APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant-Appellant, Morris Long, was convicted by a Dickson County jury of first-degree premeditated murder, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-202, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Zachary Pence, was convicted of aggravated rape of a child, aggravated child abuse, and child abuse. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-531, -15-401, -15-402. He was subsequently sentenced to sixty years. Following denial of his direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective based on the following grounds: (1) failing to prepare for trial and to prepare the Petitioner to testify at trial; (2) failing to investigate; and (3) failing to provide the Petitioner with audio recordings until the day prior to trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This Court suspended an attorney from practicing law for six months, with one month on active suspension. The discipline resulted from a report of misconduct received by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility in 2013. In 2018, we reinstated the attorney to the practice of law based on his eligibility for reinstatement and his compliance with the order of discipline. Before being reinstated, the attorney agreed to a monthly payment plan to satisfy the Board’s assessed costs from the disciplinary case. Soon after he was reinstated, the attorney petitioned the Board to revoke the agreed costs. The attorney argued he did not owe the costs because the Board improperly assessed costs under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 in effect when the 2013 disciplinary proceeding was initiated instead of Rule 9 in effect when he was reinstated. A hearing panel found the Board had properly assessed costs based on Rule 9 in effect when the disciplinary proceeding began. The attorney appealed. We affirm. Based on this Court’s Order promulgating revised Rule 9 and our subsequent decisions, the version of Rule 9 that was in effect when the disciplinary case was initiated in 2013 governs the assessment of costs regardless of when this Court reinstated the attorney to the practice of law. Thus, we hold the Board followed the correct procedure in assessing costs. We order the attorney to pay the costs assessed against him within forty-five days of the filing of this opinion. Failure to timely pay the costs may serve as a ground for revocation of the attorney’s reinstatement to practice law.

The defendant, Regina Jackson, appeals her Cheatham County Circuit Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause and by denying her a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

PHI Air Medical brought suit based on unjust enrichment and action on sworn account against Corizon for air ambulance services it provided without a contract after Corizon paid only a portion of the billed amount, citing its practice of paying according to statutory caps and Medicare rates. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the preemption clause of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, which provides that a state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation,” preempts PHI’s claims. We affirm the trial court’s finding that PHI’s claims are preempted and that summary judgment was proper. We reverse the trial court’s grant of PHI’s voluntary nonsuit of a claim that PHI did not plead.

The petitioner, Terrell B. Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on four statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court following the denial of a motion that sought the disqualification of the trial court judge. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

This appeal involves a fraud claim filed against an attorney by his former client. The attorney conceded that the client had been double-billed for some charges and repaid the client for those matters prior to trial. However, the client, now pro se, continued to pursue his claim for fraudulent billing, insisting that fraud extended to the entire invoice. He also claimed that the attorney had charged a higher hourly rate than agreed. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the client failed to demonstrate that the attorney intentionally misrepresented the amounts owed by the client and failed to present sufficient evidence of fraud. As such, the trial court dismissed the claim and granted the attorney’s request for discretionary costs. The client appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Gary Wayne Bunch, pled guilty to two counts of theft under $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years for each offense, and he was placed on supervised probation. Upon finding that the Appellant violated the conditions of his probation, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the ruling of the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur fully with the conclusion reached by the majority that there was evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Defendant’s probation and to order Defendant to serve the balance of his original sentence in incarceration. I write separately to affirm my belief expressed in my concurring opinion in State v. Craig Dagnan, No. M2020- 00152-CCA-R3-CD, 2021WL 289010, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2021), perm. app. filed, that once a determination is made that a defendant has violated the conditions of his or her probation, neither an additional hearing nor any additional findings are statutorily mandated of a trial court to determine the manner in which the original sentence should be served. Thus, there is no opportunity for an abuse of discretion when a “second exercise of discretion” is not required by either sections 40-35-310 or 40-35-311 of Tennessee Code Annotated.

This appeal concerns an administrative judge’s decision to exclude several exhibits in a contested case between a hospital and the TennCare Division of the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration. At issue in the contested case is the validity of two TennCare rules that regulate payment for emergency services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries when the hospital has no contract with the beneficiaries’ managed care provider. The exhibits contain out-of-court statements made by industry representatives and federal agency employees about the meaning and application of federal and state law. TennCare asserts that the exhibits are necessary to show the reasonableness of its decision-making process. The healthcare services provider argues that the exhibits contain irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay. Having determined that the exhibits are not admissible under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm the administrative judge’s ruling.

A Davidson County jury found Defendant, Kenzi Eugene Anderson, guilty on two counts each of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated robbery, for which the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to sever defendants and by imposing an excessive sentence and that the trial court committed plain error by failing to sever his offenses for trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kelly Lee Pitts, was convicted by a jury of seven counts each of attempted first degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective fifty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation; (2) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender criterion; (3) and the trial court erred in imposing Class C felony convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony when he was convicted only of possessing such a firearm, a Class D felony.1 The State concedes that the sentences and judgments for employment of a firearm were in error, and we agree. In all other respects, we affirm. Accordingly, though we affirm the Defendant’s convictions, we vacate and modify certain judgment forms and sentences consistent with this opinion. The case is remanded.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant, Alfred Lee Boykin, III, appeals two certified questions of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his case due to excessive delay in prosecuting the case. Because the defendant failed to establish prejudice flowing from the more than two-year delay in this case, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss. The judgments of the trial court are, therefore, affirmed.

Trenton Jermaine Bell, Defendant, was arrested and charged with first degree premediated murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse in connection with the death of the victim, Sydney Green. A Wilson County jury convicted Defendant as charged on all counts, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to issue a curative instruction when a police detective offered improper lay testimony. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and that he was denied a jury venire comprising a fair cross section of the community. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After their case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs moved for relief from the judgment claiming that the trial judge should have recused herself. The court denied the motion for relief, and this appeal followed. We previously considered the plaintiffs’ claims of the judge’s “appearance of a predispositional bias” in an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. In that appeal, we determined that the plaintiffs had waived their right to challenge the judge’s impartiality. So based on the law of the case, we affirm the denial of plaintiffs’ motion for relief from the judgment.

The appellant, Juanita D., filed a motion to accept late-filed notice of appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

The Defendant, Eli Kea, was convicted by a jury of four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of reckless endangerment of another by discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation. Thereafter, the trial court merged several of the convictions and imposed an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of his vehicle based solely on a general description of the vehicle; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the episode involving four counts of attempted aggravated robbery and four counts of aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach a co-defendant with a prior statement because the jury was unlikely to consider the prior statement only for credibility purposes given the prejudicial nature of the statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

City employees brought action against the city upon its amendment of the pension plan. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. The employees appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant, Nathaniel Shawn Declue, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, driving on revoked license, violation of the vehicle registration law, simple possession of a Schedule VI substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged multiple convictions and imposed an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply a mitigating factor and by failing to consider the economic resources available to state prisons in its decision to impose a twenty-year effective sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Jeffrey Neal Olive, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of second-degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Jesus Baltazar Diaz Ramos, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the petition.

This case examines a trial court’s decision to grant, in part, a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. A Davidson County jury convicted Shalonda Weems of aggravated child neglect and reckless homicide following the death of her six-month-old daughter, Kar’mn. The autopsy investigation determined that Kar’mn’s primary cause of death was malnutrition and dehydration and that the circumstances of her death were neglect. Ms. Weems was adamant in her statements to law enforcement that she fed Kar’mn, and medical records showed Ms. Weems took Kar’mn to all of her regularly scheduled doctors’ appointments. After the jury’s verdict, Ms. Weems filed a motion for judgment of acquittal as to both charges. The trial court granted the motion as to the aggravated child neglect charge but denied the motion as to the reckless homicide charge. The State appealed the trial court’s decision to partially grant the acquittal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found all the necessary elements of the crime of aggravated child neglect, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-402 (2003), beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and vacate the trial court’s decision to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated child neglect charge. As a result, Ms. Weems’ conviction for aggravated child neglect is reinstated. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that three grounds for termination had been established as to the child’s mother: abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 1-102(1)(A)(ii), persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3), and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). The court further determined that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Although we vacate two of the termination grounds due to insufficient findings, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that there is clear and convincing evidence to support its finding of abandonment and its determination that the termination of the mother’s rights is in the child’s best interests.