APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Daniel Perez, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery. The Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to reference witnesses that the Defendant could have produced at trial. Following our review, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Antonio Smith, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury in a multi-count presentment with one count of sale of heroin in a drug-free zone, one count of delivery of heroin in a drug-free zone, three counts of possession of heroin with the intent to sell in a drug-free zone, three counts of possession of heroin with the intent to deliver in a drugfree zone, one count of possession of marijuana, two counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and four counts of criminal gang enhancement. A codefendant, Heather Montgomery, was also indicted for several offenses. The trial court dismissed the criminal gang enhancement counts prior to trial after the statute was found unconstitutional by this court in State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016). Following a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of the two counts of felon in possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony but found guilty of all other counts as charged. The trial court merged several of the convictions and sentenced Defendant as a career offender to an effective sentence of 72 years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant initiated this appeal. On appeal Defendant challenges the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence. Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jeffrey Carl Shields, pled guilty to one count of burglary and thirteen counts of forgery in exchange for a total effective sentence of twelve years as a Range II, multiple offender. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. This appeal followed. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence where Defendant was facing additional charges at the time of sentence and previous attempts at alternative sentencing had failed. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Antonio Johnson, on charges of attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and three counts of aggravated assault; the State later dismissed two of the aggravated assault counts. The jury convicted Defendant of attempted second degree murder, employment of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, six years for the aggravated assault conviction, six years for the employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction, and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment to run concurrently with each other and ordered the remaining sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of attempted second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the admission of testimony regarding Defendant’s past fight with one of the victims; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the admission of a surveillance video; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the facts and
law, we affirm.

This appeal revolves around a pro se litigant’s efforts to assume control of the assets of a trust and to replace the trustee. After the dismissal of his second petition related to the trust, the pro se litigant filed this appeal. We dismiss the appeal for failure to file a brief that complies with the appellate rules. We also grant the trustee’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal.

Defendant, Mardoche Olivier, was indicted for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license and violating the vehicle registration law. While that charge was pending, Defendant filed pro se a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the trial court summarily denied. After a review of the record, we hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Because the present appeal is frivolous and because Defendant is abusing the appellate process, we tax the costs to Defendant and restrict further habeas corpus appeals unless Defendant attaches to his notice of appeal a copy of a final judgment for the challenged conviction.

This is a termination of parental rights case concerning two minor children. Mother is the biological parent of both children. Father is the biological parent of the younger child only. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that multiple grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to both children and Father’s parental rights to his child. Mother and Father appealed. We reverse the trial court’s finding as to one ground for termination asserted against Mother and one ground asserted against Father, but we otherwise affirm the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.      

Harakas Construction, Inc. appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) and Dale and Associates, Inc. (“Dale”). We find and hold that the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Metro based upon sovereign immunity and that the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Dale because Dale had negated essential elements of Harakas’s claim. 

A trial court designated the father of a child born out of wedlock as the primary residential parent and imputed additional income to the mother for purposes of child support after determining she was underemployed. The mother appealed the trial court’s judgment. During the pendency of the appeal, dependency and neglect proceedings in the trial court resulted in the child’s removal from the father’s residence and his placement with the mother in California. The dependency and neglect proceedings rendered moot the mother’s challenge of the trial court’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent, leaving the imputation of additional income to the mother as the only issue on appeal. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating additional income to the mother for child support purposes, we affirm that aspect of the trial court’s judgment.

In this interlocutory appeal, the petitioner, Braylen Bennett, appeals the ruling of the post-conviction court denying his request for discovery materials from the State. We conclude that the plain language of both the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and Rule 28 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court impose upon the State an obligation to provide discovery materials to the petitioner as part of the post-conviction proceeding. We further conclude that the State’s obligation cannot be met by requiring the postconviction petitioner to obtain from his trial counsel those discovery materials disclosed by the State as part of the trial proceeding. Finally, we conclude that, because the postconviction court’s ruling contains insufficient analysis to support its conclusion that none of the disclosures required by Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant to the claims presented by the petitioner, the case must be remanded for reconsideration of the petitioner’s request in light of the rulings in this opinion.

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Rhodes, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and resentencing him to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence and in increasing his sentence to ten years. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William Greene, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered because trial counsel failed to inform him of a special condition waiving his ability to petition to suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Petitioner contends the trial judge should have recused himself because Petitioner “was directly involved in a decision-making process that ultimately resulted in an effect on the [judge’s] finances.” Petitioner also contends recusal is required because “the Judge based his ruling almost exclusively on his own statements that he was unaware of the Petitioner’s involvement in his loan application process,” which statements made him “a material witness.” Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Corbyn Davis, of first degree premeditated murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison for the murder conviction and to four years for the firearm conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support each conviction. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action, which involves the plaintiff’s claims of assault and battery against her former co-workers and a medical doctor at the hospital where she was previously employed, is before this Court on appeal for the second time. See Lacy v. HCA Tristar Hendersonville Hosp., No. M2015-02217-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4497953 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016) (“Lacy I”). The first appeal arose from an involuntary dismissal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), following the close of the plaintiff’s proof during a bench trial. The plaintiff, proceeding without benefit of counsel, had filed a statement of the evidence, which was subsequently stricken from the record by the trial court upon an objection filed by the defendants. The first appeal came before this Court without a statement of the evidence in the record. Determining that the trial court had failed to resolve the parties’ conflicts concerning the plaintiff’s statement of the evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) and (e), and that the trial court had failed to make sufficient factual findings in its final order, this Court vacated the order of involuntary dismissal and remanded to the trial court for appropriate factual findings and a resolution of the conflicts concerning the statement of the evidence. Lacy I, 2016 WL 4497953, at *3. On remand, the defendants submitted a statement of the evidence, which, upon review, the trial court approved as accurate. The trial court then entered an order setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that the plaintiff had failed to present proof of causation and damages during the bench trial. The trial court subsequently entered a final order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.  

Billy Tankersley (“Employee”) worked for Batesville Casket Company (“Employer”) for thirty-seven years. He injured his right shoulder and arm on December 12, 2012. He ultimately was unable to return to work. He filed this action in the Chancery Court for Coffee County seeking permanent total disability benefits. The trial court found him to be permanently and totally disabled. The award was apportioned 90% to Employer and 10% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Linda Wimmer (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System (“Erlanger”) with regard to an incident in which Plaintiff was hit with an interior door and seriously injured. After a trial without a jury, the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its Memorandum and Judgment finding and holding, inter alia, there was no evidence that the location of the door constituted a defective design and no evidence that the door itself was defective, and that even if Erlanger had a duty to post a sign or put a glass window in the door, there was no evidence of causation. The Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Erlanger. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that Erlanger was immune from suit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101, et seq., that Plaintiff failed to prove that said immunity was removed, and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff failed to prove causation. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in favor of Erlanger.

The Defendant, William D. Lennox, Jr., appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentences. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The Defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is welltaken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The majority holds that Erlanger was immune from suit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”); that Ms. Wimmer failed to prove that said immunity was removed; and, in the alternative, that she failed to prove causation. I think the hospital is liable for this injury and the plaintiff should prevail.

Following the end of the three-year term of a commercial real estate lease, the tenant continued to occupy the leased premises and pay rent to the landlord. The landlord accepted the rent payments for six months and then notified the tenant that the amount of the required rent had increased. The tenant paid the increased rent but notified the landlord that it was ending its tenancy in thirty days. Contending that the tenant had in effect exercised its option to renew the lease for an additional three years, the landlord demanded that the tenant pay rent for the remainder of the renewal term. The tenant refused, and the landlord brought this action for breach of the lease agreement. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Because the trial court found that the lease had not been renewed and the tenant properly terminated the resulting periodic tenancy upon thirty days’ notice, the court denied the landlord’s motion and awarded summary judgment to the tenant. We agree that the lease was not renewed, but because we conclude that the resulting periodic tenancy was year-to-year, the tenant was required to give at least six months’ notice prior to the end of the periodic tenancy. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The primary claim at issue in this appeal is for breach of an insurance contract. The insured property at issue, Opry Mills Shopping Mall, sustained catastrophic damages from the May 2010 flood in Nashville, Tennessee. Following the flood, the insureds contended the policy provided $200 million of coverage. The insurers insisted the policy limit for the claim was $50 million pursuant to the High Hazard Flood Zones Limit due to the fact the location of the Mall had been designated on a Flood Insurance Rate Map as a Special Flood Hazard Area. The trial court summarily ruled that the policy limits were $200 million finding, inter alia, the insured properties that were limited to $50 million of coverage were listed on the High Hazard Flood Locations schedule in Endorsement 6 of the policy, and Opry Mills Shopping Mall was not listed. Therefore, the trial court ruled that the policy limits for the claim were $200 million. Following a lengthy trial, the jury awarded the insured a judgment of almost $200 million. The insurers appealed. We have determined the policy limits are $50 million. Because the insurers paid the insureds $50 million before the commencement of this action, which is all the insurers are obligated to pay on the claim, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. We have also determined that the trial court did not err by summarily dismissing the insureds’ alternative claim that was based on promissory estoppel.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by demonstrating a wanton disregard for his child’s welfare. DCS failed to offer evidence that Father knew of the child’s existence when Father was engaging in the behavior that demonstrated wanton disregard. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights.

This appeal arises from an alleged breach of contract. Lew Winters (“Winters”) sued Southern Heritage Bank (“the Bank”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) for, among other things, breach of contract. Specifically, Winters asserted that the Bank wrongly backed out of a tripartite agreement involving the Internal Revenue Service (“the IRS”) which would have allowed Winters to obtain financing for new tractors and therefore be able to continue operating his trucking company. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no such agreement was reached. Instead, according to the Bank, the parties only engaged in discussions about a possible resolution. The Trial Court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. Winters appealed to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the purported oral agreement violates the Statute of Frauds. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort.  The trial court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and full custody of their minor child.  After determining that the husband was willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the court set child support based on his earning capacity rather than his actual gross income.  Then, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido.  The court also granted the wife a judgment for compensatory damages on her tort claim.  On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s determination that he is willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the valuation of the marital residence, the alimony awards, and the award of damages in tort.  After careful review, we vacate the court’s award of damages to the wife for her child’s pain and suffering.  In all other respects, we affirm.

A father filed a petition to modify his child support obligation based on a reduction in income. Following a trial, the court determined that there was a significant variance between the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and the amount of support ordered, and the court reduced the father’s child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm.