APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Andre Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to an effective term of thirty years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentences and ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce case dealing with numerous issues of interpretation of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan. The plaintiff wife appealed one portion of the on-going case. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

This is a conservatorship action in which the wife sought appointment as her husband’s conservator. Following a hearing, the court found that the husband was fully disabled and in need of a conservator to manage his personal and financial affairs. The court appointed the wife to serve in that capacity and awarded her spousal support. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Upon the petition of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both the mother and father of two children. Clear and convincing evidence supports each ground relied upon by the trial court and the trial court’s conclusion that termination of both parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm.

We assumed jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(1) and Rule 48 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and ordered expedited briefing and oral argument. The issue we must determine is whether the vacancy in the Office of Mayor of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County may be filled at the August 2, 2018 election, or whether it must be filled at a special election pursuant to section 15.03 of the Metropolitan Charter. We conclude that section 15.03 of the Metropolitan Charter requires that a special election be set, that the Davidson County Election Commission therefore acted in contravention of the Charter in setting the election on August 2, 2018, and that the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wallace’s claims for relief and dismissing this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The Commission is hereby ordered to set a special election in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-14-102(a). This opinion is not subject to rehearing under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, and the Clerk is directed to certify this opinion as final and to immediately issue the mandate.  

This appeal involves a dispute between two limited liability companies (and an individual with an interest in both companies) over four lots in a residential subdivision. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiff-company $116,151.87 in proceeds from the sale of lots that were originally owned by the plaintiff. However, the trial court ruled that the defendant-company was entitled to recover $512,795.07 for the amount it expended constructing homes on those lots. The plaintiff-company has appealed, challenging numerous rulings made by the trial court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

In this post-divorce dispute, Mother filed a petition to modify parenting time and obtained an ex parte restraining order based upon Father’s physical altercation with his wife during parenting time with the parties’ children. After a hearing in December 2015, the trial court suspended Father’s parenting time until he took steps to address his anger management issues. At a review hearing in August 2016, the trial court determined that the suspension of Father’s parenting time was no longer in the best interest of the children and adopted the recommendations of Father’s psychologist concerning the reintegration of Father into the lives of the children. The trial court subsequently awarded Mother her attorney fees and discretionary costs incurred throughout the case. On appeal, Father asserts that he should have been awarded his attorney fees for the period of time after the December 2015 hearing and that the trial court erred in awarding Mother her discretionary costs for the same period. Both parties seek their attorney fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney fees in full. With respect to discretionary costs, we affirm the trial court’s award with the exception of the costs of preparation and travel, which are not authorized by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04. Each party shall pay his or her own attorney fees and costs on appeal.
 

Shane T. Usrey, the Defendant, pled guilty to theft of property over the value of $500 in case numbers CR6120, CR6493, and CR7510. In 2017, the Defendant was arrested for violating the terms of his probation by committing domestic assault and aggravated assault. After a hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s probation in all three cases and imposed the original sentences. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court should not have placed any probative value on the victim’s testimony because she was intoxicated at the time of the offenses; and (2) the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to have found that the Defendant violated his probation. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract action in which both parties assert affirmative claims. Plaintiff, a Memphis TV station, sued one of its advertisers for breach of an advertising agreement to recover approximately $511,000 for past advertising services. Defendant Advertiser filed a counterclaim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, for constructive fraud, and for breach of contract. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings with respect to the breach of contract claim in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages of $510,000. Subsequently, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Second Amended Counter-Complaint in its entirety, finding that Defendant failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted. Defendant appealed. We have concluded that Defendant’s Answer constituted a denial that Defendant owed approximately $511,000 in unpaid advertising fees; therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should have been denied. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Defendant’s claims for constructive fraud; however, we have determined that the factual allegations in the Second Amended Counter-Complaint are sufficient to state claims for breach of contract, and claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of these claims and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from an order entered on February 23, 2018, terminating the mother’s parental rights. The mother filed her notice of appeal on April 5, 2018, together with a motion to accept an untimely notice of appeal. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the mother’s motion and dismiss the appeal.

This is an appeal from an order entered on February 5, 2018, dismissing the appellant’s Petition for Writ for Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum. The appellant filed his notice of appeal on April 2, 2018, together with a motion to accept a late notice of appeal. Because the thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional in civil cases and cannot be waived, we deny the appellant’s motion and dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from a claim of retaliatory discharge. Randy Roberts (“Roberts”) was fired by Tennier Industries, Inc. (“Tennier”) for several stated reasons, including that he kept an unmarked bottle of pills at his desk and was insubordinate. Roberts contends that he was, in fact, fired for having complained about a manager who harassed him. Roberts sued Tennier in the Circuit Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”). Tennier filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it fired Roberts for valid, non-pretextual reasons. Roberts filed a motion to continue in which he requested more time for discovery in order to probe Tennier’s practices in situations similar to his. The Trial Court denied Roberts’ motion to continue and granted Tennier’s motion for summary judgment. Roberts appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the information for which Roberts sought additional time for discovery could have assisted his case and that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion to continue. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Vern Braswell, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide the defense with statements of witnesses, items recovered from the Petitioner’s home, and the contents of a sealed envelope that was discovered during the pendency of post-conviction proceedings. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Steven Tyler Nabi, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for trial, failing to properly cross-examine the State’s witnesses at trial, and failing to pursue the issues of the State’s lack of DNA evidence and defense of a third party. Petitioner entered guilty pleas following the State’s presentation of its evidence at trial. Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered because he was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the plea acceptance hearing, the trial court failed to properly advise him under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Petitioner did not understand that his sentence would be served at 85 percent. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a dispute over ownership of three easements and allegations of fraud stemming from the failure of Appellee to honor its alleged oral promise to purchase the disputed easements and an adjacent parcel of land owned by Appellants. The trial court, on Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss, ruled that Appellants had no interest in the easements and that Appellants’ claim arising from the alleged oral promise to purchase the easements and the adjacent parcel of land was barred by the Statute of Frauds. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case wherein the trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights based upon the sole statutory ground of abandonment by incarceration. The court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother timely appealed. We affirm.

Defendant, Danyelle McCullough, was charged with one count of theft over $1,000 and one count of forgery over $1,000 in an indictment returned by the Shelby County Grand Jury. Following a jury trial, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of four years for each count to be served in confinement. In this appeal, Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, David Smith, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve four years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion or probation. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the rights of J.R.L. (mother) with respect to her two children, B.M.L. and Z.A.L (the children). DCS alleged four grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (4) persistence of conditions. DCS did not seek in the trial court to support the ground of failure to support. The court found clear and convincing evidence of (1) mother’s failure to provide a suitable home; (2) mother’s failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals. We affirm.  

The Defendant, Chastity Coleman, entered into a plea agreement with the State with an agreed-upon sentence. During the plea colloquy, the trial court invited and met with the Defendant outside the presence of the prosecutor and trial counsel after which the court decided to reduce the Defendant’s period of incarceration. The State appeals. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s judgments under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. We further conclude that the trial court committed three errors that each independently require reversal: (1) the trial court acted improperly by engaging in ex parte communication with the Defendant; (2) the trial court erred in failing to rule on the State’s motion to recuse while continuing to hear matters involving this case; and (3) the trial court lacked the authority to unilaterally modify the plea agreement. Because the trial judge has predetermined the sentence to be imposed, we remove the trial judge from further consideration of this case. We vacate the judgments and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff employer filed suit against its employee, claiming that he was liable for balances on his commission and sales accounts and for breach of loyalty pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the employee and ordered the employer to direct the redemption of his stock held in the parent company. We reverse, in part, and hold that the parent company is not obligated to redeem the stock and that the employer is entitled to $15,000 in damages for unearned compensation as a result of the employee’s breach of loyalty. The court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. We remand for the collection of attorney fees and costs.   

The Defendant, Andrew Young Kim, pled guilty to six counts of burglary, seven counts of theft of property in varying amounts, and one count of vandalism. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him to continuous confinement for a non-violent property offense and erred in setting the length of his sentences, in denying all forms of alternative sentencing, and in imposing partially consecutive sentences. Upon a thorough review of the record below and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order as to the length of the Defendant’s sentences, the denial of any alternative sentence, and the partial consecutive sentence alignment, but reverse the trial court’s order of continuous confinement for the Defendant’s Class E felony conviction for theft of property (Count 14), an enumerated non-violent property offense in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(c)(11). Upon our de novo review of Count 14, we order that the Defendant’s two-year sentence on that count be served on supervised probation with the imposition of $1000 fine. Moreover, for reasons stated herein, Counts 7 through 10 are remanded for correction of clerical errors in the judgment forms. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

This is a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff employer filed suit against its employee, claiming that he was liable for balances on his commission and sales accounts and for breach of loyalty pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the employee and ordered the employer to direct the redemption of his stock held in the parent company. We reverse, in part, and hold that the parent company is not obligated to redeem the stock and that the employer is entitled to $15,000 in damages for unearned compensation as a result of the employee’s breach of loyalty. The court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. We remand for the collection of attorney fees and costs.   

The Petitioner, Sheddrick Harris, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2), - 403. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner raises the following ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the Petitioner that he had a constitutional right to a trial before a different judge than the one who signed the search warrant for the Petitioner’s automobile; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek recusal of the trial judge because the trial judge had an ex parte communication with a head deputy that led to enhanced courtroom security procedures, evincing the trial judge’s bias against the Petitioner, and because the trial judge was the same judge who issued the search warrant; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the warrantless search of the Petitioner’s vehicle, failing to challenge the search warrant by requesting a Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) hearing, and failing to challenge the Petitioner’s illegal detention effectuated without probable cause and without an arrest warrant and solely for the purpose of gathering additional evidence against the Petitioner; and (4) that trial counsel failed to adequately impeach an attorney witness who was facing disciplinary action by the Board of Professional Responsibility at the time of the Petitioner’s trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Marcus S. Akins, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and order of incarceration for the remainder of his three-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.