APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

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Petitioner, Walter George Glenn, appeals the denial of his petition for post-convictionrelief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After thorough review, we determine that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Larry W. Hopkins, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-502 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of twenty-five years’ incarceration at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of the victim and (2) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An Anderson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Gordon Scot Katz, with reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of the same, and the trial court imposed a sentence of two years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and alleges the trial court erred when denying the defendant’s request to cross-examine a witness regarding pending criminal charges and that the State presented alternate theories of liability, thereby calling the unanimity of the jury’s verdict into question. After hearing the arguments of the parties, reviewing the record, and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties negotiated, signed, and submitted to the trial court a marital dissolution agreement. The trial court approved and incorporated the MDA into its final judgment. Twenty-nine days after entry of the judgment, Ridley David Hassler (husband) filed a “motion to set aside” the final judgment and MDA. He told the trial court that he wanted to repudiate the MDA, arguing that it was ambiguous and that he and Linda Sue Hassler (wife) had differing interpretations of it. The trial court denied the motion, finding the MDA unambiguous, valid, and enforceable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tony Gibson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of tampering with evidence, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following his retirement, an alimony obligor petitioned to terminate his alimony. The parties agreed that the obligor’s retirement represented a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support decree. But the obligor also conceded his ability to pay the alimony. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the obligor failed to meet his burden of proof and denied his request to terminate his alimony obligation. The court also awarded the obligor’s former spouse her attorney’s fees without specifying the basis for the award. On appeal, the obligor argues, among other things, that his former spouse had the burden of proving her continuing need for alimony once a substantial and material change in circumstances was conceded. We affirm the denial of the request to terminate alimony but vacate the award of attorney’s fees.

The pro se Appellant, Donald Ragland, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to correct and illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Appellant has failed to establish that his sentences are illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion.

Following his retirement, an alimony obligor petitioned to terminate his alimony. The parties agreed that the obligor’s retirement represented a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support decree. But the obligor also conceded his ability to pay the alimony. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the obligor failed to meet his burden of proof and denied his request to terminate his alimony obligation. The court also awarded the obligor’s former spouse her attorney’s fees without specifying the basis for the award. On appeal, the obligor argues, among other things, that his former spouse had the burden of proving her continuing need for alimony once a substantial and material change in circumstances was conceded. We affirm the denial of the request to terminate alimony but vacate the award of attorney’s fees.

The Defendant, Terry Patterson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, in Count 1; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, in Count 2; aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, in Count 3; second degree murder, a Class A felony, in Count 4; and aggravated child endangerment, a Class A felony, in Count 5. He was sentenced to twenty-five year terms for the aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, aggravated child endangerment, and second degree murder convictions, and six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction. The court ordered that the sentences for the aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated child endangerment convictions be served concurrent with each other but consecutive to the sentences for the second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions, which were ordered to be served concurrent with each other, for an effective term of fifty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) his convictions for second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter should be merged, as should his convictions for aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect and aggravated child endangerment; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After review, we modify the Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter in Count 2 to reckless endangerment and impose a sentence of four years for that conviction, the judgment of which should indicate the merger of Count 2 into Count 4; reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child endangerment in Count 5; and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 4 to indicate the merger of Count 2 into Count 4. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other regards.

A debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case hired an attorney to represent him in his divorce. Several years later, the attorney filed suit against the debtor for unpaid legal fees. The debtor raised the statute of limitations as a defense. The attorney claimed she delayed filing suit after receiving a letter from the debtor’s bankruptcy counsel. The letter asked the attorney to “[p]lease cease collection pursuant to the automatic stay of 11 USC § 362.” Applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the trial court “decline[d] to apply the statute of limitations as unjust” and granted judgment to the attorney for the unpaid fees. Because the court erred in concluding that the debtor was equitably estopped from asserting his statute of limitations defense, we reverse.

The Defendant, Victor Martin, was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and setting fire to personal property, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-seven years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, contending that the State failed to establish use of deadly weapon, serious bodily injury, confinement that exceeded the accompanying felony, or his identity; (2) that the State committed a Ferguson violation by failing to preserve both a second photographic lineup and a single photograph shown to the victim on an iPad, thereby violating his due process rights requiring dismissal of the indictment or, alternatively, a limiting instruction; (3) that admission of the victim’s medical records was improper given that the affidavit from the hospital’s custodian of records was insufficient violating Tennessee Rule of Evidence 902(11); and (4) that the trial court erred by giving the jury an instruction on flight because it was not supported by the proof. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal of the termination of a tenured teacher’s employment pursuant to the Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-5-501 to – 515. The Director of Schools of the Franklin Special School District filed Charges for Dismissal of the tenured teacher on the grounds of unprofessional conduct, incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, and neglect of duty. The charging document alleged multiple incidents of unprofessional conduct based on a lack of adherence to required procedures, particularly in the area of special education laws and procedures. It further alleged that the teacher was placed on a Corrective Action Plan for the 2014-2015 school year, during which the teacher was found to be in violation of the plan on multiple occasions. Moreover, at the end of the 2014-2015 school year, the teacher was suspended for three days without pay as a result of an incident that occurred on May 11, 2015, during which the teacher improperly restrained a special education student, which violated the student’s individualized education plan. The charging document also identified, inter alia, an incident that occurred on October 28, 2015, when the teacher got into a physical altercation with a special education student who refused to return the teacher’s day planner and which resulted in the two falling to the floor. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Impartial Hearing Officer recommended dismissal on the grounds of unprofessional conduct. When the school board voted to sustain the Hearing Officer’s decision, the teacher sought review in chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the teacher’s dismissal based on the grounds of unprofessional conduct and incompetence. This appeal followed. Because the Hearing Officer did not find that the ground of incompetence had been proven, and that decision was not appealed, the ground of incompetence was not before the court. Therefore, it may not be considered as a ground for dismissal. However, we affirm the decision to dismiss the tenured teacher’s employment with the school district on the ground of unprofessional conduct.

Petitioner, Derrick Helms, appeals the summary denial of his pro se petition for postconviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court did not follow the proper procedures for a preliminary consideration of his petition and that the allegations in the petition, when taken as true, stated a colorable claim for relief. The State concedes that the post-conviction court erred in its summary denial of relief without the appointment of counsel and a hearing. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Rodney Carson Forbes, Defendant, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion seeking pretrial jail credits. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce child custody and relocation action involving one child, who was seven years of age when the case was commenced. Following the parties’ divorce, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent of the child and was awarded 225 days of co-parenting time annually. The father was awarded 140 co-parenting days per year with the child. In response to notice that the mother intended to relocate to California with the child, the father filed a petition in opposition to relocation and a petition to modify custody. The mother subsequently filed an answer and a petition requesting injunctive relief and modification of the existing permanent parenting plan. After the father’s attorney failed to appear for the hearing or inform the trial court in advance of his whereabouts, the trial court dismissed the father’s petitions for failure to prosecute. The trial court subsequently granted the mother’s petition for injunctive relief and allowed the mother to move to California with the child. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Gary Allen McKennie, sought coram nobis relief from his convictions, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered; therefore, the convictions were void. The coram nobis court denied the petition, finding that it was not timely and that coram nobis relief was unavailable to a Petitioner who had entered a guilty plea. The Petitioner appeals the coram nobis court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

We granted the Rule 9 application for an interlocutory appeal filed by The Krystal Company (“Krystal”) to consider whether certain communications between Krystal’s chief legal officer and David Jungling (“Jungling”), an employee of Krystal vendor Denali Sourcing Services, Inc. (“Denali”), are protected by attorney-client privilege. Waste Administrative Services, Inc. (“WASI”), which provided refuse service for Krystal, sued Krystal, Denali, and Jungling in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Krystal breached their contract by unilaterally terminating it and that Denali and Jungling induced the breach. The Trial Court held that communications between Jungling and Krystal’s chief legal officer after June 9, 2014— at which time Krystal and Denali executed a master agreement—are protected by attorney-client privilege while prior communications are not. We hold that Jungling was the functional equivalent of a Krystal employee as of October 31, 2013 when he was told by Krystal’s President to “take lead” on Krystal’s dealings with WASI, and that his subsequent communications with Krystal’s chief legal officer qualify for attorney-client privilege belonging to Krystal. We, therefore, modify the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, Charles Glen Connor, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief arguing (1) that “the State failed to provide and defense counsel failed to seek discoverable recorded interviews of witnesses in violation of Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 83 (1963)],” and (2) that trial counsel “failed to keep [the Petitioner] informed of the evidence against him.” After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Thomas Allen Stringer, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault and one count of felony evading arrest. In a superseding presentment, Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of misdemeanor assault and one count of felony evading arrest. The jury found Defendant not guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years for his felony evading arrest conviction and 11 months and 29 days for each of his assault convictions. The trial court ordered all of Defendant’s sentences to run consecutive to each other. The court ordered Defendant to serve three years, 11 months, and 29 days incarcerated and the remaining 11 months and 29 days to be served on Community Corrections. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a fraudulent transfer case. Defendant-debtor purportedly orchestrated the removal and transfer of large sums of money to and from several different business entities—all of which are controlled by Defendant. Plaintiff-creditor sued, at first naming only Defendant and one entity; however, during the course of litigation, Plaintiff discovered two other entities possibly involved in Defendant’s scheme. After being added as defendants, these two additional entities moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s TUFTA claim against them pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), which the trial court granted. We reverse.

The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of L.B.M. (mother) and J.W.H. (father) with respect to their only child, E.M. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence for terminating mother’s rights on the ground of severe child abuse. By the same quantum of proof, the court found that termination of mother’s rights is in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights. We affirm.

Heirs of intestate decedent appeal the probate court’s construction and interpretation of a trust agreement established by the decedent’s wife and the decedent’s wife’s will. The trust terminated at the death of the decedent and court awarded the assets remaining in the trust in accordance with the residual clause of the decedent’s wife’s will, rather than allowing the assets to go to Husband’s estate, as sought by the decedent’s heirs. We conclude that the trial court’s construction and interpretation of the instruments and distribution of assets aligns with the decedent’s wife’s expressed intent and accordingly, affirm the judgment.

The pro se appellant, a state inmate incarcerated on capital murder convictions, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Bradley County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Claiming to have information regarding a homicide other than those for which he was convicted, the petitioner requested that the trial court direct the Bradley County Grand Jury foreperson to grant him the right to testify before the grand jury pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-12-104 (2014). The petitioner subsequently filed a motion to be transported for a hearing, requesting that the trial court issue a habeas corpus ad testificandum. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) then filed a response in opposition to the petition for writ of mandamus. The petitioner responded by filing a motion to strike the State’s response, arguing that the State was not a proper party to this action. On October 26, 2017, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition for writ of mandamus, finding, inter alia, that the petitioner possessed no mandatory right to appear before the grand jury. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Edgar C. Salinas, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari seeking relief from his two convictions of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective twenty-two-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, the appeal is dismissed.

J.S. (father) appeals the trial court’s adjudication that his children C.T. and L.T. were dependent and neglected and severely abused in the care of father and A.T. (mother). Mother, who did not appeal, testified, among other things, that father bought her illegal drugs while she was pregnant, and that she and father abused drugs and alcohol during her pregnancy. Father denied mother’s allegations. The twin children were born prematurely and tested positive for opana, an opioid, and oxycodone. The trial court expressly credited mother’s testimony and discredited father’s. On appeal, father bases his assertion of error solely on his argument that the trial court incorrectly assessed the credibility of the witnesses, and that the trial court should have believed him instead of mother. We affirm.