APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a case for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant prohibiting commercial use of lots in a residentially restricted neighborhood. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs nominal damages in the sum of $500 against one defendant and denied the plaintiffs’ requests for specific equitable performance and injunctive relief and for punitive damages. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Generally at issue in this litigation is the propriety of a foreclosure. The trial court held that summary judgment should be entered in the appellee’s favor due to, among other things, the appellant’s lack of standing. The appellant’s principal brief only raises issues connected to the trial court’s determination on standing, although even these issues have now been disclaimed by the appellant on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Paul Steven Murphy, of rape and incest. The trial court ordered the Appellant to serve concurrent sentences of ten years for the rape conviction and four years for the incest conviction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.  

This is a negligence case that was dismissed in the Tennessee Claims Commission for several articulated reasons, including that Tennessee’s recreational use statute barred the plaintiffs’ claims. For the specific reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

This case involves a pro se complaint to quiet title filed by several plaintiffs challenging a deed that was executed over twenty years ago. This is the second appeal in this matter. After the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed in 2016, only one plaintiff/appellant appealed to this Court. The remaining plaintiffs did not participate in the first appeal. The matter was remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the appellant died at some point. After a second order of dismissal was entered containing the requisite findings, the instant appeal was filed by counsel purportedly on behalf of the original plaintiffs. We conclude that the appeal must be dismissed because the plaintiffs who did not participate in the first appeal are bound by the first order of dismissal, which became final as to them when they did not appeal. Also, the sole appellant from the first appeal has died, and the attorney who filed the notice of appeal has admittedly never communicated with the appellant or anyone acting on behalf of his estate. As such, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

This appeal involves review of a trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. The trial court determined that the Tennessee Public Participation Act was not applicable and denied the motion, finding that the defendant’s activity was not protected. The defendant now appeals, contending that the underlying matter involves the exercise of her right to free speech and her right to petition. We agree and find that the defendant engaged in protected activity in the filing of a Title IX complaint. Because we find that the defendant’s appeal is limited to that part of the trial court’s judgment relating to the allegations in plaintiff’s lawsuit concerning defendant’s Title IX complaint, we reverse in part the trial court’s cited basis for denial and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the Tennessee Public Participation Act. 

Grandparents sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother and a father to their two children on the statutory ground of abandonment. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the children by failure to visit or support them during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare. And the court ruled that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interest. Because Mother proved that her failure to visit was not willful and her support under the circumstances was not “token,” we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare and that termination is in the children’s best interests. So we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.    

This is an appeal of a health care liability case. Although the matters presented for our review were taken under advisement following oral argument, we hereby dismiss the appeal with prejudice pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to the wife. Because the trial court’s final order contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its alimony award under Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the alimony award and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a more detailed order.

In 1997, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Montez Adams, of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated burglary, and theft over $500, and he received an effective life sentence. On appeal, this court vacated the conviction for especially aggravated burglary and ordered the entry of a conviction for aggravated burglary and an accompanying ten-year sentence. State v. Montez Antuan Adams, et. al., No. 02C01-9709-CC-00352, 1998 WL 556174, at *1, 2 n.1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 1998), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 5, 1999). In the following years, the Petitioner litigated post-judgment motions, including a petition for post-conviction relief. It appears that a new judgment form reflecting the Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated burglary rather than especially aggravated burglary was not entered until 2019. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed this instant second petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that the new judgment form reset the statute of limitations with regard to his claims of post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was not timely and that the claims had been either previously determined or waived. We conclude that the delayed entry of the corrected judgment, as mandated by this court in 1998, does not permit the Petitioner to relitigate the post-conviction claims raised in his petition. Accordingly, the dismissal is affirmed.

The Defendant, George H. Person, pled guilty to two counts of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), two counts of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, and a violation of the light law. The Defendant’s sentencing took place after an amendment to the statute that was the basis of his MVHO conviction went into effect, so that the Defendant’s conduct was no longer criminalized and, concomitantly, triggered no penalty. The trial court ruled that the Defendant was entitled to the lesser penalty of the amended statute under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112, and the State appeals. We conclude that the savings statute applies and that the Legislature’s act of removing punishment for the offense constitutes a lesser penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this action for breach of an insurance policy, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company upon finding that, pursuant to an occupancy clause, the insurance policy had become “automatically void” when the plaintiff homeowner had vacated the insured residence and had allowed other individuals to occupy the insured residence without obtaining the insurance company’s written consent. The trial court subsequently certified its summary judgment order as final, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, determining that although the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, the insurance company would be allowed to pursue a counter-complaint it had filed against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this action involving a collision between an automobile and a bull that escaped its enclosure and entered the roadway, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, who had maintained a leasehold interest in the property from which the bull escaped. The trial court determined that no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs had failed to show that the defendant owned the bull in question and because the defendant had terminated the lease before the accident occurred. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Gwendolyn Jumper (“Employee”) filed this action against Kellogg Company (“Employer”), seeking workers’ compensation benefits for an injury to her back. Following a hearing, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

An inmate petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari after the Tennessee Board of Parole denied him parole. The trial court dismissed the petition. In this appeal, the inmate argues that the Board’s action was illegal and arbitrary and that the rules and procedures in place at the time of his crimes should have governed his parole. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Douglas Eugene Horton, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of nineteen counts of various drug related offenses, for which he received a total effective sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering partial consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, and 26; we reverse the judgments of the trial court in Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 31 due to insufficient evidence, and we vacate these convictions; and we remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Stanley Jefferson, of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued at more than $1,000, and he received an effective sentence of fifty-eight years. The sole issue raised on appeal is the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for the aggravated rape conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and we affirm the convictions. We remand for any further proceedings necessary to correct an error in the sentence related to the Defendant’s theft conviction.

We granted this extraordinary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the trial court considered the proper statute, the relevant facts, and the arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude that the application for an extraordinary appeal was improvidently granted. We therefore dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Anthony Lee Carter, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court conviction for driving as a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that after his arrest and before his trial, our legislature amended the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act such that the Defendant was entitled to the benefit of a lesser penalty under our criminal savings statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-112 (savings statute), 55-10-601 (MVHO Act). Following our review, we conclude that when the legislature removed the offense of driving as a MVHO and the associated penalty and replaced it with a mechanism for MVHOs to petition for reinstatement of their driver’s licenses, the legislature enacted a lesser penalty. As a result, the Defendant should benefit from the lesser penalty pursuant to the criminal savings statute.

The Defendant, Riley Christopher Wilburn, was convicted of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, by a Giles County Circuit Court jury. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2020). The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with thirty days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the basis that the indictment was fatally flawed because it alleged two offenses in a single count. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lashawn Shannon, appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority’s opinion that based upon the current status of caselaw, the indictment was not duplicitous and the resulting verdict did not violate the Defendant’s right to a unanimous jury. However, I write separately to emphasize that while the language in the indictment and the resulting verdict were not unconstitutional, the practice employed by the State in drafting the indictment and by the trial court in failing to provide an enhanced unanimity instruction also is not advisable.

Defendant-Appellant, Quinton Devon Perry, entered guilty pleas to eighteen counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and six counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor where the number of exploitive materials exceeded twenty-five, a Class B felony under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-1004(a)(1) and (2).  The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing and imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors and in imposing partial consecutive sentencing.  Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated kidnapping, assault, domestic assault, and interfering with an emergency call, the defendant, Jay W. Edwards, appeals. The defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized following his arrest, the propriety of the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand the case for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the merger of the defendant’s convictions in Counts 4, 5, 6, and 8.