APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County deputy jailer saw a plastic bag of 2.5 grams of cocaine fall from the defendant's crotch area as he removed his clothing for a strip search after his arrest for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently convicted of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the introduction of contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony. He argues on appeal that he cannot be convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution when his entrance into the jail was involuntary, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Based on our review of the record and of applicable law, we conclude that a voluntary entrance into a penal institution is not a requirement of the offense, and that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the defendant's convictions in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to the offense of carjacking and was sentenced to 7.2 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal he claims that he was improperly denied probation because the trial judge mistakenly held that individuals convicted of carjacking were statutorily ineligible for probation. We hold that the legislature has allowed individuals convicted of carjacking and sentenced to eight (8) years or less to remain eligible for probation. Moreover, the trial judge also erred in determining that the use of a weapon in a carjacking was, standing alone, sufficient reason to deny the defendant probation. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant for first degree murder, and the State elected to seek the death penalty in this case. Following the guilt phase of the defendant's bifurcated trial, the trial jury convicted him as charged. At the close of the sentencing phase, the trial jury further found that the evidence supported the existence of the alleged aggravating factor but concluded that this factor did not outweigh the mitigating factors. The jury, therefore, sentenced the defendant to serve a life term without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the defendant filed a new trial motion which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in barring him from the courtroom because of his outbursts in the jury's presence; (3) that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after deciding that the defendant could not be present at his trial because of these outbursts; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting three letters written by the defendant; and (5) that the prosecution, in its closing argument, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense by commenting on a witness mentioned by the defense in its opening statement but not called to testify at trial. Upon reviewing these issues, we find that none merit relief and, therefore, affirm the defendant's conviction.

The petitioner, Timothy Roberson, was convicted in 1995 of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, receiving respective sentences, to be served consecutively, of life without parole and fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal of his conviction, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the order denying the petition.

The defendant, Gerald E. Saylor, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years imprisonment. The defendant appeals, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession; (3) the trial court erred in excluding testimony that several hours before the killing the victim had stated to a third party that he was going to kill the defendant; (4) the trial court erred in excluding testimony to rebut the state's inference that the defendant planted weapons on the victim and that the victim had made prior threats to the defendant; (5) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial when the jury heard references to his being "on parole" and "on the run"; and (6) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors to his sentence. Although we conclude that enhancement factor (5) regarding exceptional cruelty should not have been applied, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Joseph Antonio Hough, was convicted of two counts of delivering cocaine and was sentenced as a Range II offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court committed legal error by allowing the appellant to represent himself, and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Lester Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and (2) that the trial judge who presided over the revocation hearing was not impartial. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, John Paul Seals, appeals as of right the Hamblen County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which the court deemed to be filed outside of the statute of limitations. He contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for the appointment of an additional psychological expert in order that he might prove that his mental incompetence tolled the statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.