APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of a probation revocation warrant as untimely.  Because the probationary period of the defendant, Vincent D. Clark, had not expired at the time of the filing of the revocation warrant, the trial court erred in its dismissal.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new hearing.

This action presents issues regarding the interpretation and application of a postnuptial agreement previously executed by parties who later filed for divorce. The trial court determined that the parties’ agreement was valid and enforced its terms, including a provision allowing for an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party who was attempting to defend the agreement. The trial court granted the wife an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to this provision. In addition, the husband filed two motions seeking the trial judge’s recusal, which the trial court denied. The husband timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We further determine that the wife is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The Defendant, Kandi Sue Gaines, was convicted at a Lawrence County Circuit Court bench trial of shoplifting property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, for which she is serving an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence on probation.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-146 (2014) (amended 2017) (theft of property involving merchandise).  On appeal, she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Randy A. Rice, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions for felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their minor child.  Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent’s parental rights on the statutory groundof abandonment for failure to remit child support.  The court further found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest of the child.  The parents appeal.  We affirm. 

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to her minor child. Father and Grandmother jointly filed a “Petition for Termination and Adoption” to terminate Mother’s parental rights and to allow Grandmother to adopt the child without terminating Father’s parental rights. The trial court granted the petition and Mother appeals. We have determined that petitioners do not have standing to petition the court to terminate Mother’s parental rights in order to allow Grandmother to adopt the child without terminating Father’s parental rights. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of standing. 

Father filed a petition to change primary residential parent and for civil and criminal contempt. Because there was no material change of circumstance that affected the wellbeing of the child, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s petition. We also affirm the trial court’s decision not to find Mother in civil contempt.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Gregory Ricardo McDonald III, was convicted of one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; two counts of forgery of $500 or less, a Class E felony; and one count of identity theft, a Class D felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105, -14-114, -14-150, -16-301 (2012).  The trial court subsequently imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) that his statement to police should have been excluded because “there was not an adequate waiver executed in acknowledgement of his” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner seeks reversal of the denial of a beer permit by the city. City’s board asserts that the property is unsuitable for a beer permit as it has lost its zoning status as a “grandfathered in” restaurant, bar, or event hall. The trial court affirmed the board’s action. The petitioner filed this appeal. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it. We vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this case.

The Estate of Evelyn Sample (“the Estate”) appeals the March 13, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Life Care Centers of America, Inc. and Life Care Center of Cleveland (collectively “Life Care”) in this health care liability action. We find and hold that Life Care made a properly supported motion for summary judgment negating an essential element of the Estate’s claim, i.e., causation, and that the Estate failed to produce evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment to Life Care.

Beneficiary of decedent’s estate appeals the judgment holding that the executor did not breach his fiduciary duty in administering the estate and the award of a fee to the executor. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the decision of the Probate Court.

This case involves the interpretation of a divorce judgment. William August Lockler, III, and Pamela Michelle Barr Lockler were married on January 3, 2002, and divorced on September 6, 2007. In its judgment, the original trial judge, the Honorable Jean A. Stanley, ordered that “If [wife] is entitled under federal law to receive any portion of [husband’s] military retirement benefits[,] then she is awarded one-half (1/2) of those benefits earned during the parties’ marriage.” After husband retired from military service in December 2014, wife filed a petition on February 20, 2015 to reopen the divorce judgment. She sought one-half of husband’s military retirement that had accrued during their marriage. The trial court granted wife’s petition, holding that Judge Stanley awarded wife a portion of husband’s military retirement benefits. Husband appeals, arguing that wife is not entitled to a portion of his benefits because she is only eligible to receive the benefits under federal law and does not have a right to them. We hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the original trial judge intended to award wife onehalf of husband’s military retirement that accrued during their marriage. Accordingly, we affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A man convicted of aggravated assault filed suit for malicious prosecution against the other three persons involved in the altercation that led to his conviction. The trial court determined that the statute of limitations had run on the malicious prosecution claim. We affirm on a different ground: the plaintiff has no claim for malicious prosecution because the aggravated assault case has not been terminated in his favor.

The petitioner, Marquize Berry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing trial counsel’s failure to file a pre-trial motion regarding video evidence of the crime pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d. 912 (Tenn. 1999), was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Scottie Lee Mofield, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014) (amended 2015, 2016, 2017).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years’ confinement and ordered his sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence in an unrelated case.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) during sentencing and (2) by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in a products liability action arising out of a deadly vehicle crash in Mexico. The accident was allegedly caused by a separation of the tire tread and resulting blow-out and vehicle rollover. The decedent’s son, daughter, and mother brought suit against the manufacturers of the tire and SUV. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal an instruction the court gave the jury on contributory negligence and several evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari, claiming that the Tennessee Board of Parole acted arbitrarily and without material evidence in denying his request for parole. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the time for filing such a petition had passed. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. The petitioner appeals. We reverse and remand for further hearing.

The pro se appellant appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court's order denying post-judgment motions filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure "36 et seq." The trial court summarily denied the pleadings based upon the pro se appellant's earlier execution of a waiver of all direct, post-conviction, and collateral challenges to the conviction, in exchange for his codefendant-wife's receiving a more lenient sentence. Because this court has twice ruled that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily entered, we sua sponte affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Montrekus Lamon Tiller, was convicted of aggravated assault. He received a sentence of six years’ incarceration to be suspended after 350 days. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.