APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Casey Carlos Raines, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2016 convictions of simple possession of methamphetamine and failure to appear, as time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Jonathan A. Wheatley, was convicted of two counts of child abuse and neglect. Subsequently, the trial court ordered a new trial, and the Defendant later pled guilty to one count of child abuse and neglect. As a condition of his guilty plea, he sought to reserve the right to appeal three certified questions of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside his two initial convictions. Following our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly certify his questions of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2).

The Board of Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) filed a Petition for Discipline against James MacDonald (“Attorney”) based on a single complaint arising from his representation of Michael Huddleston.  A hearing panel (“the Panel”) was appointed and, after an evidentiary hearing, the Panel dismissed the Petition for Discipline and concluded that the Board “failed to sustain its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Attorney violated” any Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”).  Thereafter, the Board filed a petition for review of the Panel’s decision in the Knox County Chancery Court.  The chancery court reversed the Panel’s dismissal of all six rule violations and determined that the Panel’s conclusions were arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by the evidence.  In addition, the chancery court held that the Panel abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard.  The chancery court found that Attorney violated all six rules alleged in the Board’s petition and imposed a public censure as punishment.  Attorney sought review in this Court, arguing that the chancery court incorrectly substituted its own judgment for that of the Panel’s and abused its discretion.  Upon review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the chancery court’s conclusion that Attorney violated RPC 3.3(b) and (c), 3.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), and we reinstate the Panel’s dismissal of those allegations.  Additionally, we hold that the chancery court was without authority to conclude that Attorney violated RPC 8.4(c), and this Court must treat the Panel’s failure to make a conclusion as a dismissal of the allegation.  Therefore, the Petition for Discipline against Attorney is dismissed in its entirety.

Paternal great uncle and great aunt of a minor child filed a petition under the grandparent visitation statute, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-6-306, and the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, finding that the petitioners did not meet the statutory definition of “grandparent.”  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jerry A. Thigpen, was found in contempt of court for four separate acts of publishing online certain materials related to his underlying charge of misdemeanor assault, and he received an aggregate sentence of forty days in jail, with two days suspended. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt, that he did not have adequate notice of the charges, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the hearing, and that the trial court was obligated to recuse itself. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Tipton County jury convicted the Defendant, Nathan Allen Wallace, of rape, aggravated statutory rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and incest, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) admitted prior statements by the victim into evidence; (2) declined to enforce a subpoena for the victim’s DCS record; (3) admitted expert testimony on the subject of “grooming”; and (4) limited his cross-examination of the victim. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his request for a suspended sentence should have been granted. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Lindsey, of aggravated rape for a crime committed in 2005, and he was sentenced to serve thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and asserts that the ten-year delay in indicting him violated his right to due process. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and that the Defendant has waived the issue of pre-indictment delay. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed and the case remanded for correction of the judgment form.

This appeal concerns the validity of an agreed order entered in a proceeding before the Tennessee Board of Equalization in a contested case between Anderson County, Tennessee, and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Inc. The order purported to settle a dispute over the value of dies, jigs, and molds used for manufacturing automobile parts. The attorney for the Tennessee Comptroller’s Division of Property Assessments, which intervened in the proceeding, signed the agreed order on behalf of Toyota and the Anderson County Property Assessor “with express permission” of both parties, two months later, the Assessor moved to set the order aside, asserting that he had not agreed to the settlement terms or given the attorney for the Division of Property Assessments permission to sign on his behalf. The administrative judge treated the motion as one for extraordinary relief under the guidance of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 and held an evidentiary hearing. The administrative judge found the testimony of the Division of Property Assessment’s attorney was more credible than that of the Anderson County Assessor and denied the motion. The County filed a petition for review with the Chancery Court and the trial court reversed the decision of the administrative law judge, finding that the documentary evidence gave more credibility to the Assessor’s testimony. Considering the deference that reviewing courts must give to credibility determinations, we find no basis for reversing the administrative judge’s decision to deny Anderson County’s motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case with instructions to remand the case to the Tennessee Board of Equalization for further proceedings.

Gregg T. Merrilees, Defendant, was indicted for aggravated robbery, robbery in concert with two or more persons, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The week prior to trial, the State moved to amend count one to change the theory by which it would prove aggravated robbery. Defendant filed a response stating that he did not consent to amendment and requesting a continuance if the trial court granted the motion to amend. The trial court granted the State’s motion to amend and denied Defendant’s motion to continue. The same week, Defendant moved for a second continuance so that he could employ private counsel rather than appointed counsel, and the trial court denied the motion. Prior to the jury panel being sworn, the trial court issued preliminary jury instructions. Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery in count one and robbery in concert with two or more persons in count two. He was acquitted of the especially aggravating kidnapping in count three. The trial court merged counts one and two and sentenced Defendant to serve eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by amending the indictment without also granting Defendant a continuance, by denying Defendant’s motion to continue so he could employ private counsel, and by issuing preliminary jury instructions prior to the jury panel being sworn. Defendant also argues that cumulative error requires the granting of a new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

This is a dispute regarding the ownership of a gravel lane used to access a 95-acre tract of land; Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their suit to quiet title to the property or, alternatively, for a declaration that they acquired ownership of the road through adverse possession. The trial court held that Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110 barred Plaintiffs from pursuing their claim of ownership because there was no proof that they had paid taxes on the property at issue for twenty years, as required by the statute; finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

 This is an action to pierce the corporate veil. In a previous action in which the limited liability company was the only defendant, the plaintiffs received a default judgment for breach of contract in the amount of $709,500. The same plaintiffs subsequently filed this action against the sole member of the now-defunct limited liability company to pierce the corporate veil and hold the defendant personally liable for the unsatisfied judgment. Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, determining that the undisputed facts weighed against piercing the corporate veil, and the plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

The defendant, Willie Lee Ballard, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentences imposed for his convictions of rape and violating the sex offender registration requirements. Because we discern no error in the ruling of the trial court, we affirm the order of revocation. Because, however, we discern clerical error in the judgment form for case number 277642, the case is remanded for the entry of a corrected judgment.

This is the second appeal of this termination of parental rights case. Appellants appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); and (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). Because it does not appear that the trial court exercised its independent judgment in reaching its decision, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) (2017). Such findings and conclusions must also be a product of the trial court’s own independent judgment.

This appeal concerns a jury verdict in a personal injury case. Joanna L. Golden (“Golden”) was jogging in the dark early one morning when she was struck accidentally by a car driven by Cynthia D. Powers (“Powers”). Golden and her husband, Douglas K. Rice (“Rice”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued Powers in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”), asserting various claims including negligence. The matter was tried before a jury. The jury found Golden to be 80% and Powers 20% at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the Trial Court denied. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing that the Trial Court failed to act as thirteenth juror and that the jury’s allocation of fault was unsupported by material evidence. Plaintiffs argue also that the jury was prejudiced against them for their being well-off out-of-towners. We find, first, that the Trial Court independently weighed the evidence and acted properly as thirteenth juror. We find further that the jury’s allocation of fault is supported by material evidence. Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim of jury prejudice is speculative, at best. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal concerns a jury verdict in a personal injury case. Joanna L. Golden (“Golden”) was jogging in the dark early one morning when she was struck accidentally by a car driven by Cynthia D. Powers (“Powers”). Golden and her husband, Douglas K. Rice (“Rice”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued Powers in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”), asserting various claims including negligence. The matter was tried before a jury. The jury found Golden to be 80% and Powers 20% at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the Trial Court denied. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing that the Trial Court failed to act as thirteenth juror and that the jury’s allocation of fault was unsupported by material evidence. Plaintiffs argue also that the jury was prejudiced against them for their being well-off out-of-towners. We find, first, that the Trial Court independently weighed the evidence and acted properly as thirteenth juror. We find further that the jury’s allocation of fault is supported by material evidence. Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim of jury prejudice is speculative, at best. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Marvin Stinnett, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On August 3, 2017, Clarence Turnage (“Employee”) died as a result of injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment with Dole Refrigerating Co., Inc. (“Employer”).  Employee was unmarried at the time of his death, but resided with and had a child
out-of-wedlock with Megan Black.  It was undisputed that this child, EJT, is entitled to workers’ compensation death benefits as a conclusively presumed wholly dependent child under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(a)(2).  Employee had two additional children out-of-wedlock, NRT and SMT, with another woman.  However, prior to his death, Employee had surrendered his parental rights to NRT and SMT, and his mother had adopted these children.  NRT and SMT sought workers’ compensation death benefits as either conclusively presumed wholly dependent children of Employee under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(a)(2), or, alternatively, as partial dependents of Employee under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(d).  The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims determined that NRT and SMT are not entitled to benefits as conclusively presumed wholly dependent children or as partial dependents.  The court awarded EJT benefits equal to fifty percent (50%) of Employee’s average weekly wage.  The court denied the motions of the guardians ad litem for EJT and for NRT and SMT for attorney’s fees and deferred any fee determination until after an appeal.  NRT and SMT appealed the decision of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims.  The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment.  We award attorney’s fees on appeal to the guardian ad litem for EJT and remand the case to the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims for a determination of the amount of such fees, together with a determination of what, if any, fees are to be awarded to the guardians ad litem for the prior proceedings in that court.

The Defendant, Terence Dewayne Borum, pleaded guilty to burglary, vandalism, and theft of property valued at more than $500 and after an appeal of the trial court’s initial ten-year sentence on probation received a twelve-year sentence on remand. He filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that his sentence was illegal because the trial court improperly sentenced him as career offender. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the sentence was not illegal and that this issue had been determined in a previous appeal. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying relief because he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Atu Campbell, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Because the trial court failed to provide the Defendant with an evidentiary hearing, the State concedes error. Upon our review, we reverse the determination of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the allegations raised in the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Defendant, Ernest Ervin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of burglary of a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years as a Career Offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting surveillance video without sufficient authentication and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert Elijah Oxendine (“Defendant”) pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide and one count of improper passing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective four-year sentence with one year of incarceration and the balance on probation. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to split confinement rather than full probation and by using elements of the offense as a factor to enhance the sentence. We affirm the trial court’s imposition of a four-year sentence, but we reverse the court’s imposition of split confinement and remand for entry of amended judgments of conviction placing Defendant on probation.

A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Karlus Montrezz Branch, with first-degree premeditated murder, and he was later convicted of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, and (2) whether the Defendant is entitled to plain error review of the trial court’s admissions of statements made by Tierra Braden as excited utterances, and whether these admissions violated the Confrontation Clause. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Raymond Lee Pryor, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his conviction for attempt to commit second degree murder and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Todd Sutton, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the evidence of several jurors’ viewing the Petitioner in shackles and handcuffs during his capital trial and sentencing hearing is newly discovered, (2) the Petitioner is without fault for failing to present this evidence previously, (3) equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applies, (4) constitutional considerations require the coram nobis court to address this case on the merits, and (5) the coram nobis court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Rubalddi Espinoza Yoc, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and his subsequent resentencing to serve ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Defendant argues that the original violation warrant was invalid because his detention and deportation by immigration authorities was a civil matter rather than a criminal arrest or conviction; that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing Defendant; and that he should receive sentencing credit until the date that he conceded a violation of community corrections. Based on our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.