APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur completely in the majority’s decisions pertaining to (1) the allocation of the parties’ debt; (2) the imputation of income to wife for the purpose of calculating child support; and (3) wife’s request for her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. In my judgment, there is no error regarding any of these matters. I dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to award wife “rehabilitative” alimony rather than alimony in futuro. I do so because, I believe, the evidence clearly and overwhelmingly preponderates against the trial court’s “rehabilitative” decision.

The petitioner, Rodney Smith, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, the petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to call a material witness at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, De’quon Letray Boyd, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the petitioner’s 2011 convictions of attempted first degree premeditated murder, premeditated murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and aggravated criminal trespass. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this case, a judgment creditor pursued enforcement of a foreign judgment. Although the judgment creditor obtained a charging order against the judgment debtor’s interest in a partnership and later moved to foreclose this interest, the judgment debtor subsequently moved to dismiss the case and vacate all prior orders by alleging that he had never been properly served. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and entered an order allowing foreclosure against the partnership interest. Despite filings by the judgment debtor highlighting the absence of personal service, the trial court ultimately left its enforcement orders undisturbed. Because we agree that the judgment debtor never received proper service incident to the judgment creditor’s attempt to enroll the foreign judgment, we vacate the trial court’s orders relating to execution.

The petitioner, Darrell M. Anderson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A bank filed a wrongful detainer warrant in general sessions court against a homeowner who defaulted on her loan, and the homeowner raised counterclaims that the foreclosure was wrongful and fraudulent. The general sessions court awarded the bank possession of the property and dismissed the homeowner’s counterclaims as barred by res judicata based on an earlier action in which the homeowner sought to prevent the foreclosure. The homeowner appealed the general sessions court’s decision, and the circuit court also dismissed the homeowner’s counterclaims based on res judicata. The homeowner appealed the circuit court’s judgment to this court, and the bank sought an award of its attorney’s fees as damages for having to defend against a frivolous appeal. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment and deny the bank’s request for an award of its fees.

The Petitioner, Jerry Finis Layne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendants Deredious Otis and Carlos Key each were convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder, and Defendant Brashard Gibbs was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder, five counts of attempted first degree murder, and three counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendants Otis and Key each were sentenced to life for their first degree murder conviction and twenty-five years for each of their attempted first degree murder convictions, with all sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant Gibbs was sentenced to life for the first degree murder conviction, twenty-five years for each of the five counts of attempted first degree murder, and six years for each of the three counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, with all sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, all three Defendants argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts and that the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments; and Defendants Otis and Gibbs argue that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gregory Lee Gordon, pled guilty to aggravated assault by strangulation, a Class C felony, and after a sentencing hearing, was ordered to serve nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ernest Butler, aka Antonio Butler, was convicted of first degree felony murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and fifteen years, respectively, to be served consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the murder conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgments.

The Defendant, Terance P. Bradley, aka Terrance P. Bradley, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years at 45% for the aggravated burglary conviction; as a Range IV, career offender to twelve years at 60% for the reckless aggravated assault conviction; and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor assault conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to his convictions in another case. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his aggravated burglary and reckless aggravated assault convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This probate action is before this Court on appeal for the second time. Following remand from this Court subsequent to the first appeal, the trial court determined that the petitioner did have standing to file her petition for probate as a “purported creditor” of the decedent. The trial court ultimately denied the petition, however, finding “no basis for either primary or ancillary probate in Tennessee.” The trial court had also previously awarded sanctions against the petitioner and her counsel pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no error in the trial court’s denials of both primary and ancillary probate, we affirm such determinations. Although we also affirm the trial court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against the petitioner and her counsel generally, we vacate the specific award granted against the petitioner personally and remand such issue to the trial court for a determination of the proper amount of sanctions to be awarded against the petitioner solely pursuant to Rule 11.02(1). We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother/Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and wanton disregard; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s removal. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the proof is not sufficient to establish that the child was removed from Appellant’s home, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

This appeal involves a custody dispute between the unmarried parents of a minor child. Mother filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking custody of the minor child, a determination of Father’s child support arrearage, the establishment of a child support order, the entry of a permanent parenting plan, and an award of attorney’s fees. Mother also sought a temporary restraining order preventing Father from removing the child from her care, custody, and control. Following several pre-trial hearings, the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court awarded visitation to Father. Within days of the trial, Mother filed a motion to vacate the juvenile court’s ruling based on Mother’s allegation that Father had perjured himself at the trial. Following a hearing at which Father failed to appear, the juvenile court suspended Father’s visitation, and in a reversal of the its prior decision, ordered Father to pay all of Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred throughout the proceedings. Because we find that the juvenile court’s orders fail to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 such that we are unable to determine the basis for the juvenile court’s decisions, we vacate the court’s orders pertaining to the establishment of a permanent parenting plan, the suspension of Father’s parenting time, and attorney’s fees, and we remand for more detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law. 

The petitioner, Jose A. Rivas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2005 Hancock County Criminal Court guiltypleaded convictions of facilitation of first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves the intent of Stephanie Diane Ellerman, formerly Bramlett, (mother) to relocate with the parties’ minor child. Mother, the primary residential parent, seeks to move from Cleveland, Tennessee to Greenville, Tennessee, a distance of approximately 160 miles. She sent notice to Michael Lee Bramlett (father) of her intent to relocate. The notice indicated that mother intended to relocate because she had remarried and intended to move into her husband’s residence. Father responded with a petition objecting to the relocation. The court entered an order allowing mother to move, finding that the move has a reasonable purpose and is not vindictive or meant to interfere with father’s coparenting time. Father appeals. We affirm. We decline mother’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses at the trial court level. In the exercise of our discretion, we do award to mother her reasonable fees and expenses on appeal.

This appeal involves the interpretation and construction of a trust agreement. John Marion Reed and his wife Willie Kate Reed, in the process of their estate planning, executed a revocable living trust agreement. They conveyed approximately 204.61 acres of real property to the trust. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Reed died testate. The trust was the sole residual beneficiary of his will. Mrs. Reed, the successor trustee, distributed all of the real estate in the trust to herself by way of a quitclaim deed. She then terminated the trust. Bobby Reed, her son and a beneficiary of the trust, filed this action alleging that Mrs. Reed exceeded her authority under the terms of the trust agreement. He asked the trial court to order an accounting of the assets of the trust that had been distributed by Mrs. Reed since her husband’s death. He sought the return to the trust of the assets wrongfully distributed. The trial court held that Mrs. Reed did not have the authority to transfer all of the real estate in the trust. Accordingly, the court voided the quitclaim deed, and granted the requested relief of Bobby Reed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Alan Steele, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of relief for his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The post-conviction court granted his petition for analysis but denied further relief based upon the results of the analysis. The Petitioner contends that the court failed to afford him a hearing and erred in denying relief after interpreting the DNA analysis reports. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Homeowner brought an action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for damages to his property caused by storm water runoff under the tort theory of a temporary continuous nuisance. Homeowner alleged that each time it rained, the drainage overflow from the street caused his property to flood. Homeowner sought to compel Metro to repair or replace the broken drainage pipe on his property. The trial court granted summary judgment to Metro based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a release of liability. Leslie Johansen (“Johansen”) was a passenger in an ATV accident that resulted in the death of the driver, Lee Martin Sharber. Johansen sued Leon Sharber, Personal Representative of Lee Martin Sharber’s Estate, in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”) alleging negligence. Johansen’s uninsured motorist carrier, GEICO Casualty Company (“GEICO”), was joined as a defendant. While the tort action was underway and without GEICO’s approval, Johansen executed a release of claim regarding the Personal Representative which was filed in the Probate Court for Rutherford County (“the Probate Court”). GEICO filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, as a result of the release, Johansen forfeited any recovery rights she had against GEICO. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to GEICO. Johansen appealed. We hold that the release executed by Johansen served to release GEICO from any liability arising from Johansen’s personal injury claim stemming from the ATV accident. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Following a bench trial in the Criminal Court for Davidson County, the Defendant, Darrell Wayne Bumpas, was convicted of forgery over $1,000; criminal simulation over $1,000; theft of property over $1,000; and two counts of identity theft. For these offenses, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of twelve years to serve in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a photocopy of the fraudulent check and still photographs from a bank security camera. He argues that the State failed to properly authenticate the evidence under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 901 and 902. The Defendant also asserts that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ramiro R. Ibarra, pleaded guilty to one count of vehicular homicide and three counts of vehicular assault. The trial court sentenced him to twelve years and ordered that he serve 364 days in confinement and the remainder of his sentence on Community Corrections. The Defendant’s probation officer alleged that the Defendant violated his probation and, at a hearing, the Defendant admitted that he violated the conditions of his probation. The trial court revoked his probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Matthew Bruce Howard, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court, arguing that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence because he abused a position of private trust. Upon review, we agree that the trial court erred by finding that the Appellant abused a position of private trust, but we nevertheless affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff in a health care liability action appeals the dismissal of her claim on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations and the failure to provide pre-suit notice compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(3)(B). Because the undisputed facts in the record fail to establish that decedent was aware of the alleged misdiagnosis prior to his death, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on this issue. We also determine that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate standard or adequately explain its decision regarding the plaintiff’s alleged non-compliance with section 29-26- 121(a)(3)(B). We therefore vacate the dismissal of the complaint on this basis and remand for reconsideration in light of the appropriate standard. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Barbara E. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor children Mack E., Hannah E., Amber E., Donnica B. and Barbara Jean B. (collectively “the Children”). Donald B. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor children Donnica B. and Barbara Jean B. We find and hold that the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3) to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. We, therefore, affirm the June 28, 2017 order of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children.