APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Jerome Nchiyako Dooley, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s partial
revocation of his probation. He argues on appeal that: (1) the trial court revoked
Defendant’s probation on grounds not alleged in the warrant, in violation of due process;
(2) the State failed to prove that Defendant violated the terms of his probation; and (3) the
trial court violated Defendant’s due process rights by failing to act as a neutral and detached
magistrate. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cantrell Devon Hodges, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a
firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, two counts of possession of
marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia
after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence recovered from his home. As
part of his plea agreement, he reserved a certified question of law for appeal, challenging
the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the certified question is not dispositive of the
case as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), we dismiss the
appeal.

In denying appellees’ motion to remove an estate’s personal representative, the trial court
adopted appellees’ proposed findings of fact verbatim and proposed conclusions of law “to
the degree they [were] not in conflict with [the] court’s order.” The proposed findings and
conclusions were signed by the trial court judge and attached to the order. Because we
cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s order represents its independent judgment, we
vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order that reflects that it is
the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment.

In this will contest initiated by four of the testator's grandchildren, the trial court determined that the execution of the testator's will met the statutory requirements for admitting the will to probate and, accordingly, dismissed the will contest. The grandchildren-contestants appealed. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dariun Bailey, of second-degree murder,
aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to twentytwo
years of incarceration. State v. Bailey, No. W2015-00542-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL
3645141, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).
This Court affirmed his convictions on appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for
post-conviction relief in which he alleged, as relevant to this appeal, that his trial counsel:
failed to adequately review and inspect discovery, coerced the Petitioner into testifying,
and failed to adequately meet with the Petitioner to review the evidence and prepare him
for trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After review,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A limited liability company filed suit in relation to a piece of real property for which the company had executed an agreement to purchase. Although closing did not occur by the time stated in the executed agreement, the trial court ultimately held that the opposing side in this case was estopped from denying that the contract had been extended. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2022, the Defendant, Stasey Tyrome Gregory, Jr., pleaded guilty to six counts of methamphetamine related charges, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the three minor children on the ground of severe child abuse and on the trial court’s finding that termination of her rights is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this real property dispute, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertions that they were
entitled to an easement over the land of the defendant. Among other things, the trial court held that an easement was not essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ land. Although the plaintiffs now appeal, we decline to address their arguments due to their noncompliance with applicable briefing requirements and therefore dismiss the appeal.

In this child custody case, the record transmitted on appeal creates significant doubt as to whether the trial court’s final order represents its own deliberations and decision. Due to this concern, and because the judge who previously presided over this case has since retired from the bench, we vacate the appealed judgment and remand for a new trial.

The petitioner, Crystal Gregoire, appeals from the Circuit Court of Lawrence County’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The notice of appeal filed by the Appellant, Myan Joy Spear, stated that the Appellant was appealing the judgment entered on February 15, 2023. As the orders appealed from do not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The plaintiff filed a complaint against two parties in general sessions court. One defendant
was served, but the other was not. Judgment was entered against the served defendant.
Seven months later, the claim against the unserved defendant was voluntarily dismissed.
The served defendant then appealed, but the circuit court dismissed the appeal as untimely.
Because a final, appealable judgment in the general sessions court was not entered until
the claim against the unserved defendant was voluntarily dismissed, we conclude that the
served defendant’s appeal was timely. Reversed and remanded.

This is a negligence and premises liability action. One of the defendants, Appellee property
owner, filed a motion for summary judgment three days after answering and before any
discovery was scheduled or conducted. Appellant filed motions for permission to amend
his complaint and for additional time to conduct discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Civil Procedure 56.07. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for additional time,
reserved his motion to amend his complaint, and heard Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed
Appellant’s claims “with prejudice,” and explicitly reserved its judgment pending
adjudication of Appellant’s pending motion for permission to amend. The trial court
subsequently determined it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant’s motion to
amend and instructed Appellant to file a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion to
set aside the judgment. The trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 60 motion and motion to
amend and certified its order awarding summary judgment to Appellee as final pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We vacate the award of summary judgment to
Appellee and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Lemonderius Antwan Goodner, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of premeditated first-degree murder, felony murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus ten years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his claims related to foreclosed property, asserting that
he was the true, legal, and lawful owner of the property. Because of serious deficiencies in
Appellant’s brief, we conclude that Appellant has waived his issues on appeal. The trial
court’s judgment is therefore affirmed.

At issue in this appeal is the classification and division of marital property from a nearly
22-year marriage. The trial court divided the marital property 50/50. The husband appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment to divide the marital property 75% to the husband and 25% to the wife. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Shawn Rafael Bough, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary
denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner/Appellee Matthew Long (“Long”) applied for disability pension benefits due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) caused by various traumatic events he experienced during his time as a firefighter with the Chattanooga Fire Department (“CFD”). The Board of Trustees (the “Board”) for Respondent/Appellant Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (the “Fund”) denied Long’s application. Long filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”) seeking a reversal of the Board’s decision. Finding that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, the trial court reversed the denial of Long’s application. The trial court also denied a motion to alter or amend filed by the Fund. Following thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Lee Woods, Jr., Defendant, was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder, one count of felony murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense. The convictions stemmed from an incident that left two people dead and one person paralyzed. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences plus 10 years. Following the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, challenging: (1) the trial court’s decision to permit the State to introduce evidence of Defendant’s involvement in two unrelated shootings in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the trial court’s decision to permit the State to introduce a video clip in which Defendant is seen brandishing a gun; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the convictions for first degree murder, felony murder and attempted first degree murder; and (4) his sentence. Defendant also alleges that cumulative errors during the trial entitle him to reversal of the convictions. Because trial counsel failed to object to the introduction of evidence about the two unrelated shootings as well as the video clip of Defendant brandishing a gun and Defendant failed to establish all five factors necessary for plain error review, he is not entitled to relief on those issues. Moreover, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for correction of the judgment form in Count 5 to reflect that the sentence runs consecutively to Counts 1, 2, and 4.

A Knox County jury found the Defendant, John Shaffighi, guilty of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery from events occurring in 1992. He was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. He also asserts the trial court erred by (1) denying a motion to dismiss in light of missing evidence; (2) allowing the victim’s forensic interview to be played at trial; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial after testimony from the victim; (4) limiting the testimony of his expert witness; (5) instructing the jury on its deliberation during its deadlock; and (6) imposing the maximum sentence after misapplying enhancement factors and failing to apply mitigating factors. The State concedes that the Defendant was not sentenced properly under the pre-2005 sentencing statutes. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but respectfully remand the case for resentencing in accordance with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

The defendant, Roger Dean Guin, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of aggravated sexual battery, rape of a child, assault, rape, incest, and sexual
battery by an authority figure, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress his statement and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
Because the State’s elections in Counts 8, 9, and 10 were insufficient to protect the
defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict and to protect against violations of the
principles of double jeopardy, we vacate those convictions and remand for a new trial on
those counts. We also remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments
in Counts 3, 5, and 7 reflecting the merger of those convictions into Counts 2, 4, and 6
respectively and reflecting the proper misdemeanor classification and sentences. We
reverse the conviction in Count 1 and affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

This is an appeal from a default judgment originally entered by the General Sessions Court for Knox County (“general sessions court”) and then appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“circuit court”). Because the defendant did not appear in the circuit court, the circuit court also entered a default judgment against the defendant. The defendant then appealed to this Court. However, because of deficiencies in the defendant’s brief, any issues purportedly raised are waived. We thus affirm the circuit court’s ruling.

This appeal involves claims to three disputed areas based on adverse possession and prescriptive easement. We affirm the trial court’s decision denying the plaintiff’s claims.

Appellant attorney appeals the denial of his request for attorney’s fees to be paid from the
estate of a ward in a conservatorship proceeding. The trial court denied the request on the
bases that the legal services contract at issue did not provide for the payment of fees from
the estate, the ward lacked capacity to enter into a power of attorney giving the executor of
the contract authority to do so, and the applicant attorney was never appointed as attorney
ad litem for the ward. We affirm.