APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her two sons.  The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination were proven and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate parental rights.  Mother appeals but only challenges the best interest determination.  We have also reviewed the evidence regarding each ground for termination.  We vacate the trial court’s finding regarding one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the trial court’s order and affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, Davarius Smith, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he was entitled to post-conviction relief based on the following alleged violations of his constitutional rights: (1) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) that, alternatively, he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel regarding this undisclosed evidence; (3) that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress a witness’ prior identification of the Petitioner; and (4) that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to appellate counsel’s failure to challenge an allegedly impermissible comment by the prosecutor during closing arguments and to properly challenge a special jury instruction provided by the trial court. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The State appeals the suppression of evidence by the Obion County Circuit Court. The defendant, Jerome Antonio McElrath, was arrested on two separate occasions for criminal trespass. The searches of the defendant’s person incident to those arrests produced marijuana in the amounts of 10.1 grams and 4.0 grams, respectively. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrests and dismissed the charges. The State argues that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant and, therefore, the search incident to each arrest was lawful. Furthermore, the State contends that the evidence was legally obtained because the officer acted in good-faith reliance on information provided by dispatch. After review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this breach of contract action, the plaintiff entered into a contract with a sole proprietor whereby he purported to purchase 10% of the sole proprietorship. The contract entitled the plaintiff to 10% of the cash withdrawals made from the business's account. It further provided that, should the sole proprietor dissolve the business and form a new entity of which she was a majority owner, the plaintiff would be entitled to 10% of the cash withdrawals taken by the sole proprietor from the new entity. Two years later, the sole proprietor closed the business and formed a new entity, a limited liability company, with another individual. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging breach of contract and violations of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court found for the sole proprietor, concluding that the sole proprietor was free to close her business at will. It further found that the sole proprietor did not breach the express terms of the contract, nor did she breach her implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, in closing her business and forming the LLC. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute between a loan servicer and a family who subsequently defaulted on a mortgage for a piece of property. The loan servicer foreclosed and sold the property according to the express terms of the mortgage note and deed of trust after the family had been in default for multiple years and after multiple failed attempts to seek loan modification. The family sued for breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional misrepresentation, asserting that the loan servicer promised to postpone the foreclosure sale until after completion of the most recent loan modification review process. The trial court granted summary judgment to the loan servicer on all claims. The family appealed on all four issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

In this breach of contract case, Transfill Equipment Supplies & Services, Inc. (TESS) sued Advanced Medical Equipment, LLC (AME) for delinquent payments of (1) rent due on TESS’s equipment, (2) purchases of medical oxygen, and (3) the fair market value of rented equipment that AME had not returned to TESS. AME filed a separate lawsuit against TESS seeking damages for conversion of oxygen tanks. After consolidating the cases, the Sumner County General Sessions Court awarded damages to TESS and dismissed all of AME’s claims. AME appealed to the trial court. The court found that AME was guilty of breach of contract due to its failure to make timely payments. As a consequence, the court awarded judgment to TESS in the amount of $34,999.45. The trial court also found that TESS had not converted AME’s oxygen tanks. AME appeals. We affirm.

Deadrick Garrett (“the Petitioner”) appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) communicate with the Petitioner and adequately explain criminal and trial procedure; (2) review discovery with the Petitioner, including witness statements and forensic evidence; (3) have the Petitioner evaluated by a mental health expert and pursue a diminished capacity theory of defense; (4) anticipate that the trial court would deny a self-defense jury instruction and develop a viable alternative defense; and (5) object to the Petitioner’s demonstrating on crossexamination that he could open the knife used in the murder with one hand. The Petitioner further asserts that trial counsel improperly: (6) advised a defense witness to be hostile towards the victim; (7) instructed the Petitioner to “cry on cue”; and (8) fabricated the Petitioner’s trial testimony “so as to create some justification for [the Petitioner’s] stabbing [the victim].” After a thorough review of the appellate record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant hospital on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish that they witnessed or perceived an injury-producing event for purposes of their negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. We hold that the alleged failure of the defendant hospital to provide care to the plaintiffs’ daughter, despite repeated assurances from the hospital that it would occur, constitutes an injury-producing event that was witnessed by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claims on this basis.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jeffrey H. (“Father”) to his minor children Candice, Danonie, and Izabella (“the Children”). The Children had entered DCS custody after a domestic incident between Father and the Children’s mother. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father appealed. Finding it inapplicable to putative biological parent Father, we reverse the ground of failure to establish paternity found as regards the child Danonie. We affirm the rest of the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a pro se inmate’s complaint for failure to prosecute. After filing his complaint in 2005, the plaintiff took no action in the case for more than 10 years. In 2015, the trial court directed the plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Instead of providing an explanation for the delay, the plaintiff sought a default judgment against the defendant. The trial court then dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Rafael Moreno, Jr., pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to a three-year sentence of incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and/or an alternative sentence. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alejandro Avila Salazar, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Wayne County Circuit Court. The Petitioner previously entered guilty pleas to second degree murder and attempted aggravated rape, for which he received an effective sentence of forty years' confinement. On appeal, he argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because his sentence for attempted aggravated rape is illegal and was a material, bargained-for element of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Charlene Trussell, was found guilty by a Bledsoe County Circuit Court jury of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, three counts of the attempted sale of a controlled substance, and felony possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014) (sale and delivery); 39-17-425 (2014) (drug paraphernalia); 39-12-101 (criminal attempt) (2014). The trial court merged the delivery convictions into the attempted sale convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective three years’ probation. The court did not impose sentences or enter judgment forms for the delivery convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and (2) as a matter of plain error, evidence of the confidential informant’s previous statements were inadmissible hearsay, violated the Defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and were inadmissible because the probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact. Although we affirm the Defendant’s convictions, we remand the case to the trial court for the imposition of sentences and the entry of judgments for the delivery of a controlled substance convictions, merger of the attempted sale convictions into the delivery convictions, and entry of corrected judgments for the attempted sale convictions.

Defendant, Scottie R. Buckles, pled guilty in ten separate cases to a total of sixty-three separate offenses for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied alternative sentencing after a hearing. Defendant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing on the basis that the trial court failed to consider whether Defendant should be sentenced under the special needs provision of the Community Corrections Act. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant, Scottie R. Buckles, pled guilty in ten separate cases to a total of sixty-three separate offenses for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied alternative sentencing after a hearing. Defendant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing on the basis that the trial court failed to consider whether Defendant should be sentenced under the special needs provision of the Community Corrections Act. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The plaintiff business owner, who provided carpet cleaning services, filed an action in the Hamilton County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”) against a customer, alleging that the customer had failed to compensate him for services rendered. The customer subsequently filed a counterclaim against the business owner, alleging that he had ruined an oriental rug in her home and sprayed chemicals on her furniture. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the customer. The business owner appealed to the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a de novo trial, the trial court also found in favor of the customer, determining that the business owner had damaged the customer’s carpet. The trial court awarded damages to the customer in the amount of $500.00. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tysheka Barnett brought this action solely against her employer, B.F. Nashville, Inc., dba Wendy’s of Nashville, alleging that Wendy’s general manager, William Rogers, sexually harrassed her during her employment at a Wendy’s restaurant. After a four-day bench trial, the court found that plaintiff had not met her burden of proof to show that the sexual conduct between her and Rogers was unwanted, and, therefore, she was unable to show harassment. On appeal, plaintiff primarily argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that the sexual interaction in question was not unwelcomed by plaintiff. This ruling was driven and determined in large part by the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility, including demeanor, of the various witnesses. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. 

In this child support action, the respondent father, who resides in Texas, filed a motion seeking to vacate the trial court’s previous child support orders, alleging that the court had no personal jurisdiction over him. The State of Tennessee (“the State”), acting on behalf of the mother, asserted that the father had consented to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction by previously seeking administrative review of the child support award. The trial court agreed, determining that its exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper. The father has appealed. Having determined that the trial court did not have a proper basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the father, we reverse the trial court’s adjudication concerning personal jurisdiction. Because the trial court’s prior child support orders are void, we remand this matter to the trial court for a determination concerning whether exceptional circumstances exist that would justify denying relief from the prior void orders.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the child, Lena G. (“the Child”), who was fifteen years of age at the conclusion of trial. On October 8, 2013, the Washington County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she has remained since that date. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on June 11, 2014, adjudicating the Child dependent and neglected in the care of the parents. On November 19, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s mother, Sherry G. (“Mother”), and her father, Teddy G. (“Father”). The trial court admitted Mother’s hospital records as an exhibit during trial over her objection. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parents failed to provide a suitable home for the Child, (2) the parents failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from the parents’ custody still persisted, and (4) Mother was mentally incompetent to adequately care for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Both Mother and Father have appealed. Having determined that the Child had not been removed from the parents’ home for six months by court order when the petition to terminate parental rights was filed, we reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the statutory ground of persistence of conditions as to both parents. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Mother’s hospital records but determine this error to be harmless. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child.

This appeal involves an attempt to set aside an allegedly void order pursuant to Rule 60.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court dismissed the petition for multiple reasons, including res judicata. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Kenneth J. Cradic, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis relief. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred in denying his petition because he presented newly discovered evidence of his actual innocence through a new witness who would discredit the victim’s trial testimony and evidence that the victim recanted her trial testimony on numerous occasions since the trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The court terminated the father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by engaging in conduct that exhibited wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, as well as substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The court found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The Petitioner, Courtney R. Logan, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner challenges his long-ago extradition to the state of Mississippi. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed this lawsuit against three prison employees seeking to recover certain personal property. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice based on the inmate’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-805, which requires inmates wanting to proceed in forma pauperis to submit to the trial court a complete list of every previous lawsuit or claim filed by the inmate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), established a new rule of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively to his case. Because Petitioner failed to follow the statutory requirements to seek discretionary review of a motion to reopen, this Court does not have jurisdiction, and we dismiss the appeal.