APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Javier Soto-Hurtado, appeals from the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner contends that his conviction for sexual battery is void. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, tampering with or fabricating evidence and unlawful possession of a weapon. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence based on accomplice testimony, the issue whether Brian Morrow was in fact an accomplice, the admission of graphic photographs of the decedent, and the actions of the trial judge as thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgment of trial court.

The petitioner, Thomas T. Cummings, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to second degree murder. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent (100%), in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner timely filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his attorney erroneously advised him that he would be required to serve only eighty-five percent (85%) of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole and that his sentence could be reduced an additional fifteen percent (15%) for "good behavior." On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's conclusion that he received effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The majority holds that Mr. Bogan’s ability to provide support has been significantly reduced based solely upon a unilateral, voluntary decision to retire. If Mr. Bogan currently is unable to pay Ms. Bogan the alimony she was awarded at the time of the divorce, it is only because Mr. Bogan became dissatisfied with his job and voluntarily decided to leave. His employment was not terminated or in danger of termination. Mr. Bogan decided to retire despite his existing obligation to his former wife. I therefore cannot agree with the majority’s decision to reduce Ms. Bogan’s alimony and must respectfully dissent.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents. Appellant/mother challenges the juvenile court’s termination of her rights contending the juvenile court erred by allowing in certain documentary evidence, that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that termination was in the child's best interest, the court failed to state affirmatively that termination was in the best interest of the child, and the petition for termination was defective as it did not explicitly state the statutorily mandated language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(d)(3)(C) (Supp. 2000). As discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
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A prison disciplinary board found a minimum security prisoner to be guilty of violation of state law. The prisoner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, claiming that the board had denied him due process. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm.

The sole question in this appeal is whether an obligor’s retirement constitutes a substantial and material change in circumstances so as to permit modification of a spousal support obligation. The trial court held that the obligor’s retirement did constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because the retirement was voluntary and foreseeable, the obligor could not seek modification of the original alimony award. We granted permission to appeal and hold that a bona fide retirement need only be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances to constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances. In so holding, we reject, in the retirement context, the traditional test requiring an involuntary and unforeseeable change in circumstances to modify a support award. We further hold that the retirement in this case was objectively reasonable and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the support award. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s modification of the support award. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Application for Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed

A prisoner who was denied parole filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, challenging, on constitutional grounds, the procedures followed by the Parole Board. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm.

I write separately in this case to address a single issue of paramount significance here: the decision to retire and just how much scrutiny it should receive in the factual context of the case under submission. Assuredly, I concur in the result reached by the majority, which reinstates the trial court’s reduction of Bogan’s support obligation. I disagree, however, with the breadth of the reasoning used to reach that result. In my view, the decision to retire, particularly among workers nearing the ends of their careers, is personal, private, and nearly sacrosanct. Thus, I am compelled to clarify that I would limit the majority analysis to those cases involving obligors who have not yet reached the age for Social Security eligibility, presently age 62. In cases involving obligors who decide to retire after age 62, I would not subject the retirement decision to  analysis embraced by the majority

The Defendant, Michael Hill, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and submitted sentencing for determination by the trial court. Included within the sentencing was a determination by the trial court as to whether or not Defendant's prior convictions for DUI could be used to sentence him as a multiple DUI offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403. The trial court determined that at least two of the prior DUI convictions could be used to sentence Defendant as a multiple third DUI offender. Defendant was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with all but 180 days suspended, and he was fined $3,500.00. On appeal, Defendant argues that all of the prior convictions for DUI were imposed more than ten years prior to his conviction for DUI in this case, and that he should be sentenced as a first offender. We agree, and reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a sentencing hearing as a DUI first offender.

The Petitioner/Appellee, Danny W. Hobbs, filed a petition for post conviction relief in the Criminal Court of Sullivan County. The petition was filed after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted post-conviction relief and the State appeals. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Following Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, this Court granted his application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App.  P. 10 to determine whether a second trial on the matter of guilt for attempted first degree murder, an offense charged in Defendant’s first trial but upon which the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, would violate principles of double jeopardy. After a review of the facts and relevant law, we dismiss the count of the presentment charging attempted first degree murder and remand this case for sentencing on his conviction for aggravated assault.

The defendant, Colico Walls, was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range III sentence of 15 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to identity. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Nicholas J. Johnson, presents for review a certified question of law. Johnson pled guilty to two counts of possession of Schedule I drugs for resale, one count of possession of Schedule IV drugs for resale, and simple possession. Johnson received an effective ten (10)-year Community Corrections sentence, and was ordered to serve one hundred and fifty (150) days, day for day, in the Williamson County Workhouse. As part of his plea, Johnson explicitly reserved, with the consent of the trial court and the State, a certified question of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. After review, we find that the question was not properly certified because it fails to clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Daniel O. Connelly, appeals from his conviction of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) imposed after a bench trial in the Dickson County Circuit Court. He claims on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in overruling a pretrial motion to suppress any evidence that the state garnered following the defendant's warrantless arrest. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the conviction.

The Appellant, Richard W. Herrell, a.k.a. Ricky Herrell, was indicted by a Dickson County Grand Jury for vandalism resulting in personal property damage of $500 to $1,000. Following a bench trial, Herrell was found guilty of the indicted charge and received a two-year suspended sentence. On appeal, Herrell raises one issue for our review: Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

This case involves whether Mike and Bonnie Graves d/b/a/ GRESCO ("Defendants" or "Lessees") breached a commercial lease with Sue S. Plemmons ("Plaintiff" or "Lessor"). The lease was entered into in 1983 and permitted the installation of a billboard on Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff claims Lessees breached the lease when they paid the rent for 1999 late and when they refused to pay an increase from $250 to $1,500 in the annual rent. The Trial Court held that Lessees did not breach the lease and dismissed the case. We affirm.

A state prisoner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of sanctions imposed in prison disciplinary proceedings. He asserts the proceedings denied him due process and that the board's failure to follow Department of Correction policies and procedures constituted an illegality under state law grounds for common law writ of certiorari. We affirm the trial court and hold (1) the sanctions imposed did not trigger due process protections, (2) the alleged failure to follow specific procedures did not amount to failure to follow the essential requirements of the law in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, and (3) there was evidence to support the board's finding.

This appeal involves a dispute between a decedent’s estranged husband and brother over the proceeds of a $12,000 life insurance policy. When he discovered that his deceased wife had removed him as the beneficiary of her policy, the husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to invalidate the change of beneficiary form. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the decedent lacked the capacity to change the beneficiary on her life insurance policy and that the decedent’s brother had procured the change through undue influence. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the decedent’s husband the proceeds of her life insurance policy as well as $350 that his brother-in-law had removed from a joint account using a power of attorney he obtained from the decedent. We have determined that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the decedent lacked capacity to change the beneficiary of her life insurance policy and that the decedent’s husband never asserted an undue influence claim in the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case with directions to award the proceeds of the life insurance policy to the decedent’s brother.

The petitioner, Lucious Allen,¹ pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to four felony offenses and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eight years with the sentence running concurrently to a previously imposed federal sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging involuntary guilty pleas and that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose concurrent sentencing. On appeal, the petitioner disputes the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief without the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case to the post-conviction court for appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves the custody of a child born out of wedlock to a mother who was at all times married to another man. The trial court awarded the mother custody. The father of the child now appeals. We have determined that the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself and properly awarded custody to the mother. Accordingly, we affirm.

In this action to collect the purchase price for the sale of nursery stock, the buyer alleged that the goods did not conform to the contract and that the number of units delivered was significantly short of the number specified in the invoice. The buyer also filed a counterclaim for the damage to its professional reputation resulting from the seller's breach. The Circuit Court of Franklin County resolved all the issues in favor of the seller and rendered judgment for the balance of the purchase price. Because we find that the buyer had accepted the goods and failed to carry his burden of proving that they were defective, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the third effort of the plaintiffs to obtain compensation and other employment benefits from their former employer. The same claims were first filed in Chancery Court against the doctor and his management company, and the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and failure to join an indispensable party. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed suit in Chancery Court against the company which supplied the employee handbook and other services to the doctor. That case was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs then again filed suit against the doctor-employer in Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed the case by converting the doctor-employer's motion for Rule 11 sanctions into a motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata. The plaintiffs now appeal that dismissal to this court. We affirm the trial court's dismissal.