APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B,
§ 2.01, we affirm the claims commissioner’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

This divorce action concerns the trial court’s division of the marital estate, calculation of child support, and its denial of alimony and attorney fees. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Juan Cerano, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to include records from the Department of Children’s Services with the appellate record on direct appeal of his convictions, which resulted in this court’s being unable to review whether the trial court properly ruled that the records were inadmissible at trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Former CEO brought an action for libel, false light invasion of privacy, and retaliatory discharge pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act. In this appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), we affirm the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Ronald Hudson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that he should be afforded counsel and an evidentiary hearing because his petition was timely. The State agrees there is some evidence that the petition was timely but notes that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was clearly untimely. Because the notice of appeal is untimely and we find nothing that warrants the waiver of the timely notice of appeal requirement, we dismiss the appeal.

This is the second appeal of this case. In Holleman v. Holleman, No. E2018-00451- COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2308066 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2019), this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the sole purpose of determining the amount of Husband’s reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement. On remand, Appellee/Husband provided an attorney affidavit and timesheets to support his request for $11,260.00 in fees. Appellant/Wife provided no evidence to dispute the amount, and the trial court entered judgment for Husband for the full amount. Wife contends that she did not receive proper notice of the hearing on Husband’s motion and further contends that the trial court erred in awarding Husband his attorney’s fees and expenses. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Sevier County Jury found Defendant, Stephanie Brown, guilty of reckless homicide. The trial court imposed a sentence of four years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted testimony about the hydrostatic or float test performed on the baby’s lungs; (2) whether the trial court properly admitted Defendant’s confession and denied her motion to dismiss the indictment; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for reckless homicide; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced Defendant. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court following the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The Defendant, Antywan Eugene Savely, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of the sale of a Schedule II drug, a Class C felony; the delivery of a Schedule II drug, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to sell or deliver a Schedule II drug, a Class D felony. The court merged the delivery conviction into the sale conviction and imposed a twelve-year sentence as a Persistent Offender. The court imposed a consecutive twelve-year sentence as a Career Offender for the conspiracy conviction, for an effective term of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the State could cross-examine him on a twenty-two-year-old felony conviction; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This divorce action concerns the trial court’s setting of the residential schedule and calculation of child support. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on both issues and also deny the competing requests for attorney fees on appeal.

The plaintiff filed this action against his employer for breach of contract by failing to provide the plaintiff with severance pay after the employer terminated the contract without cause. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, determining that it was undisputed that the plaintiff was terminated without cause, which entitled him to severance pay pursuant to the employment contract. On appeal, the defendant argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment by failing to conduct an objective inquiry as to whether cause was present to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves modification of a permanent parenting plan. The father has appealed, arguing that the trial court’s order does not contain a sufficient best interest analysis or the requisite factual findings to support its decision. We have concluded that the order contains sufficient factual findings and the required best interest analysis. The father did not provide a transcript or statement of the evidence presented before the trial court that would enable us to review the evidentiary basis for the trial court’s findings. As such, we must affirm the decision of the juvenile court. We grant Mother’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

The Defendant, Darron Rogers, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession with intent to deliver, Class E felonies; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective term of four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify that she knew him by the nickname of “Weed.” After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tina Nichole Lewis, was charged with one count of second degree murder through the unlawful distribution of fentanyl and amphetamine and one count of delivery of fentanyl and amphetamine. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges on the basis that the indictment was duplicitous because it charged a single count of each offense by listing two Schedule II drugs, fentanyl and amphetamine. The State appeals the dismissal of the homicide charge. We conclude that the indictment, which charged one single offense of homicide, was not duplicitous, and we accordingly reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the charge.

The pro se Petitioner, Christopher H. Martin, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In a sealed indictment, the Defendant-Appellant, Michael Wright, was charged by a Davidson County grand jury with alternative counts of first-degree premeditated murder and murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery of Gregory “Pee Wee” Johnson (counts one and two), and first-degree premeditated murder of Daresha Cole (count three). A petite jury convicted the Defendant as charged of felony murder in count one and first-degree premeditated murder in count three, for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers (ICD); (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to sever offenses; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s social media posts; (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; and (5) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Reynolds, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the Defendant and other individuals were gang members in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (3) exculpatory evidence, namely the victim’s gunshot residue test and a photograph referenced by the gang report, were improperly withheld by the State; (4) the trial court erred by failing to compel the State to produce the above-referenced gunshot residue test and photograph; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient relevant to premeditation and that some of the evidence relative to gangs was improperly admitted. We remand for a new trial on one count of second degree murder, in which some gang evidence shall be excluded.

This appeal concerns a jury verdict in a slip and fall case. Geneva Jessica Day (“Plaintiff”), a resident of Beaver Hollow Apartments (“the Apartments”), sued Beaver Hollow L.P. (“BHLP”), which owned the Apartments, as well as Olympia Management, Inc. (“Olympia”) (“Defendants,” collectively), the entity BHLP contracted with to manage the Apartments, in the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff was injured when she slipped on ice and snow in the Apartments’ parking lot. The jury allocated 49% of the fault to Plaintiff, 50% to Olympia, and 1% to BHLP. Defendants appeal. Defendants argue, among other things, that no material evidence supports the jury’s allocation of fault to BHLP. After a careful review of the record, we find no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict regarding BHLP, which exercised no actual control of the premises whatsoever. The Trial Court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict with respect to BHLP. As we may not reallocate fault, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition without a hearing to determine whether due process dictates the tolling of the statute of limitations. The State concedes that the
post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing to address the Petitioner’s tolling argument. We agree. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations.

Eric Bernard Howard, Movant, filed a pro se “Motion to Correct Judgment Pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1” (the Rule 36.1 Motion). The trial court found that the Rule 36.1 Motion failed to state a colorable claim and summarily denied the Rule 36.1 Motion. We affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jimmy M. Cruse, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Madison County Jail. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Cuben Lagrone, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is an appeal from an order denying the defendants’ motions seeking to compel the parties to participate in mandatory arbitration. The trial court denied the motions to compel arbitration with respect to “the issue of the unconscionability of the precise agreement to arbitrate or delegation to arbitration” and “the issue of cancellation of the purchase agreements,” finding that such issues presented questions for the court rather than an arbitrator. The trial court also determined that the defendants had not waived their right to arbitration. The defendants timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Christopher Bailey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of rape of child and sentenced to twenty-five years at one-hundred percent. Petitioner contends on appeal that the
post-conviction court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to file a pre-trial motion in limine; (2) failing to object when the State asked the victim to testify about other times in which Petitioner forced the victim to perform oral sex; (3) asking the victim’s stepsister about her opinion of Petitioner’s character for truthfulness; (4) asking the victim why she slept downstairs; (5) failing to object when the State asked the victim about counseling and her medication; and (6) failing to argue during the Rule 412 hearing that Petitioner should be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual behavior. Petitioner further argues: that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants post-conviction relief; that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request for funding for an investigator; and that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request to call the prosecutor as a witness at the post-conviction hearing. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Adonis Reynolds, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to two counts of burglary of a vehicle, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, two counts of theft, and one count of evading arrest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The trial court granted the Appellant judicial diversion and placed him on supervised probation for three years. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and his judicial diversion and ordered that he serve his effective three-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and judicial diversion. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.