APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Buford Cornell Williams, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Buford Williams, No. M2017-00507-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 6028876, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2018). Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. The post-conviction court granted relief for the purpose of filing a motion for new trial which would permit an appeal if the motion was denied. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve evidence or exclude evidence from the trial. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy Terell Mays, was convicted on his guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine, a Class C felony, and two counts of delivery of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(2), (3), (c)(2)(A) (2018). The delivery offenses were merged with the sale offenses. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received six-year sentences, to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to a previous sentence, and he reserved a certified question of law regarding mandatory joinder of the present offenses with the offenses from a previous prosecution in which his guilt had already been adjudicated. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, and we remand the case for correction of a clerical error.

The Defendant, George Anthony Vasser, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of selling or delivering cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2018). He received a sentence of eight years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence does not support the Defendant’s conviction for selling or delivering, (2) the evidence only supports a conviction for the lesser included offense of casual exchange of drugs, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joseph A. Colwell, Sr., appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his two convictions of rape and two convictions of incest and resulting effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object to evidence of prior sexual abuse pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), failed to file a motion to question one of the victims about her prior sexual behavior pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, and failed to present evidence from electronic devices that would have been helpful to his case. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. The juvenile court determined that there were five grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support both the grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, James Ruba Hill, Jr., of burglary, theft, and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Appellant as a career offender to a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his burglary conviction and that the theft conviction should be merged into the burglary conviction. Upon review, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain his burglary conviction and remand to the trial court for the theft conviction to be merged into the burglary conviction.

Defendant, Jesus Alfonso Castillo, was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury along with four co-defendants for conspiracy to sell over 300 grams of methamphetamine in a drug free zone. Defendant was also indicted for delivery of over 300 grams of methamphetamine in a drug free zone and possession of over 300 grams of methamphetamine in a drug free zone. The second and third counts and the drug free zone enhancement were dismissed prior to trial. A jury convicted Defendant on the conspiracy count. The trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence to be served in confinement. Defendant filed a motion for new trial that was denied by the trial court. Defendant timely appeals whether the trial court had territorial jurisdiction and whether venue was proper. Defendant further argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A wife filed for divorce after approximately seventeen years of marriage. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The husband appealed, challenging the trial court’s valuation of his separate property interest in a closely held corporation and the division of the marital estate. We have determined that the trial court erred in undervaluing the husband’s separate property interest and modify the valuation to $255,000. Because the trial court failed to allocate all of the marital debt, we vacate the trial court’s division of the marital estate and award of alimony and remand the case for further consideration.

Five years after the parties’ divorce, the father relocated to another state. Both parents moved for modification of the joint parenting plan, seeking to be named primary residential parent. Finding that the father’s move was a material change in circumstances, the court entered a temporary plan that designated the mother as primary residential parent. Before trial, the court sanctioned the father for his complete failure to respond to the mother’s Rule 34 requests. After a trial, the court found that modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The modified plan named the mother the primary residential parent and substantially reduced the father’s parenting time. The court also modified child support retroactive to the date of the mother’s petition and found the father in both civil and criminal contempt. Because the court’s final order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its modification decision, we vacate that part of the court’s order and remand for entry of an order in compliance with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We also vacate the post-trial civil contempt sanctions imposed by the court for the father’s violation of the modified plan. In all other respects, we affirm.

This dependency and neglect action focuses on ten siblings: Josiah, Nehemiah, Jonathan, Hadasah, Nathaniel, Noah, Hope, Malachi, Obadiah, and Grace (“the Children”), whose ages ranged from eighteen years to one year at the time of trial. All of the Children were born during the marriage of Amy H. (“Mother”) and Timothy H. (“Father”). The Children were taken into the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) based on allegations of abuse and neglect by the parents. The Fentress County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) determined that the Children were dependent and neglected, and the parents appealed that ruling to the Fentress County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a de novo trial, the trial court also determined that the Children were dependent and neglected and that the parents had committed severe child abuse. Both Mother and Father have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed this personal injury action seeking compensation for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. The jury found in favor of the defendant and awarded zero damages. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the jury verdict was inadequate and the special verdict form was misleading. We conclude that there is material evidence in the record to support the jury award. And we deem the plaintiff’s second issue waived. So we affirm.

The Petitioner, James Rodney Smith, appeals the Houston County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process requires the tolling of the one-year limitations period. After reviewing the record, we conclude that while the petition was untimely, the Petitioner has alleged facts that would toll the limitations period. As such, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled a late-filed petition for post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Maliq Asadi Muhammad, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of probation for his Range I,
eight-year sentence for possession with the intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2018). The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Novodny Young, appeals after the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his effective eight-year sentence in incarceration. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jose Gonzalez Bonilla, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, and he received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever, that the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of a forensic social worker, that he is entitled to relief from the convictions under the theory of cumulative error, and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to appellate relief, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Michael William Shavers, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of the 10-year effective sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of attempted second degree murder in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Allen Hill, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2018 conviction for possession with the intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine, for which he is serving a twenty-year sentence as a Range II offender. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Petitioner, Quinton A. Cage, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he argues that he was deprived of a fair trial. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal or provide a reason as to why the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived, the appeal is dismissed.

Steve M. Jarman (“defendant”) was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his girlfriend, Shelly Heath (“victim”). At trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant allegedly assaulted the victim two years prior to her death, an act for which he was tried and acquitted. The defendant appealed his conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed based, in part, on the acquitted-act evidence being used at trial. We accepted the State’s appeal to consider two issues: (1) whether the rule announced in State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981), which prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant at a subsequent trial, should be overruled, and (2) if so, whether the trial court properly admitted the acquitted-act evidence as a prior bad act under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review of the case law in this area and the record before us on appeal, we expressly overrule our decision in Holman to the extent that it prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant in a subsequent trial under all circumstances. Additionally, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the acquitted-act evidence, pursuant to Rule 404(b), under the theory that it was relevant to show the defendant’s intent. We also hold that additional errors in admitting threats made by the defendant against the victim or the victim’s sister, not at issue in this appeal, were harmless. For reasons stated herein, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision and reinstate the defendant’s conviction.

The petitioner, Miguel Saenz, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Dwight Michael Alston, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify and for failing to investigate and raise issues regarding the competence of the Petitioner’s son. Additionally, the Petitioner asserts that the postconviction court erred in finding that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues on appeal that were included in the motion for new trial. The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred in not allowing a continuance or bifurcated hearing so that appellate counsel could be present to testify. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted Petitioner, Leonel Lopez, for first degree murder. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. Petitioner received a twenty-year sentence. This Court upheld Petitioner’s conviction on appeal. State v. Lopez, 440 S.W.3d 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and that the trial court made various errors. After two hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bryan James Cooke, challenges his effective sentence of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole resulting from his convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated burglary, and a theft offense. Both the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and his notice of appeal were filed over one year after the entry of the judgment forms, and the Defendant has given no explanation of the untimely filings. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

A father appeals the trial court’s decision terminating his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support both grounds and that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Carlton Smith, of three counts of burglary and one count each of assault and theft. As a result of his convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 12 years’ confinement for each count of burglary and 11 months and 29 days for assault and theft. The trial court merged the three burglary convictions into one count and ordered the defendant’s sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the application of the burglary statute, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and claims his misdemeanor convictions for theft and assault should merge into his conviction for burglary. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we conclude the defendant’s convictions for assault and theft should be merged with his conviction for burglary and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of amended judgments in accordance with this opinion.