APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Charles M. Thomas, appeals his conviction for possession of greater than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and the trial court's order requiring his resulting ten-year sentence to be served consecutively to prior sentences. This case presents three issues for our determination: (1) whether evidence against the defendant was the fruit of an illegal detention and search; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred by ordering the defendant's sentence to be served consecutively to his prior sentences. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude there is no reversible error; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Speedy Release Bail Bonds, appeals the order of the Madison County Circuit Court denying its motion for reimbursement of a forfeited bail bond. Following a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner in this post-conviction matter was originally convicted of theft of property over $10,000 in value, a Class C felony, and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment as a Range III persistent offender. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he sought post-conviction relief which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) recommend he accept the state's plea offer, and (2) challenge an erroneous jury instruction on the range of punishment. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel's failure to object to the erroneous range of punishment jury charge at trial and failure to argue the error on direct appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204(a) (1997) must govern any reimbursement of the conditionally forfeited bail bond in this case. As noted by the majority, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201(b) (1997) does prohibit the rendering of a conditional or final judgment of forfeiture, and therefore the entry of and execution on a final judgment of forfeiture, when a surety is unable to surrender a defendant due to the defendant’s incarceration in a jail, workhouse, or penitentiary and the surety furnishes the trial court with an affidavit of the jailer, warden, or other responsible officer. As also noted by the majority, the appellant did not provide the requisite affidavit to the trial court. Of course, the Madison County Sheriff’s Department has since obtained custody of the defendant, and a final judgment of forfeiture has yet to be entered in this case. Still, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201 places no affirmative obligation on the trial court to order reimbursement of money paid pursuant to a bail bond agreement following a defendant’s failure to appear. Cf. Blankenship v. State, 443 S.W.2d 442, 445-446 (Tenn. 1969)(interpreting the different language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-201’s predecessor statute).

The appellant, Jeffrey L. Marcum, appeals his convictions by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of one count of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of incest. In this appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court erred under Tenn. R. Evid. 412 in limiting his cross-examination of the victim concerning her "sexual history and knowledge;" (2) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury's "verdict" of guilt; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempt to commit rape of a child. Following a careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court for the offenses of aggravated sexual battery and incest, but we reverse the judgment for the offense of rape of a child and remand the case for a new trial on that charge.

The defendant was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury on one count of premeditated first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the indicted premeditated first degree murder count and two counts of the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for premeditated first degree murder and two 11-year terms for the two counts of attempted second degree murder, with all sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of life plus 22 years. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) the trial court erroneously refused to charge reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder; and (3) the trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court erroneously failed to charge reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder and remand for a new trial on these two counts. We affirm the conviction and life sentence for premeditated first degree murder.

The defendant, Kenneth Lee Kendrick, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation. We affirm the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I disagree with its implicit conclusion that legislative action regarding pretrial procedure in cases before the courts does not infringe upon the separation of powers doctrine.