APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Edward Parnell Porter, was convicted of aggravated assault, domestic assault, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the domestic assault conviction and its sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days into the aggravated assault conviction. The court imposed a sentence of eight years and six months as a Range II offender for aggravated assault and eleven months, twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a “federal sentence and any unexpired sentence.” On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issue in this appeal is whether a Tennessee court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a Texas corporate defendant involved in a contractual dispute with a Tennessee company it chose to perform specialized professional services. A Texas oil-drilling company elected to contract with a Tennessee civil engineering company for custom design and consulting services related to the potential construction of a railcar repair facility in Texas. The Tennessee company performed the services primarily out of its principal place of business in Tennessee. When the Texas company failed to pay in full, the Tennessee company filed a civil action in Tennessee for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Texas company moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2). The Williamson County Chancery Court granted the motion, finding (1) that the Texas company lacked the “minimum contacts” necessary for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, and (2) that requiring the Texas company to litigate in Tennessee would be unreasonable and unfair. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying primarily on Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc. v. Chelsea House Publishers, 621 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982). Although we find Nicholstone to be consistent with our opinion today, we base our review on contemporary jurisprudence in this area of the law. We hold that, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Tennessee company established a prima facie case for the valid exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Texas company. Additionally, the exercise of jurisdiction would not be unfair or unreasonable. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support his child. The father stipulated to certain grounds for termination but appeals the trial court’s conclusion that terminating his parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Because the trial court’s findings as to the grounds for termination do not relate to the father’s conduct during the relevant time period prescribed by statute and the trial court’s final order fails to show that the trial court considered the best interests factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand.

This is an appeal from a company’s claim of a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the individual owners of a limited liability company serving as its contractor. In 2017, Cored, LLC entered into a construction contract with Astercor Group, LLC for the construction of two homes in Nashville. A dispute arose as to the specifics of the contract, and a complaint was filed against Cored, LLC, for breach of contract. In response to the complaint against it, Cored, LLC filed its own complaint against the individual owners of Astercor Group, LLC for violating the Contractor’s Licensing Act of 1994 and thus violating the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Although the respective lawsuits were eventually consolidated, this appeal concerns only Cored, LLC’s lawsuit against the individual owners of Astercor Group, LLC. The trial court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit on the basis that the statute of limitations had run due to the company’s failure to properly serve the individual owner defendants. Additionally, the trial court denied the individual owners’ request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court in both respects.

Stephen R. Mayes, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After entering guilty pleas to aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated robbery, the Petitioner, Brian Cameron Frelix, sought and was denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner appeals, asserting that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel when she did not file a motion to suppress a statement he had made to authorities in Williamson County. He also contends that the State violated his right to counsel because the inmate who was housed with him was a State agent who interrogated him without an attorney. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance and that his Sixth Amendment claim has been previously determined. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

In this health care liability action, the surviving daughter of a woman who died as a result of a stroke brought suit as executrix of her mother’s estate and as her next-of-kin against two physicians and their practice group as well as a pharmacist who filled a prescription for her and the pharmacist’s employer. Plaintiff alleged that the death occurred due to a stroke her mother suffered as a result of taking the drug Pradaxa, which had been prescribed by the defendant doctors and filled by the defendant pharmacist and the defendant pharmacy (the “pharmacy defendants”).  The trial court granted summary judgment to the pharmacy defendants on all claims, holding that the proof submitted by Plaintiff was insufficient to establish the element of causation; the court granted summary judgment to the defendant doctors on Plaintiff’s claims that their negligence caused and hastened the decedent’s death, and the claim that the doctors did not have the decedent’s informed consent to administer Pradaxa; the court granted summary judgment to one doctor on all claims; and the court denied summary judgment to one doctor and the practice group on the remaining claims.  Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment to the pharmacy defendants and the doctors; the remaining doctor and practice group appeal the denial of their motions for summary judgment on the remaining claims.  Upon ourde novo review, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the pharmacy defendants; we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Thomas Farmer in toto; we affirm in part the grant of partial summary judgment to the doctors and their group and remand for further proceedings on whether the nurse practitioner’s actions caused Ms. Grimes’ injury and suffering during the period of October 20 until she was stabilized in the hospital, as well as whether the remaining doctor and practice group are liable for that negligence under a respondeat superior theory.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s finding that grounds exist for terminating a mother and father’s parental rights to four children, and its finding that termination is in the children’s best interest. In this appeal, the parents contest only the best-interest determination. They contend termination was not in the children’s best interests because, inter alia, the Department of Children’s Services failed to use “reasonable efforts” to help them make a lasting adjustment to their circumstances. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the grounds of severe abuse and persistent conditions were proven and that termination of the parents’ rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of both the mother and the father’s parental rights.

Attorney Herbert Moncier (“Claimant”) brought this action for prejudgment and/or post-judgment interest on an award of $667,681.80 in attorney’s fees charged by Claimant for legal services rendered to W. Lynn Brakebill (“Decedent”). Claimant also sought an award of attorney’s fees against Decedent’s estate for his pro se legal work done in litigating the issues pertaining to his fees charged as an attorney. The trial court denied prejudgment and post-judgment interest and held that Claimant could not recover attorney’s fees for his time expended representing himself. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that three grounds supported the termination of the father’s rights and also concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. Although we reverse one ground for termination found by the trial court, we affirm the trial court as to the remaining grounds. Further, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s holding that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest

Following a jury trial in 1990, Oscar Smith was sentenced to receive the death penalty in each of three first degree murder convictions in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of death in State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1993). Mr. Smith is scheduled to be executed February 4, 2021. This appeal by Mr. Smith is from the trial court’s summary dismissal of “Oscar Smith’s Omnibus Request for Relief on His Jury Claims,” (hereinafter “Omnibus Request”). After oral arguments and review of the briefs and the appellate record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, and dismiss the appeal in part.

The Defendant, James Edward Knight, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of nine years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement, which the Defendant now challenges. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Johntel Billings, was indicted for one count of aggravated assault (Count 1), one count of attempted aggravated robbery (Count 2), one count of simple assault (Count 3), and one count of vandalism (Count 4). A Madison County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated assault, simple assault, and vandalism. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence with the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support her aggravated assault conviction. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in sentencing her to four years of confinement, rather than probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Tevin Mantez Harris, of first degree premeditated murder and imposed the statutory sentence of life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court improperly permitted the State to refresh a witness’s memory. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Crockett County jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Reed, of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of methamphetamine and introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and argues the trial court erred in admitting the drugs and lab report without a proper showing of the chain of custody. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. In the petition, the Department alleged five grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court found that all five grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother’s parental rights. As a result, the juvenile court granted the petition, and the mother appealed. We affirm the juvenile court’s ruling and remand.

Appellant appeals the denial of her motion under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because Appellant's brief fails to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal.

A minority business owner sued the City of Memphis and two city officials alleging that the City wrongfully terminated his service contract and contracted with two non-minority owned companies for similar services in violation of state and federal law. The trial court ruled that the business owner failed to prove that race was a motivating factor in the City’s decision. On appeal, the business owner contends that the trial court erred in excluding relevant evidence and refusing to grant a mistrial after opening statement. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Nelson Yojeni Ochoa-Puentes, appeals his Dickson County Circuit Court jury conviction of attempted second degree murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his immigration status. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Terry Lin Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s full revocation of probation in November 2019. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it required Defendant to serve his entire sentence because no substantial evidence of a probation violation was presented at the probation revocation hearing. Defendant also argues that the trial court acted too harshly when it required Defendant to serve his entire sentence. After conducting a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial.

The Defendant, Paul N. Galbreath, was convicted after a jury trial of the knowing physical abuse or gross neglect of an impaired adult, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-6-119 (2011). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly neglected or abused the victim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The holder of a promissory note sued the maker. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted the holder a judgment for the outstanding balance of the note plus interest. On appeal, the maker contends that the holder’s claim is barred by the doctrine of laches. If the claim is not barred, the maker argues that he is entitled to a set-off. We agree with the holder that the maker waived his laches argument. And the maker’s set-off claim fails for lack of mutuality. So we affirm.  

Davidson and Shelby counties sued the State of Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program. The trial court found that both counties had standing and that the act was unconstitutional under  paragraph 2 of article XI, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The State and intervening defendants appealed. We affirm