APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Anthony Martin, alias, appeals his jury conviction for rape of a child. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to question him about facts underlying a statutory rape by an authority figure conviction as a prior inconsistent statement. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an action for declaratory judgment as to the ownership of a business, defamation, and tortious interference with business relations. The plaintiff carpet cleaner alleged that the defendant entrepreneur and his wife loaned money to the plaintiff to expand his carpet cleaning business with the condition that the defendants handle the business’s finances and bookkeeping. The defendants asserted that they started a new carpet cleaning business and the plaintiff was merely an employee. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial and remittitur. On appeal, the defendants contend that the trial judge failed to fulfill his duty as the thirteenth juror and there was no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict or award of damages. After reviewing the record, we find the trial judge fulfilled his role as the thirteenth juror and that there was material evidence to support the jury’s verdict and award of damages. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment against the defendants.

The trial court granted a default judgment to the plaintiff in March 2009, which judgment invalidated a deed for real property transferred from the plaintiff to her son and daughterin- law. The trial court subsequently set aside the default judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the basis for the ruling. Following a consequent bench trial, the trial court upheld the deed from the plaintiff to her son, although the plaintiff sought to have the deed set aside based on undue influence and fraud. The plaintiff has appealed. Based upon our determination that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order that set aside the default judgment, we vacate both the trial court’s final order and the order setting aside the default judgment. We remand this matter to the trial court for entry of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the legal basis of the trial court’s decision to set aside the default judgment, or, in the alternative, reconsideration of that judgment.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s entry of a default judgment against defendants and its denial of defendants’ motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court’s entry of default, however, was not a final judgment because it did not address the plaintiff’s claim for damages. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The plaintiff in this action is a retired employee of the defendant county. She filed a complaint in October 2009, asserting claims of negligence, breach of contract, intentional or negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty related to a county employee’s alleged faulty advice and lack of disclosure to her concerning the interplay of her disability benefits policy and her retirement plan. Upon the county’s motion, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the county in July 2016, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims of misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court subsequently denied the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining issues. Following a bench trial in July 2018, the trial court entered a judgment awarding to the plaintiff the amount of $13,985.52. The county timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court’s final order does not sufficiently explain the legal basis upon which the money judgment was awarded, we vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining the basis of the judgment or, in the alternative, reconsideration of the judgment.

Petitioner, Steven Douglas Fish, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because Petitioner’s judgment is not void and that Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief because his petition was filed outside of the statute of limitations period. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal arises from a commercial lease dispute. The trial court summarily ruled that Simmons Bank, which acquired the tenant originally named in the lease in a merger, had the right to exercise a renewal option. The appellant landlord contends this was error because “(1) the plain language of the lease expressly indicated the option could only be exercised by the tenant originally named in the lease and (2) two events of default occurred [as a result of the merger] which precluded the exercise of the option under the plain terms of the lease.” The alleged events of default were that (1) the original tenant failed to “maintain its legal existence,” and (2) the original tenant transferred its interest to Simmons Bank by operation of law. We have determined that regardless of whether the lease was transferred to Simmons Bank by merger pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(2) “without reversion or impairment,” the parties agreed to restrict any transfer of the right to renew the lease to one entity, First State Bank, “the Tenant originally named” in the lease. Accordingly, and relying on the legal principle that a statute shall not be applied to construe a contract when the parties to the contract express a contrary intention, the agreed-upon renewal restriction in the lease controls. As a consequence, Simmons Bank does not have the right to exercise the renewal option. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Simmons Bank and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the landlord.  

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Matia P. (“Mother”) to her minor children Charlie-Lynn P. and Pharaoh P. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that termination of her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest because she has taken certain steps to address her mental health and domestic violence issues. We find and hold that the Juvenile Court did not err in finding that clear and convincing evidence was shown as to all three grounds. We find and hold further that, notwithstanding Mother’s purported improvements, the Juvenile Court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

In this appeal, the parties were declared divorced in February 2013 when the trial court approved their marital dissolution agreement and entered a final decree of divorce; at the same time, the parties entered into a separate agreement which was to govern the transfer of the wife’s marital interest in four businesses operated by the husband. In July 2014, the husband filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02(5) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to have the decree set aside. The court granted the motion and vacated the decree, reinstating the marital relationship; the court also rescinded the agreement transferring the wife’s interest in the businesses on the ground of mutual mistake. Following a trial, the court entered a final decree of divorce in 2017. Both parties appeal. Wife asserts that the trial court erred in vacating the 2013 decree, in rescinding the parties’ agreement, and in failing to award her all of the attorney’s fees she incurred at the trial court level. Husband appeals the division of the marital estate in the 2017 decree, and contends that the trial court erred when it failed to order the return of payments he made to wife pursuant to the agreement that was rescinded and alimony payments he made pursuant to the 2013 decree that was vacated. Both parties seek their attorney’s fees on appeal. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects and decline to award fees on appeal.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Mario Walls, of attempted second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, contending that the proof did not show he was aware his conduct was reasonably certain to result in the victim’s death. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Katelyn Bateman, appeals as of right from the Cheatham County Circuit Court’s order revoking her community corrections sentence and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sentence served in confinement rather than permitting a furlough to the drug court program. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Fiona Eischeid Flodin (“Wife”) filed for divorce from Tan Scott Flodin (“Husband”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Husband, in the latter years of the marriage, was unemployed by his choice. Husband asserted that he contributed by helping Wife with her real estate business. Wife asserted that Husband’s contributions were minimal and that he refused to work despite her urging him to get a job. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding, inter alia, that Husband lived a life of leisure while Wife did the vast majority of the work both for pay and at home. The Trial Court found all the witnesses credible except Husband. The Trial Court proceeded to award Husband around 38% of the marital estate as well as six months of transitional alimony at the rate of $2,000 per month. Husband appealed. Husband argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred in its valuation of certain marital assets, in its division of the marital estate, and in not awarding him more alimony than it did. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings. The values adopted by the Trial Court as to marital assets were within the range of evidence presented. In addition, the Trial Court appropriately considered the relevant factors in its decisions regarding alimony and the marital estate. We discern no abuse of discretion or other error by the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, David G. Andrews, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2017 conviction for robbery and his ten-year sentence. He contends that the judgment is void. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This interlocutory appeal involves a discovery dispute. G.G., an eighth-grade student, was expelled from Boyd-Buchanan School after he sent sexually explicit messages to a female student on a social media platform. G.G. and his mother, Jackie Johnson, filed a complaint against Boyd-Buchanan School and other school officials. The trial court dismissed most of plaintiffs’ claims. The only remaining claim is plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against the school. During discovery, plaintiffs requested the employment files of various school administrators and extensive information relating to the disciplinary records of non-party students. The school filed a motion for a protective order. The court granted the school’s motion in part and denied it in part. The school then requested permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted permission to appeal, as did this Court. In this opinion, we clarify the appropriate legal standard for analyzing discovery disputes. We also hold that the trial court abused its discretion by entering an order that would allow plaintiffs to discover information that is irrelevant to their breach of contract claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order granting Boyd-Buchanan School’s motion for a protective order in its entirety.

The defendant, Derrick Williamson, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of alternative sentencing for his jury conviction of child abuse. Discerning no error, we affirm.

John W. McClarty, J., dissenting. The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion by entering an order that would allow the plaintiffs to discover information that is irrelevant to their breach of contract claim.

The Defendant, Damarcus C. Nelson, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his four-year sentence for solicitation of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the law or participated in gang-related activity, and he maintains that the remaining “technical” violations did not warrant incarceration. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Daversea A. Fitts, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to sufficiently corroborate accomplice testimony presented at trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her daughter. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination were proven and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights. Mother appeals but only challenges whether the judgment is valid if the guardian ad litem was not present for the termination hearing. After careful review, we conclude that the presence of the guardian ad litem could not be waived by the other parties at the trial on the merits. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This case involves a prisoner’s appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint, wherein he raised numerous claims relating back to his seizure, arrest, prosecution, and conviction, all of which occurred from 1998 to 2000. The trial court dismissed all of the prisoner’s claims on numerous grounds, including that they were time-barred by various statutes of limitations and that many of the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity. Concluding that because certain defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity and that all of the prisoner’s claims are either time-barred or do not comply with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm.

The petitioner, Jeffrey Mason, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017
guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Early Reynolds, of unlawful possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction involving use, or attempted use, of force, violence, or a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to serve fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements made to the police after he invoked his right to remain silent; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a photograph of the Defendant holding a gun; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court.

In this, his sixth petition for habeas corpus relief, the Petitioner, Milburn Levon Edwards, contends that his burglary, rape and assault convictions are illegal because his sentences were ordered to be served at forty percent instead of thirty-five percent. The trial court summarily dismissed his petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it denied his habeas corpus petition and then it erred when it denied his subsequently filed motion to correct clerical errors pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because his judgments were not file-stamped. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 2014, the Petitioner, Paul Brent Baxter, was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to serve thirty-five years. The Defendant appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Paul Brent Baxter, No. M2015-00939-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 2928266 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 16, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus sixty years. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.