APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury found the Defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years, four of which were to be served on probation. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that the trial court failed to properly consider enhancement and mitigating factors during sentencing, and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant judicial diversion. Finding that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals from his McMinn County Criminal Court convictions and sentences for second degree murder and facilitation of attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 years in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender for the second degree murder conviction and to five years incarceration for the facilitation of attempted second degree murder conviction. In this direct appeal, the defendant complains that the evidence is insufficient; that photographs and expert testimony were improperly admitted; that prosecutorial misconduct taints the verdict; that the state improperly questioned the defendant about his post-arrest exercise of his right to remain silent; that the jury instructions regarding intoxication were prejudicially inadequate; and that the sentences imposed are excessive. Unpersuaded by the defendant's assignments of errors, we affirm the trial court's judgment and sentence.

The petitioner, Timothy Rathers, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of possessing less than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver and one count of possessing over .5 gram of cocaine with intent to deliver. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner had not met his burden of demonstrating counsel's ineffectiveness. The petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted the defendants’ application for interlocutory appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 9, to review the trial court’s disqualification of defense counsel based upon conflicting interests in counsel’s representation of all four defendants. Because we conclude that the lower court acted within its discretion in disqualifying counsel from multiple representation, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I violent offender to eight years and one day in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court conducted a post-conviction hearing and denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that his counsel (1) failed to aggressively question the victim regarding consent; (2) failed to object to the admission of expert testimony; (3) failed to aggressively cross-examine the prosecution's expert witness concerning her qualifications and her testimony in chief; (4) failed to prepare or investigate the case; (5) failed to object to "prejudicial witness examination and argument regarding the swapping of" a car battery; (6) failed to discuss defense strategy with the Petitioner; (7) failed to question the Petitioner about his knowledge of the victim's previous sexual behavior; (8) failed to review the transcript from the Petitioner's preliminary hearing; (9) failed to offer evidence of an injury to the Petitioner's hand; (10) failed to argue in closing the weight the jury should give testimony by the State's expert witness and failed to object to the State's definition of reasonable doubt in closing arguments; and (11) "failed to raise all probable issues on appeal." Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's representation was not deficient and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief.

A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of selling a Schedule I controlled substance (heroin), class B felonies. Defendant appeals his convictions claiming insufficient evidence exists to support his convictions, and the admission of the tape-recorded sales transactions was error in that it contained evidence of other bad acts or crimes in violations of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). We affirm.

The petitioner, John H. Frasure, III, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and theft of property valued over ten thousand dollars but less than sixty thousand dollars, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and as a Range I, standard offender to three years for the theft of property conviction, to be served concurrently. The petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney (1) failed to prepare adequately for trial because she did not interview any witnesses for the case and did not hire an investigator to assist with the case; (2) did not subpoena witnesses for a hearing to suppress the petitioner's confession or trial; (3) failed to investigate thoroughly his mental condition; and (4) failed to file a change of venue motion. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The defendant appeals from his convictions of aggravated sexual battery,  sexual battery by an authority figure, and sexual battery. We conclude that  the conviction for Count Two of sexual battery by an authority figure must be reversed and dismissed because stepparents as a matter of law are not included in the statute under which the defendant was indicted. Additionally, evidence of uncharged sex crimes was erroneously admitted and inappropriately argued resulting in undue prejudice to the defendant. The cumulative effect of these errors requires a new trial on Count One and Count Three.

I fully concur in the majority’s opinion with the exception of its conclusion that the sentence in this case is unreasonable in light of the severity of the offenses. In any event, upon remand for a new trial, should the defendant again be convicted pursuant to counts one and three of the indictment, the trial court should be free to consider the imposition of consecutive sentencing in light of any additional evidence presented by the State.

The Appellant, Chad Davis, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to DUI, second offense, and driving on a revoked license. At the sentencing hearing, Davis requested that he be permitted to serve on work release the imposed forty-five day mandatory jail sentence for DUI, second offense, and the consecutive two-day jail sentence for driving on a revoked license. The trial court found Davis was ineligible for work release because he was self-employed. Davis now appeals
this ruling. In response, the State asserts that the trial court was without authority under the provisions of the work release statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-2-128, to grant work release to Davis or any other person convicted of DUI, second offense, prior to expiration of the minimum period of confinement. After review, we find the trial court’s ruling misplaced. Nonetheless, we conclude that Davis was not entitled to “work release,” as only the general sessions court has the authority to grant work release under the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-2-128.

The Appellant, Mario Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole. On appeal, Johnson argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.