APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Troy Jones, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of aggravated burglary and one count of sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-403, 39- 13-505. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach his statement to police, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced him. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Ward Strong, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Sterling Panchikal, caused a traffic accident which resulted in one death and several injuries. She entered guilty pleas to reckless homicide, three counts of reckless endangerment, and possession of marijuana. The Defendant sought but was denied judicial diversion for her offenses, and she was sentenced to six years of probation, with thirty days to be served incarcerated. On appeal, she argues that the trial court was mistaken about the nature of one of the offenses to which she was pleading guilty and that the trial court erred in denying diversion. Because the record reflects that the trial court believed that the Defendant was pleading guilty to vehicular homicide as a result of reckless conduct rather than reckless homicide, we vacate the judgments and the denial of diversion, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This appeal involves a father’s petition to modify an existing parenting plan to change the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father. After a hearing, the trial court agreed with the parties’ stipulation that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the previous parenting plan due to various difficulties experienced by the parties and their lack of cooperation. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interest of the child to designate the father as primary residential parent. The trial court entered a modified parenting plan and child support worksheets. The mother appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendants, Darrell Partin and Chanda Partin, were indicted for theft in connection with Mr. Partin’s employment at Tennessee Master Restoration (“TMR”), and the case proceeded to a bench trial. During trial, the Defendants discovered that the State had failed to produce documents in the possession of TMR which supported the Defendants’ theory of the case. After a continuance, the trial court concluded that the failure to produce the documents was a violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and of the duty to disclose exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court then granted a mistrial and dismissed the charges with prejudice based on the Rule 16 violation. The State appeals. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the charges, and we remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the dismissal of a case based on mootness. The City of Lakeland and its Industrial Development Board passed various resolutions for the purpose of funding the construction of a new high school. Plaintiffs—a group of citizens of Lakeland—sued, arguing that the city lacked the statutory authority for the financing transaction. After Congress enacted the federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the financing transaction increased in cost, and Lakeland and the Industrial Development Board repealed the resolutions. Thereafter, upon Lakeland’s motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims as moot. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute between owners of a purportedly landlocked parcel of real property and their neighbors. The landlocked owners sought condemnation of a right-of-way or easement in order to access a public road. After the trial court determined that the parcel of land had no access and a jury of view marked a road through the land of one of the neighbors, other neighbors granted a right-of-way through their properties to the landlocked parcel, which provided access to a public road. The grantors of the right-of-way then moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing at which proof was taken, the trial court determined that the granted right-of-way required revisions to be an adequate and convenient outlet. After the grantors agreed to the revisions and recorded an amended right-of-way agreement, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. We affirm.

This is an action for injunctive relief filed by a historical-preservation society against the City of Memphis and a nonprofit corporation. Prior to filing its complaint, the society filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Tennessee Historical Commission that sought a declaration on the applicability of the Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016 (“THPA”) to two parks and related monuments conveyed by the City to the nonprofit. In the present action, the historical-preservation society requested a temporary injunction under the THPA to preserve the parks and monuments pending the Commission’s final order. The trial court found the society could not prevail on the merits of its claim because the parks and monuments were no longer public property and, thus, were no longer subject to the THPA. Having determined that the historical-preservation society failed to assert a viable cause of action under the THPA, we affirm.

Messrs. Teddy and Terry Ogle filed a “Petition for Rule 60(b)” relief. Mr. Ronnie Ray Ogle filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Motion for Correction of [I]llegal Sentence and Amended Motion for Relief from Judgment.” The trial court treated the pleadings as petitions for post-conviction relief and dismissed the petitions because they were filed well after the statute of limitations. This court consolidated the three appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an action filed by a healthcare management company against a county for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The dispute centered on a financially distressed hospital, which the county wanted to purchase and lease to the healthcare company to manage. Thus, the county, the hospital, and the healthcare management company entered into a Letter of Intent to accomplish this goal. The Letter of Intent provided that the healthcare management company would loan funds to the owner of the hospital to keep the hospital operating while the county negotiated the asset purchase agreement. If the purchase of the hospital closed by the agreed-upon deadline, the county agreed to repay the healthcare management company for the amount loaned; however, if the purchase of the hospital did not close by the deadline, the county was not obligated to repay the loans to the hospital. After the asset purchase agreement did not close by the deadline set in the Letter of Intent, the county purchased the hospital and awarded the contract to manage the hospital to a company owned by the county’s attorneys and refused to pay the healthcare management company the more than $1.2 million it loaned the hospital. Thereafter, the healthcare management company filed this action against the county for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In its answer, the county denied breaching the contract because of the failure of the condition precedent, that the purchase of the hospital close by the agreed-upon deadline. Thereafter, the county filed a motion for summary judgment on the same ground and also moved to summarily dismiss the unjust enrichment claim because the Letter of Intent, which was an enforceable contract, precluded the claim. The healthcare management company responded by presenting evidence indicating that the county failed to act in good faith to close on the purchase of the hospital by the deadline in order to avoid its obligations to the healthcare management company. It also contended that its claim of unjust enrichment should not be dismissed unless the court determined that the Letter of Intent was an enforceable contract. The trial court summarily dismissed both claims on the finding the evidence was not sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to either claim. Having determined that the evidence was sufficient, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Following a trial, a Shelby County jury found Defendant, Gary Barnett, guilty of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the forensic interview of the victim; (2) the trial court erred in restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of two witnesses; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gregory Scott Wilburn, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the remainder of his sentence to be served in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves competing petitions to modify a parenting plan and child support. The trial court denied the father’s request to be designated as the primary residential parent, granted the mother sole decision-making authority, and enjoined the father from certain activities. The trial court also refused to decrease the father’s child support obligation and awarded the mother $55,000 in attorney’s fees. With regard to the trial court’s modification of primary residential parent designation and the residential parenting schedule, we conclude that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and failed to conduct an appropriate best interest analysis. We also conclude that the trial court miscalculated the father’s child support obligation by allotting to him an incorrect number of parenting days and by relying on his anticipated income rather than his actual income in the child support worksheet. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this retaliatory discharge action, the plaintiff filed suit against his former employer under both the common law and the Tennessee Public Protection Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2014). The plaintiff claimed that he was terminated for voicing his concerns about, or refusing to participate in, illegal activities. The former employer moved for summary judgment arguing, in part, that the plaintiff could not identify a specific illegal activity or a violation of a clearly established public policy. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The pro se Appellant, Jasper L. Vick, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Appellant has failed to establish that his sentence is illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion.

This case involves an effort to admit a lost will to probate. In the proceedings below, the trial court held that the lost will should be accepted for probate. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Initially, Decedent’s Mother was appointed personal representative of Decedent’s estate without notice to Decedent’s spouse or minor child. Spouse promptly filed a petition to remove Decedent’s mother as personal representative. The trial court granted the petition and named the guardian ad litem of the child as personal representative of the estate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case arises out of an incident in 2004 when five Campbell County deputy sheriffs went to the plaintiffs’ residence. The officers ordered the wife of Lester Eugene Siler, and his son, Dakota Siler, to leave the house. The deputies then proceeded to beat and torture Mr. Siler for more than two hours in an attempt to get him to sign a search warrant. Their efforts were to no avail. They arrested Mr. and Mrs. Siler and charged them at the jail with offenses. These charges were ultimately dismissed. Subsequently, plaintiffs sued the five deputies. In addition, the suit named as defendants, Chief Deputy Charles Scott, Sheriff Ron McClellan, and Campbell County. The trial court granted separate motions to dismiss filed by Scott and McClellan, finding them to be immune from suit. Following a lengthy delay, a jury trial took place in 2016. At the beginning of the trial, the defendants admitted liability on all of plaintiffs’ claims. The jury awarded Lester Siler a total of $90,000 against the individual defendants, and $10,000 against Campbell County. The trial court suggested, and Campbell County accepted, an additur to the awards against the county, increasing them to $25,000. In a pre-trial ruling, the court held this amount to be the maximum liability against the county for each plaintiff, based on its ruling that sovereign immunity was waived but only to the extent of the $25,000 sheriff’s surety bond. The jury awarded zero damages to Jenny Siler and Dakota Siler. Plaintiffs raise numerous issues on appeal, asserting, among other things, that the trial court erred in refusing their request to change venue, improperly conducting jury selection, making several errors in the admission and preclusion of evidence, dismissing Scott and McClellan, limiting Campbell County’s liability to $25,000 total per plaintiff, incorrectly instructing the jury, and declining their request for attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs further argue that the verdicts were below the range of reasonableness. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

In this post-divorce action, the trial court denied the wife’s request for relief from a prior judgment and ordered the parties to comply with their written marital dissolution agreement regarding the sale of a parcel of marital real property. Following numerous motions filed by the parties, including several motions for recusal filed by the wife, the trial court eventually granted recusal. The newly assigned trial court judge held a hearing to consider pending motions and determine the status of the case, and the wife filed another motion to recuse shortly after that hearing. The trial court entered a subsequent order, wherein the court denied recusal and instructed the Clerk and Master to select a realtor and sell the parcel of property on the parties’ behalf. Wife subsequently filed a motion seeking “relief of void orders,” pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which was denied by the trial court. Wife filed a second but different Rule 60 motion thereafter, which was also denied by the trial court. Wife timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in this matter. We grant Husband’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ MDA and remand this issue to the trial court for a determination of a reasonable award of attorney’s fees in favor of Husband. We deny Wife’s motions seeking supplementation of the record and consideration of postjudgment facts.

This appeal arises from an unlawful detainer action initiated by the conservator of the owner of the property. After the general sessions court awarded the conservator possession of the property, the defendant appealed to circuit court. The defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the conservator had exceeded the scope of the conservatorship in filing the unlawful detainer action, and that unlawful detainer was not the proper cause of action. The circuit court denied summary judgment, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. Following trial, the circuit court awarded possession of the house to the conservator, and the defendant now appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves a contentious dispute over visitation and child support for the parties’ minor child. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record before us, we hold that the evidence supports the parenting plan determination and other rulings made by the court.

We granted this appeal to consider whether a circuit court loses continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction if a post-divorce petition seeking modification of a parenting plan adopted in a final divorce decree alleges facts that are tantamount to an unruly child claim, over which juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-103. After we granted this appeal, the General Assembly amended section 37-1-103 to expressly provide that a circuit court retains subject matter jurisdiction in these circumstances until and unless a pleading is filed or relief is sought in juvenile court and the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction is invoked. Act of April 18, 2019, 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 167. The General Assembly applied this amendment to all cases pending on its April 18, 2019 effective date, including this appeal. Id. § 2. Because no pleading was filed in juvenile court nor was the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction invoked in any other manner in this case, the circuit court retained subject matter jurisdiction of the post-divorce petition. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is reinstated.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit concerning the enforcement of restrictive covenants in a subdivision. River Plantation Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (“the Association”), later joined by certain individual property owners (“Plaintiffs” collectively), sued property owners R. Randall Capps and his wife Carolyn Brown Capps (“the Capps”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant requiring homeowners to have a paved driveway. The Capps have a gravel driveway and wish to keep it. The Trial Court found in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered the Capps to install a concrete driveway. The Capps appeal, raising several issues, including one as to whether the Association lacks standing. We hold, inter alia, that the Association, although not specified in the restrictive covenants as a party capable of suing to enforce restrictions, has standing to do so. In light of the unambiguous driveway restriction and the fact that the Association never waived enforcement, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. However, we modify the Trial Court’s judgment to allow the Capps, if they so choose, to use asphalt instead of concrete, as the Association has no objection to it. In addition, we reverse the Trial Court’s decision to not award Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees incurred in successfully bringing this enforcement action where the restrictive covenants specifically provide for such attorney’s fees. We, therefore, remand for the determination and award to Plaintiffs of reasonable attorney’s fees. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arose from a divorce action filed by the wife. The husband and the wife appeared before the trial court and presented a settlement agreement for the trial court’s approval. Prior to entry of the court’s order approving the settlement agreement, the husband filed written notice that he no longer consented to the agreement. Following entry of the trial court’s order in June 2018, the husband filed a motion seeking to set aside such order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. In his motion, the husband argued that the trial court had failed to supply him with a functioning voice amplification system that he had requested for use during the hearing and that he had misunderstood the terms of the parties’ agreement. The trial court denied the husband’s motion without hearing evidence regarding whether the husband had a disability for which accommodation during the proceedings was necessary or making a finding regarding whether he had properly requested the accommodation as asserted in his motion. Upon a thorough review of the record, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for an evidentiary hearing concerning the husband’s motion.