APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from an action to remove the decedent’s son as the executor of the estate. The action also sought to remove the decedent’s son as the nominated trustee of two testamentary trusts; however, the trustee never assumed his duties because neither trust was ever funded. The decedent’s wife was the principal beneficiary of the estate and both testamentary trusts. The action was initiated by the conservator for the decedent’s wife who alleged, inter alia, that the executor/trustee failed to distribute any property or income to the wife and used the assets for his personal benefit. The conservator also alleged that he improperly used the estate’s assets to satisfy a bank loan that encumbered real property he jointly owned with the decedent for which he and the decedent were liable. The conservator claimed the bank loan was not a lawful debt of the estate because the bank failed to file a claim against the estate within the time limits set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307. In response, the executor/trustee contended the action to remove him was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for breach of trust actions. He also contended the debt to the bank was properly paid in accordance with the law of exoneration. After a hearing, the trial court found that the law of exoneration did not apply and held that the estate was not obligated on the debt to the bank because the bank did not timely file a claim against the estate. Additionally, the trial court removed the decedent’s son as both the executor and trustee based on his persistent failure to administer the estate and appointed a successor executor and successor trustee. The successor executor filed an inventory and accounting for the estate, and the former executor filed an objection. At the hearing that followed, the former executor submitted into evidence a document entitled “Land Agreement” and claimed that the agreement was enforceable against the estate as a contract to make a will. The trial court determined that the Land Agreement was a contract to make a will, but the claim was time barred. In its final order, the court assessed damages against the former executor and awarded the conservator her attorney’s fees. The former executor appealed, arguing that (1) the action was barred by the statute of limitations for breach of trust actions, (2) the Land Agreement was enforceable against the estate, (3) the debt to the bank was properly paid under the law of exoneration, and (4) he was not liable for attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

Pro-se petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found grounds for termination by abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. The trial court also found termination was in the best interests of the child. We affirm in part and reverse in part, but affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Michael Ryan Boggs, was indicted for theft of property valued at more than $10,000 and less than $60,000, a Class C felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class E felony; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103(a), -14-105(a)(4), -14-402, -14-403(a), -17-1307(b)(1)(B), -17-1324(a). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the firearms offenses and convicted of the theft of property and aggravated burglary offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence relative to his identity as a perpetrator of the burglary, arguing that the accomplice testimony was incredible and not adequately corroborated. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because I believe that the line of cases holding that the petitioner seeking to terminate a parent’s rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) must prove both a “failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody” with respect to the first prong of the analysis, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion. See In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). In all other respects, including affirming the termination of Father’s parental rights, I concur.

Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals from the summary dismissal of his latest petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences. In this, his latest challenge, Petitioner filed a petition for
post-conviction relief challenging his 2003 convictions. He alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court had improperly amended his judgment of conviction. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the grounds for relief had clearly been waived because they had not been raised in Petitioner’s prior petitions for
post-conviction relief. Following our review, we conclude that an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

James Demoss, Defendant, pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the manner of service of the effective fifteen-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant’s sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to serve his sentence in incarceration rather than granting an alternative sentence. Because the trial court failed to articulate adequate reasons for denying an eligible defendant an alternative sentence, the abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness does not apply on appeal, and this court can either (1) conduct a de novo review to determine whether there is an adequate basis for denying an alternative sentence; or (2) remand for the trial court to consider the requisite factors in determining whether to grant an alternative sentence. We determine that the record on appeal is sufficient for this court to undertake a de novo review, and after a de novo review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of an alternative sentence.

Charles L. Jones, III, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of habeas corpus relief from his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after he pled guilty to second-degree murder. After a review, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court dismissed a Husband’s petition to modify or terminate the transitional alimony he was obligated to pay on the basis of the provision of the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement that made the alimony obligation nonmodifiable. Husband appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

The only issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. An employee sustained a compensable injury to her back at work. The settlement agreement resolving her workers’ compensation claim required her employer to pay her future medical expenses. When her employer refused to pay for prescribed pain medication, she filed a petition for contempt and to compel payment. After her employer reversed its denial of payment, the trial court awarded her $7,500 in attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for determination of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to the employee for this appeal.

The defendant, Isaiah Kemp, appeals from the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his 2018 Sevier County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of passing worthless checks in an amount of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal requires us to determine whether Employee elected to receive workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Texas law and is, therefore, precluded from recovering in Tennessee under the doctrine of election of remedies. The trial court applied the election of remedies doctrine based on the Employee’s filing of a Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation Form-041, titled “Employee’s Claim for Compensation for a Work-Related Injury or Occupational Disease” (“Claim for Compensation”) with the Texas Department of Insurance (“TDI”), his filing of a “Request to Schedule, Re-Schedule, or Cancel a Benefit Review Conference (BRC)” (“Request to Schedule a Benefit Review Conference” or “Request”) with the TDI, his consultation with an ombudsman in the Texas Office of Injured Employee Counsel, and his “knowing and voluntary” acceptance of temporary total and medical benefits issued pursuant to Texas law. The trial court therefore determined that Employee was precluded from recovering workers’ compensation benefits in Tennessee. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After pleading guilty to several offenses, Defendant, Joshua Bryan Johnson, received an effective eight-year sentence to be served on probation. A violation of probation warrant was issued and the trial court fully revoked his probation after a hearing. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. After the notice of appeal was filed, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure asking the trial court to modify his sentence to provide for inpatient rehabilitation. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied relief. Defendant filed an additional notice of appeal and this Court consolidated the appeals. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Curtis Lane, appeals his 2019 Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, arguing that the 22-year sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A foster parent appealed the removal of two foster children from her home. This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services Administrative Procedures Division’s decision to dismiss the foster parent’s appeal on the basis of mootness. The Chancery Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Finding substantial and material evidence in support of the Commissioner’s decision, we affirm.

The defendant, Gary Wayne Ford, appeals the Meigs County Criminal Court’s denial of alternative sentencing for his conviction of voluntary manslaughter, arguing that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, admitted improper rebuttal evidence at the sentencing hearing, and based its decision on unreliable or contradicted evidence. After careful examination of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns an action to establish undue influence and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-6-120, et seq.2 The trial court denied the claims submitted by Plaintiff. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a default judgment in a detainer action. AA Properties, GP (“AA Properties”) filed a detainer warrant against James Scarlett (“Scarlett”) in the General Sessions Court for Knox County (“the General Sessions Court”) concerning real property of Scarlett’s that had been foreclosed upon. Default judgment was entered against Scarlett and a writ of possession was issued. Scarlett later filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Circuit Court”). AA Properties filed a motion to dismiss, which the Circuit Court granted. Scarlett appeals, arguing that the warrant was deficient in that it failed to state specifically that personal service was attempted. Scarlett argues further that, under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, only five days elapsed from the posting of the warrant to the hearing, when per statute he was entitled to six days. We hold, first, that the warrant sufficiently reflected that personal service was attempted. We hold further that, in this instance, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply in the General Sessions Court. We affirm.

Appellant sought a prescriptive easement over an existing road across Appellees’ property. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of Appellant’s proof and held that Appellant’s occasional use of the road to access his property for hunting purposes did not satisfy his burden of proof to establish an easement by prescription. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Marlon William Cotham, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, and the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of nine years. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dennis Judge, pleaded guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, and the trial court sentenced him to the agreed sentence of four years of Community Corrections. More than a year later, the Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the trial court allow him to file an untimely petition for post-conviction relief and also a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court found that due process did not require a tolling of the statute of limitations, and it dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Dennis Lee Seale, filed a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s ruling that some of the prosecution’s out-of-state witnesses could testify at trial via two-way video conferencing technology. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that four of the prosecution’s witnesses could testify via teleconferencing rather than in person. The Defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the State did not oppose, and which the trial court granted. This court determined that this application met the criteria of Rule 9, and granted the appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred because its ruling violated his rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of both the Federal and our State constitution. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that this case, as one of first impression in this state, provides this court the opportunity to hold that the standard as articulated in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), should extend to two-way video conferencing technology. As such we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a case-specific and witness-specific determination of whether the denial of the Defendant’s right to confront witnesses is necessary to further an important public interest.

The pro se Petitioner, Pamela Moses, appeals the trial court’s denial of her “Motion for Expiration of Sentence,” which the trial court essentially treated as a motion for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the motion.

Barbara Nicole Napper, Defendant, was indicted for two counts of selling heroin in a school zone. She pled guilty to two reduced charges of selling heroin without the school-zone enhancement. She was sentenced to ten years for each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other. The sentences were suspended to community corrections. Multiple violation warrants were filed after Defendant tested positive for drugs. Prior to the disposition of the alleged violations, Defendant was indicted for introducing heroin into a penal facility. The State filed a motion seeking resentencing on Defendant’s original sentence of twenty years. After a hearing on the violations, the trial court revoked Defendant’s community corrections sentence and increased the sentence on each underlying offense by two years, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. Defendant timely appeals the revocation of her community corrections sentence and the trial court’s decision to increase her underlying sentence. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kendall Joy, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis in which he alleged that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the error coram nobis court.