APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a post-divorce proceeding for contempt. Wife filed a petition for scire facias and civil contempt, alleging Husband willfully disobeyed the terms of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. The trial court granted Wife’s petition, awarding her one-half of Husband’s retirement bonus, and held Husband in civil contempt. The trial court granted Wife attorney’s fees for enforcing the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. For the reasons stated herein, we agree that Wife is entitled to one-half of Husband’s net retirement bonus, that Husband willfully violated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement and should be held in civil contempt for  this violation, and that Wife should be awarded attorney’s fees for having to enforce the agreement. We therefore affirm the decision of the circuit court.

The defendant, Vintario Tate, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count 3.

Darrell Roby, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. As a result of the convictions, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty-two years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals his convictions. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Based on a prior finding that they had committed severe child abuse against one of their children, the juvenile court concluded that there was a statutory ground to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the abused child, his siblings, and a half-sibling. The court also concluded that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of all the children. Although we agree that there was clear and convincing evidence of a ground to terminate parental rights, we are unable to review the court’s best interest determination due to a lack of factual findings. So we vacate the judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

Marlando Shuntell Sturghill (“Mr. Sturghill”) and Xavier Talik-Rashod Martin (“Mr. Martin”) (jointly “Defendants”) were convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration with release eligibility after service of eighty-five percent of their sentence. In this consolidated appeal, both Defendants claim there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we affirm the Defendants’ judgments of conviction.

For the third time in this Court, Defendant, Roy Rogers, Jr., challenges his convictions for initiating the manufacturer of methamphetamine, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal impersonation, for which he received a total effective sentence of twelve years. See State v. Roy Rogers, Jr., No. W2015-00988-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1045352, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016) (“Rogers I”), no perm. app. filed; Roy Rogers, Jr. v. State, No. W2017-01939-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 6075655, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2018) (“Rogers II”), no perm. app. filed. Defendant appeals after the post-conviction court denied his motion for new trial after remand. Because the post-conviction court failed to follow the directive of this Court on remand after Rogers II, we reverse the judgment of that court and remand the case with the same instructions given by this Court in Rogers II, for the post-conviction court to: (1) conduct an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s postconviction petition; (2) determine whether Defendant is entitled to a delayed appeal; and (3) if the post-conviction court holds the hearing and determines Defendant is entitled to a delayed appeal, enter an order that (a) allows Defendant to file a new motion for new trial, and (b) stays the post-conviction proceedings on Defendant’s remaining claims until the resolution of the delayed appeal.

The Petitioner, Michael Waddell, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and the accompanying thirty-seven-year sentence, contending that the post-conviction court erred by holding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The grandparents of a minor child filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological father. Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights, determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish five statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, persistence of the conditions leading to the child’s removal, abandonment by conduct prior to incarceration demonstrating wanton disregard for the child’s welfare, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects, including the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Defendant, Nemon Omar Winton, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping, fifteen years for aggravated kidnapping, and fifteen years for aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence for aggravated robbery for an effective forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a special jury instruction; and (3) that his sentence was excessive. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. We conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated kidnapping, reverse that conviction and dismiss with prejudice the charge of aggravated kidnapping contained in Count Nine of the indictment. That count is remanded for consideration of appropriate lesser-included offenses, if any, of aggravated kidnapping.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of: (1) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(14); (3) abandonment by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); and (4) persistence of conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Ricky Harris, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s order summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely or to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is
well-taken as to the filing of a memorandum opinion and affirm the order of the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, Thomas Massey, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Rutherford County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the effective ten-year sentence he received pursuant to his guilty pleas to aggravated assault and evading arrest is illegal because he is being held beyond the period of incarceration authorized by the judgments of conviction. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2009, a Campbell County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joseph Nathaniel Nance, of six counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty-four years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the
post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Kendall Allison Clark, pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Hamblen County to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55- 10-401 (2018). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after forty-eight hours in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marilda Evon Green, appeals from the Jefferson and Grainger County Circuit Courts’ orders revoking her probation based upon her guilty plea to a separate charge of aggravated statutory rape and reinstating her effective six-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring her to serve the balance of her sentence in custody and subsequently denying her motions to reduce the sentence and petitions for early release. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Joseph E. Graham, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of two alternate theory counts of felony murder; one count of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; and five counts of attempted aggravated robbery, Class C felonies. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and there was insufficient evidence corroborating co-defendant Cheeks’ accomplice testimony; (2) the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of co-defendant Cheeks and excluding relevant evidence; and (3) he is entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of codefendant Cheeks’ testimony at co-defendant Shelton’s trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rodney Darnell Robinson ("Defendant") was convicted in Davidson County Criminal Court of two counts of child abuse, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of rape of a child, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of rape, and one count of attempted rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty years' incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred by allowing trial counsel to proceed while "clearly ill"; (4) the trial court failed to remedy statements made during voir dire by a potential juror, thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in allowing cumulative testimony in the cross-examination of Defendant; (6) the trial court erred in allowing improper leading questions to a witness; (7) the trial court erred in the admission of certain evidence; (8) the trial court erred in the exclusion of certain evidence; (9) there was an appearance of bias from the trial judge that violated Defendant's due process rights; and (10) cumulative error requires a new trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A police department seized a car after citing its owner for driving on a revoked license.  Following the issuance of a forfeiture warrant and a contested case hearing, the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security forfeited the owner’s interest in the car.  The car owner petitioned for judicial review, contending that the forfeiture violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The chancery court denied the petition after determining that there were no constitutional violations.  We affirm.

This is a breach of contract action involving a commercial lease. The plaintiff filed suit for non-payment of rent. The defendant claimed that it was not liable because it provided notice of early termination pursuant to the terms of the contract. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, claiming that notice was not provided within the time set forth in the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

We granted review to determine whether a doctor is qualified to testify in a health care liability case as an expert witness under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 115(b) when the doctor was not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state within one year of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct, but was practicing under a licensure exemption. Section 29-26-115(b) provides that a doctor is competent to testify as an expert witness only if the doctor is licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state and the doctor was practicing medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct. We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(b), a doctor, who was permitted to practice medicine in Tennessee under a statutory licensure exemption but was not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct, does not meet the requirements of section 29-26-115(b) to testify as an expert witness in a health care liability action. We reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This action involves a maternal grandmother’s objection to the denial of her petition for custody of her minor grandchild and his adoption by his foster parents. We affirm.

Mother sought a judgment for child support arrears tracing back to January 2010. Relief was denied when it was determined that a prior order suspending child support in January 2010 had been a final order. Having determined that the order suspending child support was not a final order and was entered in error, we hereby reverse the dismissal of the case and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from an action filed by Robert F. Clark (“Plaintiff”), seeking a declaratory judgment and damages against Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). Plaintiff applied for a homeowner’s insurance policy with Tennessee Farmers upon his purchase of improved real property. The effective date of the policy was to begin on May 29, 2013, the original date of the closing for the sale of the property. The closing of the real property was rescheduled to an earlier date. A leak occurred after the actual closing on the property but before the date of the original closing and the stated effective date of the homeowner’s insurance policy. Determining that Tennessee Farmers had not been notified of the change and that Plaintiff had signed an authorization for work on the property, the Trial Court granted Tennessee Farmers’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm the Trial Court’s finding that the leak occurred prior to the effective date of the policy. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment upon our determination that genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment on other issues.

The petitioner, John Alan Chapman, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The pro se Defendant, Todd Alan Schmeling, was convicted by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, a Class C felony; facilitation of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class E felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective term of eight years as a Range II offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) his due process rights were violated by his lack of access to updated law books in preparation for trial and appeal; (2) he was improperly prosecuted on the possession of a firearm charge; (3) Lieutenant Mara committed “official misconduct” and “official oppression” by a statement he made during the traffic stop; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for production of Lieutenant Mara’s statements; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver; (6) his rights to due process and exculpatory evidence were violated vis-à-vis the testing of the drugs by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”); (7) the State made an improper closing argument; (8) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instruction on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (9) the notices of enhanced punishment filed by the State were deficient; and (10) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.