APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A bank extended a line of credit to a husband and wife in 2007 and obtained as security a parcel of undeveloped property. The bank foreclosed on the property in 2009 upon the couple’s default on the loan and filed suit in 2010 to collect a deficiency judgment. The trial court’s award of a deficiency judgment was reversed on appeal. The husband and wife then filed a complaint against the bank in 2014, based on the same line of credit agreement, claiming the bank had engaged in fraud and breach of contract. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 2014 complaint, and the couple appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment, finding (1) the couple waived their breach of contract claim by failing to assert it as a compulsory counterclaim in the 2010 litigation and (2) the couple’s fraud claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

This appeal concerns the unauthorized practice of law. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Jonathon Trotter (“Trotter”) alleging that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Trotter had advertised on Facebook and Craigslist that, for a fee, he would prepare various legal documents for customers. Trotter, however, was not an attorney. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, which Trotter failed to reply to in a manner compliant with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court granted the State’s motion with respect to liability. The Trial Court later assessed damages against Trotter. Trotter appeals, arguing material facts are disputed such that his case should survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. We find and hold that the State made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, and that Trotter failed to show that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. We affirm.

An inmate housed in a private prison filed a complaint naming several defendants including the Tennessee Department of Correction, the owner of the prison, and the owner’s employees. The complaint alleged several causes of action, including various violations of his constitutional rights, defamation, and breach of contract. All defendants filed motions to dismiss averring that the inmate failed to state any claims for which relief could be granted, and that the inmate failed to comply with the procedural requirements applicable to inmates bringing civil claims in forma pauperis. We affirm as modified.  

Defendant, Thomas Clinton Wood, was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to three years in confinement as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action involves the petitioner’s termination of employment as a firefighter for the City of Cleveland. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari and sought partial summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, that the termination procedure was unlawful. The trial court agreed and granted partial summary judgment. The case proceeded to a hearing on damages, after which, the court found that the petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence in securing employment. The petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend. The court then altered its original order and held that material evidence existed in the record to support the termination decision, reversing the order for partial summary judgment and dismissing the action. The petitioner appeals. We reverse.

After a state administrative law judge concluded the proper tax classification for the property owned and operated by a private pilot’s club in 2010 and 2011 to be “farm property,” the county property assessor reclassified it in 2013 as split property, commercial and farm. The club paid its 2013 to 2016 taxes “under protest” and filed consolidated complaints in chancery court, seeking a refund under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-901. The club argued that the chancery court had jurisdiction over its claim because purely legal issues were involved and the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel prevented such reclassification. Upon determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court granted the government’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.

This appeal follows the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration as to a claim for fraudulent inducement.  For the reasons stated herein, namely that there was no agreement to arbitrate such a claim, we affirm.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Probate Court of Davidson County, Tennessee has subject matter jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate. The decedent resided in Pennsylvania most of his life. Three weeks before his death, the decedent moved into an assisted living facility in Nashville, Tennessee to be near one of his sons. Shortly following his death, the son who was nominated to be the executor filed a Petition for Letters Testamentary in Davidson County Probate Court. The decedent’s daughter from Pennsylvania contested the court’s jurisdiction, arguing the decedent was domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of death. Following a four-day evidentiary hearing on the issue of domicile, the probate court determined the decedent was domiciled in Tennessee and admitted the will to probate. Because the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination that the decedent was domiciled in Tennessee, we affirm.

I concur in the opinion of the Court.  I write separately to address the appealability of an order compelling arbitration.   

A mother filed a complaint seeking to establish paternity. After years of litigation, the trial court established paternity and designated mother as the primary residential parent. The trial court determined that the father engaged in conduct that necessitated limiting his residential parenting time with the child. As a result, the trial court fashioned a residential parenting schedule that severely restricted the father’s parenting time, and the father appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

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This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found that the proof supported three grounds for termination as to both parents: substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2), persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3), and failure to manifest an ability to parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). The court further found that the termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the proof supported the substantial noncompliance ground as to Mother, reverse its finding that the proof supported the substantial noncompliance ground as to Father, vacate the other grounds for termination against both Mother and Father based upon insufficient findings by the trial court, affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our direction in this Opinion.

After entering an order granting Mother sole residential custody and providing Father restricted parenting time, the trial court awarded Mother discretionary costs in the amount of $45,238.85. Father appeals the trial court’s award of discretionary costs. Because Father failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion, we affirm the award of discretionary costs.

Petitioner, Charles Pennington, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present a defense regarding the victim’s ownership of the gun and failure to
cross-examine his codefendants regarding the details of their plea agreements. Petitioner also asserts that his due process right to a fair trial was violated by the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony from one of his codefendants. Although we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal in the interest of justice, we conclude that Petitioner’s grounds for relief are waived because they were not raised in the post-conviction court. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Earl Vantrease and Justin Howell, both of whom are inmates at Whiteville Correctional Facility, filed a complaint against several defendants alleging various claims, including the failure to provide a diet program that comports with the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Mr. Vantrease filed an affidavit of inability to pay costs and statutorily mandated accompanying documents. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-801, et seq. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Mr. Vantrease failed to include all required information in his accompanying documents. The trial court agreed; it entered an order dismissing the complaint for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-805. Mr. Vantrease appeals. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint without prejudice.

In this interlocutory appeal, we address whether the attorney-client privilege protects communications between a corporation’s legal counsel and a third-party nonemployee of the corporation. After acquiring four commercial properties, a corporation filed unlawful detainer actions against the properties’ tenants. The tenants subpoenaed documents from a property management company hired by the corporation to manage its properties. The corporation and the property management company objected to producing documents containing communications between the corporation’s legal counsel and the property management company, arguing that the attorney-client privilege protected the documents. The trial court held that the documents were protected because the attorney-client privilege extended to the property management company as an agent of the corporation. We hold that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between an entity’s legal counsel and a third-party nonemployee of the entity if the nonemployee is the functional equivalent of the entity’s employee and when the communications relate to the subject matter of legal counsel’s representation of the entity and the communications were made with the intention that they would be kept confidential. Applying this framework, we hold that the property management company was the functional equivalent of an employee of the corporation, that the communications related to the subject matter of counsel’s representation of the corporation, and that the communications were made with the intention that they would be kept confidential. We affirm the ruling of the trial court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Antonio Howard, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. After a review of the record, we hold that the Petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient in this regard and that the Petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by the deficiency. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition and remand this case with instructions to that court that it grant the Petitioner a delayed appeal, beginning with the right to file a delayed motion for new trial.

The Appellant, Nehemiah Rimmer, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and received a twenty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession, that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s and her mother’s out-of-court statements to be read to the jury, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jayme Lynn Shaffer, pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 with an agreed effective sentence of three years. The parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine the manner of service of her sentence and whether she was entitled to judicial diversion. After the hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion but granted her request for a probationary sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child as well as the court’s best interest determination. Because we find clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s decisions regarding both grounds for termination and the best interest of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

This direct appeal involves a lawyer disciplinary proceeding against a Memphis attorney arising from two client complaints and the lawyer’s failure to satisfy fully Mississippi’s requirements for pro hac vice admission before representing a criminal defendant in Mississippi. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility (“Hearing Panel”) determined that the lawyer had violated four provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”). After consulting the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) and considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, including the lawyer’s seventeen prior disciplinary sanctions, the Hearing Panel suspended the lawyer for six months and directed thirty days of the sanction to be served on active suspension with the remainder to be served on probation with conditions, including a practice monitor, restitution, and continuing legal education focused on law office management, client communication, and client relations. The lawyer appealed the Hearing Panel’s judgment, and the Chancery Court for Shelby County affirmed. The lawyer then appealed to this Court. After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm.

At an earlier time, Byron L. Jackson, Jr. (plaintiff) and defendant Jay Howard Crippen operated a company named Swiss Technologies, Inc. There were disagreements. The parties engaged in mediation. Following mediation, the parties, including Swiss, entered into a three year consulting agreement for Jackson pursuant to which he was to be paid $30,000 annually, “less the cost of health and related insurance.” The contract provides that plaintiff “shall be entitled to health and related insurance . . . on the same term as other employees of [Swiss].” The parties stipulated that every other employee paid no more than one-half the cost of their health insurance, and employer paid the other half. Defendants Crippen and Swiss (collectively defendants) deducted the full amount of health insurance premiums from plaintiff’s pay. Plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract. The trial court held that the contract was unambiguous, and that it required defendants to pay one-half of plaintiff’s health care insurance costs. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Morris Rucker, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Marico Vales, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (first degree murder); 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Wendy Sterling Weinert, a former City of Sevierville police officer, brought this retaliatory discharge action against her former employer pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2018). She alleged that she was discharged solely because of her whistleblowing activities of reporting an alleged incident of excessive force and alleged sexual harassment by other officers. The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that plaintiff could not establish that her termination was solely caused because of her whistleblowing activities, as required by the TPPA. We affirm.

In 1992, the Petitioner, Ercil K. Rayford, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery for an effective sentence of thirty years. On April 23, 2018, the Petitioner filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence had expired on July 12, 1999. The habeas corpus court denied the petition because the record failed to establish that the Petitioner’s sentence had expired. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his sentence has expired. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal.