s characterization of the majority’s decision in State v. Workman, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), as a “hastily considered decision – one brought on by the pressures of extraordinary circumstances – and it cannot be justified as a logical or natural progression of the law.” To the contrary, from even a cursory reading it is clear that the majority decision in Workman resulted from a principled application of established law to the facts of a particular case. The dissent’s claim that the majority opinion in Workman is not founded in logic or prior law is easily dispelled by simply considering the language of the opinion itself, rather than the dissent’s hyperbole. In concluding that consideration of Workman’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis was not foreclosed by the statute of limitations, the majority meticulously applied the due process balancing test outlined in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992), Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). In so holding, we stated as follows: As in Burford, to determine whether due process requires tolling in this case, we must consider the governmental interests involved and the private interests affected by the official action. In this case, as in Burford, the governmental interest in asserting the statute of limitations is the prevention of stale and groundless claims. The private interest involved here is the petitioner’s opportunity to have a hearing on the grounds of newly discovered evidence which may have resulted in a different verdict if heard by the jury at trial. If the procedural time bar is applied, Workman will be put to death without being given any opportunity to have the merits of his claim evaluated by a court of this State.

After a juvenile court transferred the petitioner's case, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the petitioner on one count of first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the petitioner stood convicted of this offense and for this conviction received a life sentence. Thereafter he unsuccessfully sought relief through a direct appeal. See State v. Mario Hawkins, No. 01C01-9701-CR-00014, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 685, at *2, *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 2, 1998). Subsequently, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel. Counsel filed an amended petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After conducting a hearing on this matter, the trial court denied the petitioner the relief requested. Through this appeal the petitioner continues to assert that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate the petitioner's mental health and utilize this information as a defense to the first degree murder charge. However, after reviewing this assertion, we find it to lack merit. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's denial of the post-conviction petition.