APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Cheryl Lynn Williams (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable injury and/or an occupational disease as a result of exposure to mold during the course and scope of her employment with SWS LLC d/b/a SecureWatch (“Employer”). Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the one-year statute of limitations barred Employee’s claim. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the commencement of the statute of limitations, we reverse the judgment and remand for proceedings on the merits.

The petitioner, Kendall Joy, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Shelby County Criminal Court. The petitioner argues his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Robertson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Tevin Mantez Harris, of second degree murder and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years to be served at one hundred percent and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify about his being Muslim and his “viewpoint” toward Christianity and that his twenty-two-year sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that an attorney should be disbarred after she was convicted of bank fraud. On appeal, the circuit court held that the hearing panel’s decision was arbitrary and imposed a five-year suspension. We reverse. The hearing panel’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.

This appeal concerns the alleged formation of a contract for the sale of real property. The court ruled that text messages concerning the sale of the property did not constitute a present offer and acceptance sufficient to form a contract for the purchase of the property at issue. We affirm. 

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Nancy Neely (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in these companion cases involving a conservatorship and an estate. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and the answer ordered by this Court, and finding no error in the orders of the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) denying recusal, we affirm.

The Defendant, Frazier Lee Savage, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with intent to sell less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession with intent to sell alprazolam within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class D felony; possession with intent to deliver alprazolam within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class D felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(2) (2018) (possession with intent to deliver), 39-17-417(a)(3) (possession with intent to sell), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia), 39- 17-432 (2018) (providing enhanced penalties for drug offenses committed in Drug-Free School Zones). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two heroin counts and the two alprazolam counts and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a motel room. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his convictions are illegal because the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credits, the date his sentences were imposed is in question, the trial judge’s name was not printed on the judgment forms, and the judgment forms were not stamped filed. We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

The Defendant, Christopher Caldwell, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for his convictions for burglary of a motor vehicle and felony theft and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective twelve-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Arnold Asbury, Defendant, claims that the trial court erred by denying his “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Prior to Sentencing” and, as a result, that he was denied a right to trial by jury. Although we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, we determine that the trial court committed reversible error at the subsequent sentencing hearing because it neither properly accepted Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(4) nor properly rejected the plea agreement pursuant Rule 11(c)(5). We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a hearing in which the court may, in its discretion, either reject or accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. If the trial court rejects the plea agreement and Defendant opts to withdraw his guilty pleas, Defendant will have the right to a trial by jury. If the trial court accepts the agreement, it must sentence Defendant pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.

The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s decision concerning the ownership of real property. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Rachel Kay Bond, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from her conviction of first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: 1) request a change of venue; 2) strike three potential jurors; 3) investigate the existence of text messages stored in the Petitioner’s cell phone; 4) adequately cross-examine a witness; and 5) challenge the Petitioner’s competency. The Petitioner also alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because he allowed her to testify. Following a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Harold Francis Butler, III, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and resulting sentence of life plus thirty-one years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the State violated his constitutional rights by conducting an unduly suggestive identification procedure that rendered the identification unreliable and by eliciting false testimony from a key witness at trial. He also raises numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and contends that he is entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, David William Gary, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding his expressed interest in a specific type of sexual activity, and that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to present evidence that a police investigator improperly influenced the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to clarify application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against an attorney who represented her in her divorce. She asserts that the attorney’s actions so compromised her position in the divorce proceedings that she was forced to settle on unfavorable terms. After the attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, the trial court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Citing the plaintiff’s sworn acknowledgment in her marital dissolution agreement that the divorce settlement was “fair and equitable,” the trial court held that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting in the legal malpractice action that the divorce settlement terms were unfavorable. On this basis, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the trial court should not have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the statements at issue because they are not directly contradictory statements of fact. The plaintiff’s sworn acknowledgment in her marital dissolution agreement is instead a context-related legal conclusion, and the plaintiff offers a reasonable explanation for any apparent discrepancy between her sworn acknowledgment in the divorce and her assertions in this legal malpractice action. As a result, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

This appeal involves a homeowner’s fraud claim against a foundation repair company. The trial court rejected the foundation repair company’s argument that the fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the statute of repose. After a three-day bench trial, the trial court found that the foundation repair company had engaged in fraud. Specifically, the trial court found that the foundation repair company sold its systems to the homeowner representing that they would stabilize her house from further movement when in reality it did not have the knowledge or understanding to design an effective solution for the house and “simply did not really care” whether the systems would be effective in any way. The trial court further found that the company fraudulently misrepresented whether an engineer would be involved in the process and whether it would obtain a permit for the work. The home had been condemned by the time of trial, and the trial court awarded the homeowner $187,000 for the loss of the value of the structure. Based on the reckless and fraudulent conduct of the foundation repair company, the trial court also awarded $15,000 in punitive damages to the homeowner. The foundation repair company appeals. We affirm as modified.

The defendant, Victor Wise, appeals his Shelby County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault, challenging the exclusion of certain evidence, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the propriety of the 44-year effective sentence. We affirm the defendant’s convictions but conclude that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Accordingly, the defendant’s total effective sentence is modified to 12 years.

Plaintiff, James Bidwell, took his wife, Clarissa Bidwell, to Starr Regional Medical Center for treatment. She was transferred to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority dba Erlanger Health System, a governmental hospital authority, where she was treated, but later died. Plaintiff provided statutorily compliant pre-suit notice of his intent to file a health care liability action against each health care provider that was named as a defendant in the complaint. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). Plaintiff did not provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(5) requires a recipient of pre-suit notice to give written notice to a claimant of any other person, entity, or health care provider who may be properly named a defendant within thirty days of receiving pre-suit notice. However, Dr. Jeffery Colburn and Dr. Timothy A. Strait failed to identify Erlanger as their employer, i.e. a known and necessary party to the suit. Plaintiff timely filed his complaint within the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. Defendants answered plaintiff’s complaint, each raising the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait then moved for summary judgment arguing that, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, without Erlanger as a party defendant no judgment could be rendered against them. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b). In response, plaintiff filed two motions to amend his complaint to add Erlanger as a defendant, in reliance upon the extension to the statute of limitations provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(a). After a hearing, the trial court held that plaintiff’s failure to provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger prevents him from adding them to his complaint. It granted Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait’s motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2926-121(a)(5) required Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait to identify Erlanger as a known and necessary party within thirty days after receiving pre-suit notice; they failed to comply with § 29-26-121(a)(5). We hold that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-1-119, their subsequent declaration of the necessity of the nonparty to the suit, after the complaint was filed, granted plaintiff an additional ninety days following the filing of the first answer to amend his complaint in order to add the nonparty as a defendant. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-1-119; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(g) (stating that this section applies to suits involving governmental entities). In addition, we hold that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), plaintiff’s addition of the nonparty is not barred for failure to provide pre-suit notice. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s award of summary judgment to defendants Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait. We remand this matter for further proceedings, pursuant to applicable law, and consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Cordricus Arnold, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This action was filed by two brothers, after the death of their father, contesting the validity of an amendment to their father’s trust agreement. The brothers alleged that their siblings coerced their infirmed father to amend his trust in such a manner that was favorable to the siblings’ pecuniary interests and that two sisters had a confidential relationship with their father. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the decision.

Petitioner, Helen Ruth Kirby, appeals from the summary denial of her petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging her guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder. Because Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Johnthony K. Walker, was convicted of six counts of criminally negligent homicide, eleven counts of reckless aggravated assault, seven counts of assault, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of reckless driving, and one count of the use of a portable electronic device by a school bus driver after a school bus he was driving crashed leaving six children dead and numerous other children injured. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of four years for the convictions and denied judicial diversion after a sentencing hearing. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion and/or an alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial before the Davidson County Criminal Court, the Defendant-Appellant, Charles Eugene Darvin, Jr., was convicted as charged of especially aggravated robbery, see Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-403, a Class A felony. The trial court later accepted the agreement of the parties to sentence the Defendant to a term of fifteen years’ imprisonment, to be served at 100%. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the element of serious bodily injury as required to establish the offense. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a boundary dispute. In resolving the dispute, the trial court made specific findings about the location of a
non-party’s border, indicating that it was coterminous with the disputed northern border of Mr. Simpkins, who is a party to this case. Finding this non-party to be a necessary party based on the record, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

This appeal involves a breach of a lease agreement. At trial, both defendants, operators of a natural foods business, admitted that the lease had been breached. However, because only one of the Defendants had signed the lease, the other argued that he was not a party to and was therefore not responsible for the obligations of the lease. The Defendant who had signed the lease claimed he did so on behalf of and at the direction of the other. Finding that both Defendants had combined their efforts, skills, knowledge, and money for the purpose of operating the business, the trial court concluded on several bases that the Defendants were jointly liable for the obligations of the lease. Only the non-signing Defendant appeals. Because we agree with the trial court that the Defendants had formed a joint venture and, thus, were jointly liable, we affirm.