APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant appeals his conviction of violating the motor vehicle habitual offender law. Because we find that his motor vehicle offender status was terminated before he was discovered driving a motor vehicle, we conclude that the convicting evidence was insufficient. We reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

In May of 1993, the Appellant, Bobby Vincent Blackmon, was indicted by a Sumner County grand jury for one count of class A felony possession of cocaine over 300 grams stemming from his involvement in a "reverse sting" drug operation. He was subsequently convicted in February of 1995. In 1998, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Blackmon a new trial. See State v. Bobby Vincent Blackmon, 984 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1998).

In November of 1999, Blackmon was re-tried and again convicted of the offense of possession with the intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing on May 17, 2000, the trial court sentenced Blackmon to thirty-eight years as a Range II offender and ordered his sentence be served consecutive to a prior first-degree murder conviction.

On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether Blackmon was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Blackmon to assert an "outrageous government conduct" defense, an entrapment defense and/or an impossibility defense; (3) whether the indictment in this case was fatally defective; and (4) whether the sentence was excessive. After review, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed.

The Defendant, Burita A. Winebarger, was charged in an arrest warrant with the offense of theft of property less than $500.00 in value. She pled guilty to the offense in the General Sessions Court of Sullivan County. The General Sessions Court sentenced her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but thirty days suspended. Defendant filed a timely appeal to the Criminal Court of Sullivan County. On the date that the case was set for "announcement" in criminal court, Defendant was approximately one hour late in arriving at court. The criminal court dismissed the appeal for "failure to prosecute" and remanded the case to the General Sessions Court of Sullivan County for "execution of the sentence." The Defendant filed a timely appeal to this court. After a review of the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the criminal court and remand for a sentencing hearing de novo.

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI"), fourth or subsequent offense, driving while license revoked, and child endangerment. In this appeal, Defendant challenges all convictions on the ground that the trial court's refusal to bifurcate the trial proceedings violated her right to a fair trial. Defendant also argues that recently amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a)(1) is unconstitutional and that her sentence is excessive. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse Defendant's convictions and remand this case for a new trial.

The Appellant, Rita Davis, pled guilty to one count of failure to appear, a class E felony, and was sentenced as a career offender to six years confinement. No direct appeal of her sentence was taken. Davis then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, requesting (1) a delayed direct appeal of her sentence; and (2) that her conviction be vacated upon grounds: (a) that her guilty plea was involuntarily entered based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (b) that her conviction was obtained in violation of "constitutional due process rights."

After review, we find that the post-conviction court's consolidation of issue (1), granting the direct appeal of her sentence, and issue (2), the collateral review of Davis' challenge to her conviction through post-conviction process, conflicts with our previous holding in Gibson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, consistent with Gibson, we reverse and remand issue (2) with instructions that Davis' collateral attack of her conviction be dismissed without prejudice. With respect to issue (1), we grant review of Davis' six-year sentence. After review, we find this issue is without merit and affirm her sentence as imposed.

A Stewart County grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of first degree murder involving Marilyn June Adkins' death. Following a jury trial, he stood convicted of second degree murder. For this offense he received fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender. Thereafter the defendant elected not to file a new trial motion and waived his right to bring a direct appeal. Nevertheless, he later filed a post-conviction petition alleging five grounds for relief. Finding that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in advising the defendant regarding waiving direct appeal, this Court allowed him to file a delayed appeal. See Kenneth Lee Pipkin v. State, No. 01C01-9608-CC-00328, 1997 WL 749441 at *1, 8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 4, 1997.) As no new trial motion had been brought, the defendant was also allowed to file such motion. See id. at *9. Through this motion the defendant unsuccessfully alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He now brings the same issue before this Court. However, after reviewing the matter, we find it to lack merit and affirm the action of the lower court.

The defendant, Pamela Sue King, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury on one count of first degree premeditated murder. She was subsequently convicted by a jury of second degree murder, and was sentenced by the trial court to twenty-three years incarceration at 100% as a violent offender. Following the denial of her motion for a new trial, she filed a timely appeal to this court, raising two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to use a dictionary in its deliberations. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.