APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Kimberly J. Hill, entered a best interest plea to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence with six months to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her request for judicial diversion and in imposing a term of split confinement. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce action. Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony to Wife. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff corporation filed an action for breach of contract, claiming that the defendants had failed to recognize the plaintiff’s ownership in a limited liability company that was allegedly based on an oral agreement between the plaintiff and defendants. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, determining that the plaintiff had failed to present clear and convincing evidence establishing the parties’ agreement that the plaintiff would have an ownership interest in the company. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the criminal court had authority to grant motions filed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) and to modify an order dismissing criminal prosecutions several years after the order became final.  Carl Allen (“Mr. Allen”) was indicted in November 2010 and February 2011 for violating certain reporting provisions of the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act (“the Registration Act”) applicable to violent sexual offenders.  By a written order filed on February 3, 2012, the criminal court granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on its determination that Mr. Allen’s 1995 Florida sexual battery conviction required him to comply only with the Registration Act’s reporting provisions relating to sexual offenders and not those relating to violent sexual offenders.  The State did not appeal the February 3, 2012 order; therefore, it became final thirty days after entry.  Almost three years later, in December 2014, the TBI returned to the criminal court and filed a motion to intervene in the dismissed criminal cases, citing Rule 24.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and a motion for relief from the February 3, 2012 order, citing Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.  The TBI argued that, in expressing the basis of its decision to dismiss the indictments, the criminal court exercised civil jurisdiction by ruling on Mr. Allen’s offender classification under the Registration Act.  The TBI asserted that the criminal court lacked authority to determine Mr. Allen’s offender classification and that the portion of its February 3, 2012 order doing so was void and should be vacated.  The criminal court agreed with the TBI’s arguments, and by a May 3, 2017 order, partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order.  Mr. Allen appealed.  The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal without ruling on the merits after concluding that Mr. Allen had no right of appeal in these circumstances.  State v. Allen, No. W2017-01118-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6595352, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018), appeal granted, (Tenn. May 24, 2019).  We hold, as the TBI now concedes, that Mr. Allen had a right to appeal from the criminal court’s May 3, 2017 order that partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order.  We also hold that the criminal court was not exercising civil jurisdiction in its February 3, 2012 order when it granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the criminal indictments.  We further conclude that the criminal court had no authority to modify or partially vacate its February 3, 2012 order, except to correct clerical errors, oversights, or omissions in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  Because the criminal court exceeded the authority Rule 36 provides, we vacate the May 3, 2017 order and confirm that the February 3, 2012 order remains intact and final.

In this conservatorship action, the trial court determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent had a disability but did not establish that the respondent needed a conservator. The petitioner appealed. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 

Unsatisfied with the judgment it obtained in the general sessions court, the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court.  When the plaintiff failed to file a timely motion to set its appeal for trial, the circuit court adopted the judgment of the general sessions court.  The plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment, claiming excusable neglect.  The court denied the motion.  On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside.  We affirm.

The Petitioner, Demarcus Lashawn Blackmun, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, which were merged by the trial court, and received a sentence twelve years’ incarceration. State v. Demarcus Lashawn Blackman, No. M2016-01098-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3084852, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017). He later filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to obtain the criminal history of the confidential informant (CI) and in failing to adequately investigate the crime scene. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a divorce, husband and wife agreed that wife was to receive monthly alimony payments from husband for eight and a half years. The last four years of payments were contingent upon husband attaining the rank of airline captain. The type of alimony awarded was never specified. Wife later remarried and cohabitated with her new husband. Husband filed for a modification alleging that the alimony was transitional alimony and therefore statutorily modifiable upon wife’s cohabitation with a third person. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–121(g)(2)(C) (2019). Wife instead argued that the alimony awarded was alimony in solido and therefore not modifiable except by agreement of the parties. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–121(h)(2). The trial court held that the expressly conditional nature of the alimony rendered it more properly classifiable as transitional alimony. The court terminated husband’s alimony obligation based upon wife’s remarriage and cohabitation with her new husband. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this healthcare liability action, the trial court held that the plaintiffs’ sole expert witness was not competent to testify on causation and for that reason granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend, proffering causation testimony from a new expert witness. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to alter or amend. This Court granted permission to appeal. A trial court’s decision on a motion to alter or amend is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; this standard of review does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. We hold that the trial court’s decision in this case was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions of the motion to alter or amend and was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. For this reason, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Palace R. Chandler, was charged with theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a three-year suspended sentence to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that error exists because there was no proof showing the victim did not consent to the Defendant’s taking the property. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, we remand this case to correct the judgement to reflect the full measure of the Defendant’s pre-trial jail credit.

Brenda Merriweather (“Employee”) alleged she injured her left knee in the course and scope of her employment with UGN, Inc. (“Employer”). Following the trial, the trial court determined Employee did not satisfy her burden of proving causation and therefore dismissed the case. Employee appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jermaine Nelson Buford, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for possession of .5 grams of more of cocaine with intent to sell, aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, evading arrest, vandalism of property over $500, and simple possession. On appeal, Defendant argues, among other things, that (1) the State violated State v. Ferguson by failing to preserve an audio recording of the drug transaction that formed the basis of the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to give the missing witness instruction when the confidential informant did not testify at trial; and (3) the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose witness information. After a review, we determine Defendant has waived several issues for failure to either raise them in the trial court and/or properly present argument or authority to support the issues in this Court. As to the remaining issues, we determine Defendant is not entitled to relief. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form for the conviction for vandalism.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support but affirm the trial court’s finding of willful failure to visit and its determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we affirm termination of the father’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, Richard Terry Woodson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his conviction should be set aside because requiring him to register as a sex offender violates his right to be free from ex post facto laws, his right to due process, his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and violates principles of double jeopardy. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a slip and fall premises liability claim filed by a tenant against his landlord.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the landlord because the tenant’s evidence did not show that the allegedly dangerous condition was in existence as of the date of the lease or that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition.  The tenant appeals.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Tony Young, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence and/or petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner has failed to show that his sentence is illegal or that he is otherwise entitled to habeas corpus relief; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ronnie Ray Myatt, appeals the judgments of the trial court following a June 25, 2018 probation violation hearing in which the court revoked his probation in case numbers CR7357, CR7358A, and 22CC-2010-CR-115. The Defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the first two cases because the sentences for those cases had expired prior to the filing of the revocation warrant. The Defendant also requests that we remand to the trial court for entry of a modified judgment in case number 22CC-2010-CR-115 to award to the Defendant applicable jail credits. The State concedes that the sentences in case numbers CR7357 and CR7358A expired before the filing of the instant revocation warrant and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to revoke the probation in those cases. Although not raised as an issue by the Defendant, the State argues that the trial court appropriately revoked the Defendant’s probation in Case Number 22CC-2010-CR-115. Following our review, we reverse the probation revocation orders in case numbers CR7357 and CR7358A, affirm the revocation of probation in case number 22CC-2010-CR-115, and remand to the trial court for determination of the appropriate jail credits to be applied toward the Defendant’s sentence in the latter case.

The Defendant, Kristie Ward Thompson, pleaded guilty to reckless homicide and received a twelve-year sentence to be served concurrently to a sentence in a separate case. The Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of trial court but remand for correction of the judgment form in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209.

The plaintiff filed this action seeking to recover damages on behalf of Anderson County based upon the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants had submitted false claims for payment by the county. The trial court dismissed the action, determining that the plaintiff’s amended complaint had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.

Defendant, Jerry Joyner, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury on the following counts: (1) possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule II, to wit, methamphetamine, in an amount in excess of 0.5 grams; (2) possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule II, to wit, cocaine, in an amount in excess of 0.5 grams; (3) possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule II, to wit, morphine; (4) possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule II, to wit, hydrocodone; and (5) possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule IV, to wit, alprazolam. Following an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence retrieved from a search of his person, the trial court granted his motion and dismissed, in separate judgments, all five counts of the indictment against Defendant. The State appeals the granting of Defendant’s motion to suppress on grounds that the search at issue was constitutional. After review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court, reinstate the charges in the indictment, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, LaToya Ann Shelton, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of the sale or delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; two counts of the sale or delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; the possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the twenty-year sentence of incarceration is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A prisoner filed suit against a fellow inmate and several county defendants. The county defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the prisoner’s cause of action as to the county defendants. The prisoner appealed. Because the order appealed does not dispose of all of the prisoner’s claims against all defendants, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Appellant, Matthew Jackson, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated rape, which resulted in an effective twenty-five-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

This appeal arises out of an inmate’s lawsuit alleging that an employee of Loves Truck Stop filed a false police report. The trial court dismissed the suit on September 4, 2019, for failure to file an affidavit of indigency and failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-407. The inmate, Brent G. Pitchford, filed a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court on December 16, 2019. 

A Davidson County jury convicted Shandejah Andrea Stone of simple assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all suspended except ninety days to be served by incarceration. Following release from jail, Defendant is to be on two years of unsupervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that her sentence is excessive and that her alternative sentence should not include any period of incarceration. In addition, Defendant asserts as an issue that during the sentencing hearing, the trial court erroneously allowed admission into evidence a Facebook video over objection that the exhibit had not been properly authenticated. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.