APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jeremy Randall C. Ledbetter, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and one count of exploitation by displaying sexual acts to a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-13-529(a) (soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor) (Supp. 2011, Supp. 2012, Supp. 2013), 39-13-529(b)(1) (displaying sexual acts to a minor). The Defendant is serving an effective eighty-one years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State’s election of offenses was inadequate, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a severance, (4) the court erred in admitting evidence, and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the workplace. Mona Word (“Word”), an African-American woman who worked in the Knox County Clerk’s Office for 19 years, sued Knox County Clerk Foster D. Arnett, Jr. (“Arnett”) in his individual and official capacity, Knox County, Tennessee (“Knox County”), and the Knox County Clerk’s Office (“Defendants,” collectively) asserting a number of claims, including violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“the THRA”). According to Word, she was denied opportunities for promotion because of her race, and was singled out for discipline because of her race, as well. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted. Word appealed to this Court. Accepting Word’s factual allegations as true as is required at the motion for judgment on the pleadings stage, we hold that Word alleged enough to withstand Defendants’ motion with respect to certain of her claims against Knox County and Arnett in his individual capacity. However, we affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Word’s claims against Arnett in his official capacity and the Knox County Clerk’s Office, as well as Word’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The judgment of the Trial Court thus is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, Garrick Graham, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The Sullivan County Criminal Court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part, and the Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial. Based upon our view of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bradley Townsend, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and resulting sentence of eight years. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request jury instructions on certain lesser-included offenses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his conviction of aggravated sexual battery in count twenty-one. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court as to that count and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Jamaal Mayes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2003 guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted rape of a child. Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds to assert a laterarising claim, namely that he did not become aware that he was subject to community supervision for life until more than ten years after his plea. After a hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Timothy J. Pagliara (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Marlene Moses and MTR Family Law, PLLC (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), which the Trial Court granted.  Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.

This appeal stems from a workplace injury on a construction site. On his first day on the job, Marc Douglas Swindle (“Plaintiff”) fell from the roof of a building that was under construction. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was authorized to work on the job site and that he was working in the course and scope of his employment when injured. What is disputed is the identity of his employer: whether he was in the employ of the general contractor or one of the subcontractors. Plaintiff initially filed a claim with the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims, naming the general contractor as his employer; however, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his workers’ compensation claim when the general contractor filed a response stating that Plaintiff was not its employee. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his wife filed this tort action in circuit court to recover damages from the general contractor, two of its subcontractors, and the owner of the property for the injuries he sustained at the construction site. Finding it undisputed that Plaintiff’s injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment, the circuit court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the tort claims because the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy doctrine applied. For these reasons, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Vernon Walton, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his December 5, 2016 guilty plea conviction of attempted first degree murder, for which he is serving a sixteen-year sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and entry of an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On September 21, 2015, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Michael Delk, for aggravated rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual exploitation of a minor, and ten counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. On May 4, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of rape of a child and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve twenty-seven years at one hundred percent for rape of a child and eight years at one hundred percent for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, consecutive to the first count, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years to serve at one hundred percent. On July 20, 2018, Petitioner filed an untimely pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

On March 24, 2015, a Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Reginald Parnell, for two counts of aggravated assault. On May 21, 2018, the day he was set for trial, the Defendant accepted a plea agreement and entered an Alford plea to each count of aggravated assault in exchange for a concurrent term of three years’ probation. On June 15, 2018, represented by newly retained counsel, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by the trial court following a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review, we affirm.

In January 2015, the Sequatchie County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Willard C. Land, for first degree premeditated murder. Following a trial in February 2018, a jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, for which Defendant received a sentence of thirty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior threats and acts of violence against the victim and others, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cleotris Ruben, entered best interest pleas in two separate cases to one count of Class E felony theft of property and one count of Class A misdemeanor theft of property. Prior to a sentencing hearing, the Defendant filed motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of one year in the workhouse and six years of supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to withdraw his pleas because he provided sufficient evidence demonstrating that a “fair and just reason” justifies the withdrawal of his guilty pleas. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for appointment of new counsel and a new hearing on the Defendant’s motions to withdraw his pleas.

The Petitioner, Gerald McEwen, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of life without parole. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately cross-examine an eyewitness and in failing to formally move for a mistrial following alleged improper conduct by the prosecutrix. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Javonta Marquis Perkins, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that juvenile counsel was ineffective for waiving the juvenile transfer hearing and failing to investigate his mental health in connection with the transfer. The Petitioner’s case was transferred to criminal court, and after two trials, he was convicted of aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of thirteen years. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Darin Woods, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he is serving an effective twenty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition without holding a meaningful hearing. We reverse the judgment of the postconviction court.

Plaintiff John R. Fuller initially brought this action, on July 15, 2015, for fraud, negligence, and violation of the Tennesee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). After taking a voluntary nonsuit, he refiled on August 24, 2017. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America, holding that the fraud and negligence claims were time-barred by operation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3), which provides that “[i]f a plaintiff or counsel for a plaintiff . . . intentionally causes delay of prompt issuance or prompt service of a summons, the filing of the complaint . . . will not toll any applicable statutes of limitation or repose.” It is undisputed that plaintiff’s counsel, despite knowing how to properly serve process on defendant, delayed service for almost seven months, until after the applicable three-year statutes of limitations for fraud and negligence had run. The trial court further held that plaintiff’s TCPA claim was barred by an applicable statute of repose. We affirm.

The Defendant, Terrell Lamont Reid, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell and to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and received an effective seventeen-year sentence. He filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that his sentence was illegal because his firearm offense sentence was enhanced under the criminal gang enhancement statute. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the sentence was not illegal. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying relief because the enhanced sentence for his firearm conviction was unconstitutional and illegal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A mother and stepfather filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of a father based on abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support his child.  The trial court found the petitioners proved the ground of abandonment by failure to support by clear and convincing evidence but did not prove the ground of abandonment by failure to visit because the mother interfered with the father’s attempts to visit the child.  The trial court then found it was not in the child’s best interest for the father’s parental rights to be terminated and denied the petition to terminate.  The mother and stepfather appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Demetrius Blakemore, appeals the order of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation in four cases. On appeal, Blakemore argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation because his probationary period had expired. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the propriety of the defendant’s burglary conviction.  A Knox County grand jury indicted the defendant, Abbie Leann Welch, for misdemeanor theft in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103, and burglary, a Class D felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402, for her involvement in a scheme to enter a Walmart retail store, steal merchandise, and have another individual return the merchandise for a gift card.  The defendant previously had been banned from Walmart retail stores for prior acts of shoplifting.  In this case, because the defendant entered Walmart without the effective consent of the owner—said consent having been revoked by letter—and committed a theft therein, the State sought an indictment for burglary rather than criminal trespass.  We hold that the plain language of the burglary statute does not preclude its application to the scenario presented in this case and that, because the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we need not review the legislative history to ascertain its meaning.  Application of the burglary statute in these circumstances does not violate due process or prosecutorial discretion.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 

In 2014, the Petitioner, Antwion Dowdy, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and four counts of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Antwion Dowdy, No. W2015-02342-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7654950 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 21, 2016), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the postconviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Giles County jury convicted Timothy T. Millican, Defendant, of one count of theft of property with a value of at least $10,000 but less than $60,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years at thirty percent release eligibility, which the trial court suspended to five years’ supervised probation following the service of a year in jail. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I write separately in this case because I respectfully disagree with one point in the majority’s analysis, namely, the conclusion that Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-402(a) is clear and unambiguous.

The petitioner, Casey Carlos Raines, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2016 convictions of simple possession of methamphetamine and failure to appear, as time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Jonathan A. Wheatley, was convicted of two counts of child abuse and neglect. Subsequently, the trial court ordered a new trial, and the Defendant later pled guilty to one count of child abuse and neglect. As a condition of his guilty plea, he sought to reserve the right to appeal three certified questions of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside his two initial convictions. Following our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly certify his questions of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2).