APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this divorce action, the trial court entered a “Judgment and Parenting Plan” on July 10, 2017, which addressed, inter alia, issues regarding division of the parties’ assets and debts, co-parenting time with the parties’ minor children, child support, and alimony. Within thirty days of entry of the judgment, the parties filed competing motions, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59, seeking amendment of the July 10, 2017 judgment. The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the Rule 59 motions on August 1, 2017; issued an oral ruling; and directed the mother’s counsel to prepare an order. On August 7, 2017, the father filed a petition seeking to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan in order to reflect that one of the children had recently been spending minimal time with the mother. Subsequently, on September 11, 2017, the father filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial court judge, asserting that the judge had exhibited bias against the father or his counsel by the judge’s statements and actions during the August 1, 2017 hearing. On November 6, 2017, the trial court entered an order disposing of the Rule 59 motions. Later that same day, the trial court entered a separate order granting the recusal motion. The mother filed an appeal from the trial court’s order concerning the Rule 59 motions. On appeal, the father filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and a motion seeking this Court’s consideration of certain post-judgment facts. We grant the father’s motion to consider post-judgment facts and deny his motion to dismiss the mother’s appeal. Discerning no error in the trial court’s distribution of marital assets and allocation of debts, we affirm such adjudications in their entirety. We vacate, however, the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony and remand the spousal support issue to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We grant the mother’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal, remanding that issue to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded.

J.S. (father) appeals the trial court’s adjudication that his children C.T. and L.T. were dependent and neglected and severely abused in the care of father and A.T. (mother). Mother, who did not appeal, testified, among other things, that father bought her illegal drugs while she was pregnant, and that she and father abused drugs and alcohol during her pregnancy. Father denied mother’s allegations. The twin children were born prematurely and tested positive for opana, an opioid, and oxycodone. The trial court expressly credited mother’s testimony and discredited father’s. On appeal, father bases his assertion of error solely on his argument that the trial court incorrectly assessed the credibility of the witnesses, and that the trial court should have believed him instead of mother. We affirm.

Winfield Scott Niles (“Niles”) and Nancy Niles appeal the judgment of the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) in this suit involving disputes regarding easements across real property owned by Niles located in Greene County, Tennessee. Niles raises issues regarding the Trial Court’s findings regarding the width and the permitted uses of the easements and the Trial Court’s finding that Niles was in contempt of court. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in determining the width and permitted uses of the easements. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding Niles in contempt of court. Finding no error, we affirm the Trial Court’s February 28, 2017 Judgment.

The Defendant, Daron Lekithe Moss, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the prosecutor made improper and inflammatory comments during closing argument; and (3) the State failed to include a witness who testified at trial in the original indictment. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The pro se Petitioner, Ricky L. Hill, appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, we conclude that the State’s motion is welltaken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion.

This appeal results from the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for declaratory judgment on the ground of res judicata. In 2011, the City of Memphis issued environmental neglect citations to two adjoining property owners related to damage to the properties that required significant repair. The property owners agreed with the City that repairs were necessary but could not agree on the allocation of the cost of the repairs. The cases were eventually consolidated before the environmental division of general sessions court, and the court entered an order allowing the City of Memphis to proceed with the repair and charge the costs to both owners as tax liens. After the City of Memphis completed the repair, it charged each owner one-half of the cost of the repairs. One owner thereafter filed suit for a declaratory judgment in Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that it did not owe one-half of the repair costs due to the fact that the repairs were necessitated by neglect to the other property. Following a trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the City of Memphis, finding that the property owner’s action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This is the third appeal arising from a disputed arbitration award. After the first appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of entering an order confirming the award in favor of Regions Bank (the Bank) “as to the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust.” The trial court subsequently entered an order confirming the award against “the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust” and “Rafia N. Khan as Trustee of the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable Trust.” Over twenty months later, Rafia Khan filed an independent action in equity asking the trial court to set aside its judgment confirming the award. Pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), the Bank filed a motion to dismiss and raised the affirmative defense of res judicata. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata. We vacate the trial court’s findings with respect to res judicata. Nevertheless, we affirm the court’s dismissal of the case because Ms. Khan’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Defendant-Appellant, Billy Joe Harrah, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest, for which he received an effective sentence of forty years’ confinement. On appeal, he argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions; and (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding flight. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Doyale Montez Blacksmith, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to file a motion to withdraw from representation after the Petitioner requested that he do so; (2) failed “to call witnesses to rebut the victim’s testimony”; and (3) gave the Petitioner “incorrect advice” regarding the Petitioner’s decision not to testify at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post conviction court.

Petitioner appeals from the Shelby County Circuit Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the Respondents, Shelby County Assessor of Property and Shelby County Trustee, as to Petitioner’s claims challenging tax assessments issued by the Assessor of Property. We conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-1511 mandates that judicial review of property tax classification and valuation decisions are properly to chancery court. As such, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to transfer this matter to the Shelby County Chancery Court.

In this State appeal, the State challenges the post-conviction court’s grant of relief to the petitioner in the form of a new trial for his 2013 Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The State asserts that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that the petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the results of the petitioner’s trial would have been different. Because the evidence preponderates against the findings of the post-conviction court, we reverse the ruling of that court and vacate the order granting post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Ariana Tarience Harris, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation, arguing that the court should have imposed an alternative sentence rather than ordering her to serve the balance of her original sentence incarcerated, and therefore abused its discretion. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that a material change in circumstance occurred affecting the best interests of the child and that the child’s best interests were furthered by naming Father primary residential parent. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. 

After a jury trial, Defendant, Dalvin Smith, was convicted of two counts of reckless homicide, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

I concur in affirming the sentences in this case, but I would rule that the record is inadequate for a ruling on the merits, resulting in a determination that we must presume the propriety of the trial court’s sentencing decisions. Most often, when only a sentencing issue is raised on appeal, the appellant has pleaded guilty. In this case, the defendant was tried and convicted by a jury. The record on appeal, however, does not include a transcript of the trial evidence.

The Defendant, Mario M. Washington, Jr., pleaded guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to unlawful possession of a firearm, a Class D felony, possession of a Schedule II drug, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of a Schedule IV drug, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) (2014) (unlawful possession of a firearm), 39-17-418 (possession of a controlled substance) (2014) (amended 2016). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received a five-year sentence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the search of his residence, which he presents on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marquette Benson, aka Marquette Mukes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony, based on two different prior felonies. The trial court merged the counts into a single conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. As best as we can understand the pro se Defendant’s brief and numerous supplemental motions he has filed with this court, he argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by: redacting a chronology of a 911 call, improperly commenting on the evidence, and presenting false testimony; the trial court prevented him from presenting his defense by barring the admission of a police report; and the trial court exhibited bias by its various evidentiary rulings that favored the prosecution. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Xavier Todd, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

On January 12, 2017, the Defendant, Ronald Ellis, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was mentally incapable of premeditation at the time of the murder. He further argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession and statement, asserting that both were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, and that the aggregate effect of trial errors entitles him to a new trial. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Quinton Cage, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. After a review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

On August 25 and 26, 2017, the Defendant, Timerell Nelson, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of criminal attempt second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of 16 years and the Defendant now argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his especially aggravated robbery conviction because the victim did not suffer serious bodily injury. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401(a). After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2008, the Petitioner, Christopher Young, pleaded guilty to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with a six-year sentence to be served on Community Corrections. In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed as untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that this matter should be remanded to the lower court to allow him to file an amended petition in light of recent case law. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This case involves events that span a period of some twenty years following the death of Steven Lee Coffey in a plane crash on July 13, 1995. The deceased was a successful owner of a securities business. Plaintiff, Laura Cowan Coffey, is his widow. In the deceased’s will, David L. Coffey (David the senior), the deceased’s father, was designated executor of his son’s estate. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint for fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, that David the senior breached his fiduciary duties and engaged in a fraudulent scheme to obtain for himself two highly-profitable assets of the estate, which ultimately sold for $45,000,000 in 2015 for the benefit of David the senior’s heirs. Plaintiff also sued David Michael Coffey (David the younger) - who is the son of David the senior - in the former’s capacity as trustee of the fortune resulting from the sale of the assets of the deceased. After a hearing on defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the court granted their motions, finding that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that plaintiff has set forth specific facts showing that there are genuine issues of material fact pertaining to fraudulent concealment of plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendants rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. T

This is a wrongful death case. Decedent was operating his motor vehicle in the early morning when he struck a bull in the middle of the road. As a result of the collision, Decedent’s vehicle careened off the road and flipped upside down into a nearby creek, where Decedent drowned. Plaintiffs, Decedent’s surviving spouse and children, sued Defendant, alleging that he was negligent in his ownership and control of the bull. Defendant denied ownership, possession, or control of the bull and moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred at the summary judgment stage by weighing the evidence and making determinations as to the credibility of witnesses. We agree and reverse.