APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a slip-and-fall case. A middle school teacher injured herself when she fell in the hallway outside her classroom on a wet floor. A custodian had been mopping the hallway prior to her fall, and the teacher alleged that the custodians had negligently and misleadingly placed wet-floor signs on the opposite side of the hallway, which did not warn her of the wet floor on her side of the hallway. Thereafter, the teacher brought suit against the school district pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the custodians guilty of negligence and assigned seventy-five percent of the fault to the school district and twenty-five percent of the fault to the teacher. A judgment was entered against the school district in the amount of $180,000.00, after reduction for the teacher’s comparative fault. The school district appeals, contending (1) that it is immune from suit; (2) that it was not negligent; and (3) that any negligence it may have committed is outweighed by that of the teacher’s comparative fault. The teacher argues that the trial court erred in assigning any of the fault to her. We affirm in part and reverse in part

A medical product sales representative brought suit against her former employer, a hospital, claiming retaliation in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. After a bench trial, the trial court judge entered a verdict in favor of the hospital, having concluded that the employee failed to carry her burden of proof. In spite of dismissing the employee’s case, the trial court awarded the employee a portion of her attorney’s fees as “sanctions” against the hospital for making an allegedly late-filed motion to strike the employee’s demand for a jury trial, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the employee’s retaliation claim, and we reverse the trial court’s order granting the employee attorney’s fees.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case.

The evidence presented at trial indicates that the school system’s “mopping policy” was actually part of a larger “Departmental Safety Program” directed toward all Clarksville-Montgomery County School System employees. For the “Custodial Department,” the program provided, “[w]hen mopping floors, cleaning up spills, or anytime the floor becomes wet for whatever reason, always put the wet floor signs out until the area is completely dry.” For “Professional Staff,” the program provided, “[a]lways pay close attention to wet floor signs or wet floor conditions to avoid slips and falls.”

Defendant, Quincy D. Scott, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery for which he was sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender at 85%. On appeal, Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of various errors at trial entitled him to a new trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Chris Jones, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief upon the post-conviction court’s determination that it was filed outside the statute of limitations and that the Petitioner failed to prove that his mental incompetence required its tolling. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In this post-divorce matter, the trial court ordered the father, Harold W. Duke, III (“Father”), to deposit $5,729.17 and $5,312.50 per month, respectively, into the educational accounts of the parties’ two daughters. The court determined that the children’s separate trust accounts were not required to be utilized to fund their college expenses. The court also awarded the mother, Kathryn A. Duke (“Mother”), $4,006.00 for attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing a civil contempt petition against Father, as well as $25,000.00 for attorney’s fees and $1,237.50 in discretionary costs related to establishment of the proper amounts to be contributed by Father to the educational accounts. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We decline, however, to award Mother attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

This appeal involves the filing of a termination petition by the mother and stepfather against the father of two minor children. The court denied the termination petition but appointed the stepfather as the permanent guardian of the children. The father appeals. We vacate the order of permanent guardianship.

The Petitioner, Christopher Clifton, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein the Petitioner argued that he entered an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea to aggravated assault. After thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Pro se Petitioner, Charles Owens, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Hickman County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his convictions for aggravated sexual battery are void because (1) the trial court announced his sentence through written order, without the Petitioner present, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3); and (2) the trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-111(a). Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Drayton Beecher Smith, II (“Attorney”) pled guilty in 2007 to federal charges of receipt and possession of images depicting child pornography and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment. In conjunction with these charges, Attorney consented to his disbarment, which was ordered in 2008. In August 2014, after being discharged from prison and while on probation, Attorney petitioned to be reinstated to the practice of law in Tennessee. The Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR”) opposed Attorney’s petition, and a hearing panel was appointed (“the Panel”). After an evidentiary hearing, the Panel denied Attorney’s petition. Attorney sought review in chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the Panel’s decision and ordered Attorney reinstated. The BPR sought review in this Court. Initially, we hold that the chancery court had subject-matter jurisdiction of Attorney’s petition in spite of the BPR’s untimely filing of its application for costs. We further hold that the chancery court misapplied the applicable standard of review and thereby committed reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s ruling and reinstate the Panel’s decision.

The Petitioner, Rhyunia Lamont Barnes, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life. In his appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Appellants’ employee embezzled funds from Appellants using the employee’s Bank of America account. The employee wrote checks on Appellants’ accounts to legitimate third party vendors but deposited the checks into her own personal account by way of Bank of America’s ATMs. Appellants filed suit against Bank of America alleging that the bank’s failure to either prevent this activity or alert Appellants thereto constituted causes of action for aiding and abetting conversion, aiding and abetting fraud, civil conspiracy, and negligence. The trial court granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss Appellants’ claims for aiding and abetting fraud and conversion and for civil conspiracy based on Bank of America’s lack of knowledge of Appellants’ employee’s wrongdoing. The court subsequently granted Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining negligence claim finding that the bank owed no duty to Appellants. We affirm.   

A Williamson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Frederick D. Curll, of aggravated cruelty to an animal, a Class E felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to four years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its jury instruction of “sadism,” that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call a veterinary expert to testify on his behalf and failed to file a motion to suppress the officer’s search of his back yard and seizure of the animal’s body without a warrant. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an uninsured motorist case.  Appellee State Farm Insurance Companies denied Appellants’ uninsured motorist coverage after the uninsured motorist, defendant, discharged the claim in bankruptcy.  The trial court granted State Farm’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion, finding that the policy language that State Farm was liable for “bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the [uninsured motorist],” relieved State Farm from providing coverage after the uninsured motorist discharged the claim in bankruptcy.  Because the order appealed is not final, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, James M. Meese, entered guilty pleas to aggravated statutory rape, aggravated assault, simple possession of marijuana, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, with a negotiated Range I seven-year sentence to be served on probation. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, asserting that his trial counsel failed to properly investigate his charges and inaccurately advised him regarding his cumulative exposure. We conclude that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to accurately advise the Petitioner of his range of punishment and that as a result, the Petitioner did not knowingly enter into the plea agreement. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment, and we remand for a new trial on all charges.

Trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint due to its failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is an extraordinary appeal, filed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking review of an injunction entered with respect to the August 2, 2018 Democratic primary ballot for Tennessee’s Ninth Congressional District election. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that an extraordinary appeal should be granted and that the trial court’s injunction should be vacated.

The Knox County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Nehad Sobhi Abdelnabi, on two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated burglary. The Defendant’s first trial resulted in a mistrial. At the Defendant’s second trial, the jury convicted him of aggravated kidnapping in count one, especially aggravated kidnapping in count two, and aggravated assault in counts three and four. The jury acquitted the Defendant of aggravated burglary in count five. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years for count one, seventeen years for count two, and six years for counts three and four, respectively. The trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction in count one into count two and merged count four into count three and ordered that he serve the sentences concurrently, for a total effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) at 100% release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant argues the following: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment because the State violated the rule against double jeopardy by intentionally eliciting objectionable testimony from a State witness in the Defendant’s first trial; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for mistrial when the victim told the Defendant to “[b]e a man” and “[t]ake the stand” during the victim’s cross-examination; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by allowing the victim’s objectionable testimony, which violated the Defendant’s right to not testify; (4) the victim’s objectionable testimony and “the subsequent denial of the motion for mistrial[] violated his constitutional right to a fair trial”; (5) the trial court erred by limiting the Defendant’s cross-examination of the co-defendant, Lowi Akila, which violated the Defendant’s right to confrontation; (6) the trial court erred by excluding testimony regarding the victim’s alleged bias; (7) the trial court erred under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 604 and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 42 in denying the Defendant’s request to require witnesses to testify in the language that the testimony was originally given in; (8) the trial court violated the Defendant’s right to due process by allowing witnesses to testify in English about conversations that occurred in Arabic; (9) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s medical records; (10) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by failing to disclose that the victim received compensation from the State of Tennessee; (11) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found the Defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt; (12) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors to the Defendant’s sentence; (13) the Defendant’s sentence contravenes the principles and purposes of the Tennessee Sentencing Act; and (14) the Defendant is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

Defendant, Dexter Octavius Parker, was indicted for attempted first degree murder in Count One, “aggravated domestic assault” in Count Two, and especially aggravated kidnapping in Count Three. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder in Count One, aggravated assault in Count Two, and especially aggravated kidnapping in Count Three. He received a total effective sentence of forty-six years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded the conclusion of one expert witness while allowing the conclusion of another expert witness regarding Defendant’s mental state. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by reinstating and amending Count Two of the indictment after dismissing it during the trial. Concluding that the trial court committed structural constitutional error by reinstating Count Two of the indictment, we reverse and vacate the judgment in Count Two and affirm the judgments in Counts One and Three.

The Petitioner, Richard Earl Madkins, Jr., filed a petition in the Trousdale County Circuit Court seeking habeas corpus relief from his conviction of especially aggravated robbery and resulting twenty-five-year sentence, alleging that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict or sentence him because he was arrested for the offense without a warrant. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

We granted the Rule 9 application for an interlocutory appeal filed by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“TN Farmers”) to consider whether material misrepresentations made on an application for a policy of insurance may become not material by virtue of later changes made to the policy. We find and hold that the misrepresentations made on the policy application increased the risk of loss and voided the policy or prevented its attaching pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103 and that subsequent changes to a void policy did not render the misrepresentations not material. We, therefore, reverse the June 22, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) denying TN Farmers’ motion for summary judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court for entry of an order granting summary judgment to TN Farmers.

Jason Keenan sued Jeffrey L. Hollifield for damages arising out of a two-vehicle collision on Interstate 40 in Knox County. By way of an order entered August 9, 2017, the plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit, pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(1). On the same date, the defendant filed a motion for discretionary costs. Following a hearing on September 8, 2017, the trial court, in an order entered September 15, 2017, denied the defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals, arguing that he is entitled to discretionary costs of $814.66. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and award the defendant discretionary costs of $814.66.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendants, Martavious D. Brooks and Brittany G. Lee, of theft of property valued over $10,000, and it also convicted Defendant Lee of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant Brooks as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in prison. The trial court merged Defendant Lee’s convictions and sentenced her to nine years in prison, at 85%, for the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, Defendant Lee contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions and that the trial court improperly limited her cross-examination of a witness. Defendant Brooks contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for theft. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Eric James Lewis Bogle, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police because he invoked his right to counsel and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction without his statement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial in Sullivan County Criminal Court, Petitioner, Dennis L. Rose, was found guilty of first degree murder. The judgment shows that he was given a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, State v. Dennis Lee Rose, No. E2010-00734-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 335548 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 21, 2012) (designated not for citation), Petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief was also denied, and that judgment was also affirmed. Dennis L. Rose v. State, No. E2015-00768- CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 3215682 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016). Thereafter, Petitioner initiated this proceeding by filing his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition was dismissed by the habeas corpus court, and Petitioner appealed. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.