APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Barbara E. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor children Mack E., Hannah E., Amber E., Donnica B. and Barbara Jean B. (collectively “the Children”). Donald B. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor children Donnica B. and Barbara Jean B. We find and hold that the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3) to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. We, therefore, affirm the June 28, 2017 order of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children.

The tenant of office building sued the landlord, a limited liability company, and its two owners for various causes of action arising out of his eviction. Following a nine-day trial the court held that the tenant had been wrongfully evicted and his property converted, and awarded the tenant nominal damages of $1.00 for the eviction, $23,130.00 for conversion of his personal property located in the building, $5,000.00 in punitive damages, costs of $2,395.00 and pre-judgment interest of $6,224.27. The tenant appeals the awards of damages and costs, and contends that interest should be 10 percent rather than the 5.5 percent awarded. The landlord contends that the holding that the tenant was wrongfully evicted should be reversed, that the tenant was not entitled to an award of damages for conversion, and that the individual owners should not be held liable for the damage awards. Upon a thorough review of the record, we modify the award of damages for conversion of the tenant’s property and remand the case for the court to award interest from the date the property was converted; we affirm the decision to award punitive damages, vacate the amount of damages, and remand for the court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to the appropriate factors and enter judgment accordingly; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.  

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Stephan Richardson, was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement because the “officers unreasonably delayed booking [him] in order to” secure his statement and because his statement was involuntarily given; (2) his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is invalid because the indictment failed to specify the predicate dangerous felony; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to sever or bifurcate the unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon offense from the other three counts, thereby, preventing him from receiving a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. However, because the jury was charged with a nonexistent crime regarding the employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction, we reverse that conviction and remand that count for a new trial.

Maurice Johnson (“the Petitioner”) appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life without parole. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) adequately investigate potential witnesses; (2) adequately investigate two witnesses who testified at trial; (3) prepare the Petitioner for testimony; (4) object to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence relating to the Petitioner’s drug dealing and “the Sweetwater fight”; (5) question co-defendant Twanna Blair about her statement to police that the perpetrators were white men; and (6) adequately protect the Petitioner’s appellate rights. The Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief based on these claims individually and based on the cumulative effect of these errors. The Petitioner additionally asserts that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief “in the face of structural error.” Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Petitioner, Herman McKinley, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to preserve his right to allocution at the sentencing hearing and by failing to ask the trial court to recuse itself because it signed the Petitioner’s arrest warrant. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Quinton Clovis (“Plaintiff”) appeals the February 7, 2017 order of the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) ordering, inter alia, that the Tennessee Department of Human Services (“the Department”) reinstate Plaintiff’s food stamp benefits. We find and hold that Plaintiff is not an aggrieved party, and thus, lacks standing to appeal. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

Louis Garassino (“Employee”) sustained a compensable lower back injury in the course of his work as a truck driver for Western Express (“Employer”). After a compensation hearing, the trial court awarded benefits to Employee. The order also awarded discretionary costs, in an unspecified amount. The parties disagreed over the issue. Employee filed a motion to award discretionary costs, including the fees of his examining doctor for reviewing records and conducting the examination. The trial court awarded those fees. Employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, which reversed the trial court as to the award of those two items. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been assigned to this Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.  

Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which Petitioner alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Defendant, Timothy Ware, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 16 years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a contentious continuing dispute over visitation with the parties’ young daughter. After numerous hearings, the trial court reluctantly continued limited structured visitation to the mother. The principal issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court’s rulings were in the best interests of the child. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record before us, we find that the evidence supports the parenting plan determination and other rulings made by the court.

A Tipton County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Dwight Michael Alston, of first degree premeditated murder, and he received a life sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because it fails to show he premeditated the killing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Ricardo Davidson, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

This post-divorce action primarily involves a provision in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) concerning disposition of the marital residence. The parties were divorced in 2011. The wife filed a petition in March 2015, seeking, inter alia, to enforce the divorce decree and MDA by obtaining an order requiring the husband to vacate the marital residence so that she could reside there with the parties’ minor child and her three foster children. The MDA provides that the wife is to retain sole and exclusive possession of the marital residence until it is sold while the husband is to deposit one-half of the monthly mortgage payment into the wife’s personal checking account each month “in lieu of” spousal support. The MDA also provides that the marital residence would not be placed on the market for sale until January 1, 2013, but it does not supply a deadline by which the parties would have to place the home on the market. At the time that the wife commenced this action, the wife had vacated the home, and the husband had been residing there for approximately one year. Following a bench trial conducted in May 2016, the trial court granted the wife’s petition to enforce the MDA, entering an order directing the husband to vacate the marital residence immediately and to make needed repairs to the home. The court also found that a purported post-divorce oral agreement between the parties for the husband to purchase the wife’s share of the marital residence had not constituted a valid contract. Crediting the husband with $12,000.00 he had paid to the wife toward purchase of the marital residence as payment toward a spousal support arrearage, the trial court ordered the husband to pay additional spousal support arrears at a rate of $300.00 per month and to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees. Specifically at issue on appeal is a provision the trial court included in the order, directing that the wife, the parties’ minor child, and the wife’s three foster children could remain in the marital residence until the parties’ minor child, who was then eleven years of age, graduated from high school or became otherwise emancipated. Also finding that the husband had behaved in a harassing and intimidating manner toward the wife, the trial court granted the wife’s request for a restraining order in part, limiting the number of times each day the husband could text the wife and his minor child. Seeking to have the provision at issue set aside, the husband filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied. The husband has appealed. Having determined that the trial court’s order impermissibly modified the MDA by creating an extended timeframe for sale of the marital residence not originally contemplated by the parties, we vacate the provision in the judgment allowing the wife to remain in the residence until the parties’ minor child graduates from high school or is otherwise emancipated. Inasmuch as the husband has raised this sole issue on appeal, we expressly do not disturb the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.      

Mother and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights and to allow Stepfather to adopt the minor child. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding that Father abandoned his child by willful failure to visit and support, and that Father failed to establish paternity of the child. The trial court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Father timely appealed. After review, we have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support two of the three grounds for termination, and to support the trial court’s conclusion that terminating Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Thus, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

Plaintiff parents of infant who died in child birth appeal a jury verdict in favor of the medical provider defendants. During voir dire, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ request for additional peremptory challenges under Tennessee Code Annotated section 22-3-104(b) on the basis that Plaintiffs were bringing their claim on behalf of the decedent infant. Based upon the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2017), we conclude that the trial court erred in treating Plaintiffs as a single “party plaintiff” and that Plaintiffs were entitled to eight peremptory challenges under the statute at issue. We also hold that under Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 107 (Tenn. 1996), the trial court’s error resulted in prejudice to the judicial process that necessitates a new trial. All other issues are pretermitted. Reversed and remanded.

The Defendant, Barbara Pinnix, pleaded guilty to attempted conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, and the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence, with the Defendant to serve twenty-seven days followed by the remainder of her sentence on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit for a probation violation warrant, alleging that the Defendant had brought contraband into jail. The Defendant pleaded guilty to the revocation but later filed a motion to set aside the revocation order, claiming that her decision was hastily made. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appeals. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to withdraw her admission to a probation violation and that it should have reviewed her motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f). After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff, who fell in a puddle of water on property adjacent to a water tower located on property owned by defendant, a governmental entity, brought suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that the water that caused him to fall was caused by drainage from the water tower on defendant’s property. Following a trial, the court held that there was no dangerous or defective condition in the water tower, such that it was foreseeable that a person would be injured, and that the defendant had no actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition that caused plaintiff to fall; as a consequence the Governmental Tort Liability Act did not operate to remove immunity. The court also held that plaintiff and the owner of the property where plaintiff fell were each at least 50 per cent at fault and, therefore, plaintiff could not recover. Plaintiff appeals; discerning no error we affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Randy Wayne Bennett, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel led to his rejection of a more beneficial plea offer from the State. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Way, appeals from his Sevier County jury convictions of burglary, theft over $1,000, vandalism over $1,000, and possession of burglary tools. As a career offender, he received an effective sentence of thirty-six years in confinement. The sole issues presented for our review are whether the trial court erred in denying Way’s motion to suppress certain evidence due to the State’s failure to establish a proper chain of custody and whether the evidence is sufficient to support each of his convictions. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant Rosemary L. Decosimo entered a plea of nolo contendere to driving under the influence per se and reserved a certified question regarding the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative, motion to suppress the test results from her blood test. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion on the basis that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-413(f), which gives the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation $250 for each DUI conviction that is obtained using a blood or breath test, is unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Decosimo and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

From 2011–2014, a municipality charged alcoholic beverage retailers higher inspection fees than was authorized by the municipality’s ordinance. A group of alcoholic beverage retailers paid the excess fees, but not under protest. After the municipality denied the retailers’ requests for refunds, they sued the municipality for recovery of the excess collections and other damages. The municipality moved to dismiss, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-1-901, et seq., required the retailers to have paid under protest any disputed taxes before filing suit to recover the overpayments. The trial court disagreed and awarded the retailers a judgment for the overpayments, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-1-1801, et seq., applied and payment under protest was not required. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-1-901, et seq., rather than sections 67 1-1801, et seq., apply to a suit to recover municipal taxes. Under section 67-1-901(a), the retailers were required to have paid under protest the disputed taxes before filing suit. Because the retailers did not pay the taxes under protest, they are not entitled to refunds.

This is a health care liability case. Appellant/Plaintiff first filed suit against Appellees/Defendants for medical malpractice in April 2014. Defendants filed motions to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements for health care liability claims. Before the trial court could hear Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit, and an order was entered thereon. Plaintiff subsequently re-filed her case against Defendants in September 2016 in reliance on the one year savings statute. Defendants moved the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s suit based on the statute of limitations. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, holding that, because Plaintiff’s original presuit notice was defective, her first complaint was untimely and she could not rely on the savings statute to revive a time-barred cause of action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Marvin Devon Summers, guilty of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient, his sentence is excessive, and he requests plain error review of "all objections" and "all issues regarding venue and jurisidiction." After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Defendant, Travis Eugene Taylor, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In exchange for his guilty pleas, he received consecutive sentences of fifteen years for voluntary manslaughter and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Many years later, Defendant sought to set aside the trial court’s judgment, arguing that his convictions violated the principles of double jeopardy. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion. Because Defendant’s motion fails regardless of how it is construed, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Asata Dia Lowe, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2000 convictions for two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery and his effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.