APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, John Willie Stone, of burglary of an automobile, theft of property valued at $500 or less, and aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 21 years’ incarceration. Shortly after the conclusion of his trial and prior to the entry of his judgments or his sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a pro se motion seeking new counsel, which the trial court interpreted as a petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a combined hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial and his purported petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court denied all claims. In this appeal, the defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentence in addition to the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Because the trial court erroneously treated the defendant’s motion for new counsel as a petition for post-conviction relief, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment which denied post-conviction relief to the defendant. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the Defendant’s, Jeffery Dwight Ray’s, guilty-pleaded conviction for aggravated statutory rape, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years’ incarceration. The Defendant appeals, arguing that he is a suitable candidate for alternative sentencing pursuant to the statutory considerations outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s alternative sentencing decision.

The trial court determined that the primary residential parent should be changed from mother to father without any change in the equal division of parenting time.  Because the trial court failed to address the best interest of the child in its order, we vacate and remand for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Defendant, Terry Trammell, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of burglary, a Class D felony, and two counts of theft of property, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-402 (2014) (burglary), 39-14-103 (2014) (theft). The trial court merged the burglary and theft convictions and sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of twelve years for the burglary conviction and six years for the theft conviction, which were ordered to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a medical malpractice action. The plaintiffs timely filed suit against the defendants concerning the failure to timely diagnose the husband’s prostate cancer. After voluntarily dismissing the initial suit, the plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice before filing a second suit pursuant to the saving statute. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient expert testimony to establish their claim. The court agreed and granted summary judgment. We affirm.

Defendant, Robert Guerrero, appeals from the trial court’s summary denial of his Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure (Tenn. R. Crim. P.) 36.1.  In his motion and on appeal, Defendant asserts that his nine consecutive fifteen-year sentences for nine convictions of attempted first degree murder are illegal.  He asserts that by imposing consecutive sentencing, the trial court failed to base its ruling on at least one of seven criteria found in Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) section 40-35-115.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rathal Y. Perkins, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 1995 Haywood County Circuit Court jury conviction of first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Martin E. Hughes, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault; introducing contraband into a penal institution; facilitation of possession of a schedule II controlled substance; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver; possession of drug paraphernalia; a second offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant; possession of a firearm while intoxicated; and vandalism of property valued under $500. The Petitioner received an aggregate five-year sentence, with credit for time he had served in prison and the remainder of the sentence to be served through the community corrections program. The Petitioner violated the terms of his alternative sentence, and he was sentenced to serve the remainder of the five years in prison. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. At the hearing on the petition, the Petitioner sought to establish that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas as not knowingly and voluntarily entered based on newly discovered evidence in the form of a victim recanting an earlier statement. The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief because he received the effective assistance of counsel and because the victim’s testimony at the hearing established that the material elements of her statement to police were accurate. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that a delay in the post-conviction proceedings attributable to the State resulted in the loss of a witness’s testimony and that his due process right to present his post-conviction claims was violated. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude there is no basis to disturb the Petitioner’s guilty pleas, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Paul Richardson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Travarious D. White, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is the second appeal of this employment discrimination case involving two plaintiffs. In the first appeal, Goree v. United Parcel Service, 490 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 23, 2016), this Court reversed the judgment as to one plaintiff and affirmed the judgment as to the other plaintiff, the Appellant in the instant case. On remand, the trial court determined that the specific attorney’s fees chargeable to each plaintiff could not be determined and reduced the previous award of attorney’s fees and costs by 50%. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Larry Peoples, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging his conviction of violation of sex offender registration and sentence of one year. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because the underlying sex offense was vacated and he is no longer required to register as a sex offender. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The issue we address is whether a defendant has an appeal as of right from the denial of a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) motion for return of property when the defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and pleaded guilty. The defendant was indicted on charges of aggravated assault by use or display of a deadly weapon. Law enforcement officers seized guns and other related items from the defendant’s home. The defendant did not challenge the seizure of his property and pleaded guilty to reduced charges of reckless endangerment. Three years later, he filed a Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property. The trial court dismissed the motion, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the defendant may be entitled to relief under Rule 41(g) based on the court’s determination that an illegal seizure occurs when, after a conviction, the State retains possession of property that is not stolen and not connected to the commission of a crime. See State v. Rowland, No. W2014-02311-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 6601315, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2015), perm. app. granted (Mar. 23, 2016). We hold that the defendant had no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) from the trial court’s order denying the Rule 41(g) motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals erred by hearing the defendant’s appeal when it lacked jurisdiction under Rule 3(b) and by determining that the defendant could be entitled to relief under Rule 41(g).   

The Defendant, Perry Mitchell Kirkman, pleaded guilty to two counts aggravated sexual battery in 2010 and received a fifteen-year sentence as a Range II offender. Six years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his sentence exceeds the sentencing range for a Range I offender convicted of a Class B felony. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and agreed to a sentence outside the appropriate sentencing range pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997).1 On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The owner of property in a residential subdivision appeals the order of the trial court prohibiting construction of an eight-foot wooden fence. We affirm.

This is a common law abuse of process case. The plaintiffs contend that the defendant attorney abused otherwise lawful process without authorization and for an improper purpose. The trial court dismissed this case as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). We affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “the complaint fails to state a cause of action for abuse of process.” Applying the appropriate standard of review as correctly articulated by the majority, I believe the complaint does state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the abuse of process claim.

The Appellant, Rafael Antonio Bush, appeals as of right from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The gravamen of the Appellant’s complaint is that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences based upon judicially determined facts in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Following our review, we affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute between a loan servicer and a family who subsequently defaulted on a mortgage for a piece of property. The loan servicer foreclosed and sold the property according to the express terms of the mortgage note and deed of trust after the family had been in default for multiple years and after multiple failed attempts to seek loan modification. The family sued for breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional misrepresentation, asserting that the loan servicer promised to postpone the foreclosure sale until after completion of the most recent loan modification review process. The trial court granted summary judgment to the loan servicer on all claims. The family appealed on all four issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

In this breach of contract case, Transfill Equipment Supplies & Services, Inc. (TESS) sued Advanced Medical Equipment, LLC (AME) for delinquent payments of (1) rent due on TESS’s equipment, (2) purchases of medical oxygen, and (3) the fair market value of rented equipment that AME had not returned to TESS. AME filed a separate lawsuit against TESS seeking damages for conversion of oxygen tanks. After consolidating the cases, the Sumner County General Sessions Court awarded damages to TESS and dismissed all of AME’s claims. AME appealed to the trial court. The court found that AME was guilty of breach of contract due to its failure to make timely payments. As a consequence, the court awarded judgment to TESS in the amount of $34,999.45. The trial court also found that TESS had not converted AME’s oxygen tanks. AME appeals. We affirm.

Deadrick Garrett (“the Petitioner”) appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) communicate with the Petitioner and adequately explain criminal and trial procedure; (2) review discovery with the Petitioner, including witness statements and forensic evidence; (3) have the Petitioner evaluated by a mental health expert and pursue a diminished capacity theory of defense; (4) anticipate that the trial court would deny a self-defense jury instruction and develop a viable alternative defense; and (5) object to the Petitioner’s demonstrating on crossexamination that he could open the knife used in the murder with one hand. The Petitioner further asserts that trial counsel improperly: (6) advised a defense witness to be hostile towards the victim; (7) instructed the Petitioner to “cry on cue”; and (8) fabricated the Petitioner’s trial testimony “so as to create some justification for [the Petitioner’s] stabbing [the victim].” After a thorough review of the appellate record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant hospital on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish that they witnessed or perceived an injury-producing event for purposes of their negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. We hold that the alleged failure of the defendant hospital to provide care to the plaintiffs’ daughter, despite repeated assurances from the hospital that it would occur, constitutes an injury-producing event that was witnessed by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claims on this basis.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jeffrey H. (“Father”) to his minor children Candice, Danonie, and Izabella (“the Children”). The Children had entered DCS custody after a domestic incident between Father and the Children’s mother. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father appealed. Finding it inapplicable to putative biological parent Father, we reverse the ground of failure to establish paternity found as regards the child Danonie. We affirm the rest of the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a pro se inmate’s complaint for failure to prosecute. After filing his complaint in 2005, the plaintiff took no action in the case for more than 10 years. In 2015, the trial court directed the plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Instead of providing an explanation for the delay, the plaintiff sought a default judgment against the defendant. The trial court then dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

“The law of negligent infliction of emotional distress has been called ‘one of the most disparate and confusing areas of tort law.’” Lane v. Estate of Leggett, No. M2016-00448-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1176982, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017) (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn. 1996)). While this is a statement with which I agree, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I certainly do not dispute that the Plaintiffs in this case have suffered extreme emotional distress, nor do I mean to discount their grief and suffering as a result of the death of their daughter, Halle Henderson.