APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Trevor Rochel Cullom, Alias, appeals from the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation. After a review of the record, we determine that Defendant was denied due process during his revocation hearing. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new hearing.

The Defendant, Antonio Toomes, appeals his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in ordering him to proceed pro se at trial on the day before trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; and (3) the prosecutors made improper comments during voir dire and closing arguments. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant implicitly waived or forfeited his right to counsel and in requiring the Defendant to proceed pro se at trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent through wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The trial court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Father appeals. Because there are significant deficiencies in the trial court’s order, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

A pro se plaintiff moved to recuse based on comments made by the judge at a hearing. The motion to recuse was denied, and this accelerated interlocutory appeal followed. Because the plaintiff’s filings are deficient, we affirm the denial of the motion for recusal. 

The Defendant, Terry Wayne Henson, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; one count of incest, a Class C felony; and one count of violation of the sex offender registry, a Class E felony. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirty-five years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his child rape and incest convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove that the alleged offenses occurred during the time frame set out in the indictment and that there was insufficient proof of penetration of either victim. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1995, the Defendant, Eric D. Wallace, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court in case number 95-03054 of first degree felony murder and in case number 95-03055 of attempted first degree murder and was sentenced to consecutive terms of life and fifteen years. The judgment forms reflected over 1,000 days of jail credit awarded in each case. In April 2019, apparently in response to a declaratory judgment action filed by the Defendant against the Department of Correction in the Davidson County Chancery Court, pretrial jail credits that were erroneously included in case number 95-03055 were presumably deleted from the judgment form by notation on the original judgment. The pro se Defendant is now attempting to appeal to this court the trial court’s alleged correction of the judgment in case number 95-03055 to remove the erroneously applied jail credits. In the meantime, the Defendant has an appeal of the decision of the Davidson County Chancery Court in his declaratory judgment action pending before the Court of Appeals. Because the record in this case is wholly inadequate for this court to determine what, if anything occurred in the criminal court, and the Defendant appears to have an appeal pending concerning the same matter in the Court of Appeals, we dismiss this appeal.

The petitioners filed a petition to probate the will of the decedent. The will offered for probate had markings on the provisions concerning the appointment of executors to the will and the payment of the head stone. The petitioners filed an affidavit stating that they had no knowledge concerning who made the markings on the decedent’s will. The Trial Court entered an order denying the petition to probate the will, finding that the markings on the will “negated it from being accepted to Probate” and that the decedent had, therefore, died intestate. The petitioners appealed. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the decedent’s will to be admitted to probate.

The Defendant, Lacy Lyndon Austin, appeals his convictions for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and a felony involving the use of force or violence, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a cell phone and photographs of text messages sent to the phone. Following our review, we affirm.

In this appeal regarding the proceeds of the decedent’s life insurance policy, the Interim Clerk and Master of the Shelby County Chancery Court (“trial court”) issued, pursuant to local rule, a “Notice and Recommendation for Sua Sponte Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution” after no activity concerning the case had occurred for over a year. The notice, which directed the parties to appear before the trial court on September 10, 2019, was not mailed to the defendant. Consequently, the defendant did not appear. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered a scheduling conference, at which the defendant also did not appear. During the scheduling conference, the trial court directed the plaintiffs to submit testimony and other evidence concerning the proceeds of the life insurance policy. Upon the plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment, the trial court entered an order finding, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to appear. The court awarded proceeds of the life insurance policy to the plaintiffs and assessed costs against the defendant. The defendant has appealed. On appeal, the parties have stipulated that the defendant did not receive notice of the hearings. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order of final judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s entry of an order of protection that was entered against him. The appellant’s brief significantly fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. Accordingly, we find that any issues on appeal are waived and we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Eric Bogle, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in (1) failing to introduce photographs of the Petitioner and the minor victim in order to establish a “positive relationship” between them and (2) failing to present evidence that the Petitioner’s prescribed medication had an effect on his confession given to law enforcement. Following our review of the facts and relevant law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is the second appeal in this action, the facts of which date back to the 1995 death of Steven Coffey, the successful owner of a securities business. In 2015, the deceased’s widow sued the deceased’s father, who had served as executor of the estate. Following summary judgment in favor of the executor, the widow appealed and we remanded the matter to the trial court. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled, among other things, that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the widow’s claims were tolled by application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The executor appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Kelvin Dewayne Golden, was convicted after a jury trial of rape of a child, and he received a sentence of thirty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the juvenile court erred in transferring him to criminal court, (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss due to a delay in prosecuting the case, and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a joint trial, a Shelby County jury found the defendants, Larreal Brown and Randall Rowland, guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping (Count 1), aggravated rape (Counts 2, 3, and 4), aggravated robbery (Count 5), and aggravated assault while acting in concert with two or more others (Count 6). The trial court imposed effective sentences of 120 and 71 years in confinement, respectively. On appeal, Defendant Brown asserts the trial court improperly limited his ability to cross-examine Gage Caulk, a co-defendant, regarding Mr. Caulk’s sentencing exposure, and Defendant Rowland argues the trial court erred by excluding prior inconsistent statements made by the victim and contained in a police report. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dyer County jury found the defendant, Amanda E. Jones, guilty of sale of amphetamine, a Schedule II drug. As a result of her conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended to supervised probation after serving 365 days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Nichole Larae Marlow, pled guilty in the Campbell County Criminal Court to possession of contraband in a penal institution, a Class D felony, and received a sevenyear sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that her sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Jude M., the minor child (“the Child”) of Sarah M. (“Mother”) and Andy G. (“Father”). In November 2018, Father and his wife, Jamie G. (“Stepmother”), filed a petition in the Greene County Chancery Court (“trial court”), seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother and allow Stepmother to adopt the Child. The Child previously had been removed from Mother’s custody pursuant to an order entered by the Greene County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) upon a petition for emergency custody filed by Father. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the termination petition upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to visit her during the statutorily determinative period and that conditions leading to the removal of the Child from Mother’s custody persisted. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother has appealed. Having determined that Petitioners failed to demonstrate the threshold requirement of a petition having been filed in the juvenile court that alleged the Child to be a dependent and neglected child, we reverse the trial court’s finding on the ground of persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the Child from Mother’s custody.

Pro se petitioner, Antonio Romero Roberts, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Hamilton County. Upon our review, we affirm.

On September 30, 2019, the Defendant, Adam Lee Loper, pleaded guilty to theft of more than $2,500. The trial court imposed a
three-year sentence of incarceration. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case arising from a divorce, Wife appeals the trial court’s classification as marital property a piece of real estate, which was transferred to Wife during the marriage by her mother, and on which Wife owned and operated a business.  Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. The juvenile court determined that there were three statutory grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights: abandonment by an incarcerated parent, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility. The juvenile court also determined that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in her child’s best interest. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support both the grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a trial court’s dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) based on the affirmative defenses of res judicata and waiver. This is the second action between the parties involving the same real property. In the first action, the plaintiffs sought to enforce an option to purchase property they were leasing from the defendant. While the action was pending, the defendant recorded a document with the Davidson County Register of Deeds that purported to create an ingress-egress easement across the property to an adjoining tract he owned. During the pendency of the first action, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, pursuant to which the defendant agreed to sell the property to the plaintiffs, and the parties released all claims against each other. After the first action was dismissed, the plaintiffs discovered the purported easement, which prompted them to file a motion to set aside the dismissal. Meanwhile, the parties set a deadline for closing, and the defendant prepared a warranty deed that reserved the same easement he previously attempted to create. The plaintiffs insisted that the deed be rewritten without the easement. When the defendant refused, they proceeded with the closing. Shortly after the closing, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the dismissal of the first action. The plaintiffs recorded a Notice of Acceptance of Deed under Protest the day after the deed was recorded and commenced this action three weeks later. The complaint asserted that the defendant clouded the property’s title by filing a defective easement and breached the settlement by delivering a deed that did not describe the property as bargained for. On the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court found the matter had been adjudicated in the first action and that the plaintiffs waived their claims by closing on the property. We have determined that neither the doctrine of res judicata nor the doctrine of waiver applies. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is an action by a construction company to recover on a written stipulated sum contract and an oral cost-plus contract for the construction of a commercial building. The construction company sought to recover for additional work performed that was not included in the scope of the stipulated sum contract and the remaining balance of the cost-plus contract. The building owners contended that the construction company was not entitled to additional payment under the written agreement and counterclaimed for payments the owners made directly to suppliers for work included in the scope of the stipulated sum contract, and for reimbursement of funds expended to correct a defect caused by the construction company. The trial court held that neither the construction company nor the owners were entitled to recover under the stipulated sum contract; that the owners were not entitled to reimbursement because they failed to establish that the construction company caused the defect or, in the alternative, failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to cure; and that the construction company was entitled to judgment for work performed in connection with the cost-plus agreement. We reverse the court’s determination that the owners were not entitled to a credit for certain payments made directly to suppliers, that prejudgment interest commenced on November 10, 2014, when the notice of completion was filed, and that the owners did not provide the construction company with notice and an opportunity to cure. We affirm the trial court’s holding in all other respects.

A residential tenant was injured after slipping on water that accumulated from a leak in the ceiling of her home. Prior to the accident, the tenant notified the owner of the residence and the property manager of the leak. The tenant brought suit for her injuries, alleging a common law negligence claim and a claim for the defendants’ alleged failure to comply with requirements in the Tennessee Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both claims, finding that the tenant had co-extensive knowledge of the dangerous condition, so the defendants were not liable for her injuries. The tenant appeals, primarily arguing that the common law rule on landlord non-liability is displaced by the Act. We affirm and remand.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce motion to terminate transitional alimony. In the parties’ MDA, they agreed the ex-wife would receive transitional alimony for eleven years. In 2013, the ex-husband filed the motion to terminate, alleging that the ex-wife had remarried and was cohabitating with her new spouse and that the new spouse was providing financial support. Several years later, the trial court heard the motion and terminated transitional alimony as of December 31, 2018. In rendering its decision, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s decision and remand with instructions to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.