APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Luther Ray Mabe, Jr., appeals his Hawkins County Criminal Court jury
convictions of aggravated robbery and theft of property valued at more than $1,000, for
which he received an effective sentence of 10 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery
conviction and argues that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the correct grade of theft for
which the defendant was convicted and merging the theft conviction into the aggravated
robbery conviction.

I fully concur with my respected colleagues’ reasoning and judgment as it relates to
the Defendant’s sentencing issue. Regarding the Defendant’s sufficiency challenge,
however, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that the facts at trial do not
support the State’s theory on appeal regarding when the shotgun was taken. Specifically,
I believe that the facts at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
demonstrate that the Defendant had not completed the taking of the shotgun at the time that
the Defendant and the victim struggled over control of the rifle.

Following a bench trial, Shanynthia Gardner (“Defendant”) was convicted of four counts
each of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder in perpetration of
aggravated child abuse, first degree felony murder in perpetration of aggravated child
neglect, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect, for which she received an
effective sentence of life. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court
used an incorrect legal standard in determining that she failed to carry her burden of
establishing her insanity at the time of the offenses; (2) the evidence is insufficient to
support her convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s request to
make an offer of proof of the entirety of a witness’s audio recorded statement to police.
Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jamauri Ransom, of aggravated robbery
and first degree felony murder. The Petitioner appealed, claiming insufficient evidence,
and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Jamauri Ransom, No. W2019-
02319-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1310877, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., April 8, 2021), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. July 12, 2021). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition,
alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed
to move for a mistrial based upon alleged juror misconduct. After a hearing, the postconviction
court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

Petitioner, Roosevelt Morris, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to relief because his sentence is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), he did not receive timely pretrial notice of the State’s notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment, and because the habeas corpus court did not give him sufficient time to file a written reply to the State’s response to the habeas corpus petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Donald Haynes, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years to be served on probation. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $42,000 in restitution to the victim in monthly installments of $500. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence of pecuniary loss to support an order of restitution. After review, we reverse and remand the case for the trial court to determine the victim’s credibility, the victim’s pecuniary loss, if any, and to make adequate findings of fact, if any, to support the imposition of restitution based upon sufficient credible evidence of pecuniary loss.

This products-liability case is dismissed with prejudice on the parties’ joint stipulation of
dismissal.

Defendant, William Timothy Kirk, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement, to be served at seventy-five percent. The trial court ordered the DUI sentence to be served consecutively to the life sentence for which Defendant was on parole at the time of the offense. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed a complaint for a restraining order against the defendant, the wife of the
plaintiff’s ex-husband. The plaintiff sought a restraining order because the defendant
requested to “add” or “friend” plaintiff’s co-workers and manager on certain social media
applications. The trial court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order and, after
conducting a hearing, extended the temporary restraining order for one year. Following
our review of the record, we conclude that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to
establish that she would suffer immediate and irreparable harm absent a restraining order
against the defendant or any other facts that would otherwise constitute a cause of action.
We therefore reverse and vacate the one-year restraining order.

The Defendant, Darren Marion Little, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating the Sex Offender Registry and one count of possessing a prohibited weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III offender to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred when it classified him as a Range III offender. After review, we agree with the parties. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for resentencing.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Theodore Devon Wells, of sale of a Schedule II narcotic, cocaine, and delivery of a Schedule II narcotic, cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III offender to twenty-eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erroneously admitted certain items of evidence. He further contends that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated. Finally, he contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Decedent’s siblings filed a document they alleged to be decedent’s last will and testament. Decedent’s husband, the personal representative of her estate, moved to declare the alleged will invalid for lack of an effective signature. The trial court concluded that the will was ineffective due to the lack of decedent’s signature, and declined to admit it to probate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pro-se petitioner, Chris M. Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his “Rule 36 Plain Error Motion for New Trial.” Following our review of the entire record
and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents to two children, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence as to both parents regarding the ground of severe child abuse and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the children’s best interest. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

Heather B. ¹ (“Mother”) and John S., III (“Father”) are the biological parents of Serenity S. Mother and Raymond R. are the biological parents of Harmony R., Mellody O., and Angel O. Tina S. (“Grandmother”) and John S., Jr. (“Grandfather” or, together with Grandmother, “Petitioners”) petitioned the Chancery Court for Giles County (the “trial court”) for termination of Mother’s and Raymond R.’s parental rights in April of 2021 and for adoption of the children. Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights as to Serenity S. As for the grounds for termination, Petitioners alleged: substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the children. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Petitioners proved all three statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Mother appeals to this Court. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order must be vacated and remanded. Because Petitioners proved no statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we need not consider whether termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.

The Defendant, Thakelyn J. Tate, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess more
than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(c) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled
substance) (2018), 39-17-432 (2018) (subsequently amended) (drug-free zone), 39-12-
103 (2018) (conspiracy). The jury likewise determined that the Defendant committed a
criminal gang offense, enhancing the felony classification of the conviction. See id. § 40-
35-121 (2019). The court imposed a fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the criminal gang enhancement. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Durrell James a/k/a/ James Durrell, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of
three counts of aggravated stalking (Counts 1 through 3) and one count of stalking (Count
4). The trial court imposed a four-year sentence for each count of aggravated stalking in
Counts 1 through 3, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for stalking in Count 4. The trial
court further ordered that the sentence in Count 2 be served consecutively to Count 1 and
concurrently with the sentences in Counts 3 and 4 for an effective eight-year sentence as a
Range II multiple offender to be served in a local workhouse. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review of the
entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but
remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment form for Count 2 to reflect that it
is to be served consecutively to Count 1 and concurrently with Counts 3 and 4.

The Defendant, Jermaine R. Carpenter, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his
second motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Edgar Bailey Jr., appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony
murder, setting fire to personal property, and three counts of aggravated assault. The
Petitioner is serving an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1)
the post-conviction court erred when it denied relief under the Post-Conviction DNA
Analysis Act of 2001 (the DNA Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -
313 (2018), and (2) the Petitioner is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.
We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court found Father to be willfully underemployed and imputed income to him for calculation of child support. Mother appeals the juvenile court’s determination, arguing the trial court erred as to the amount of income imputed to Father for the purposes of setting child support and also as to its determination of the amount of retroactive support. We affirm the trial court’s income imputation. However, we conclude the trial court erred in its calculation of retroactive support owed by Father. Therefore, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court in part and reverses in part.

In this real property dispute, the petitioner brought an action to quiet title to and remove
the respondent from a parcel of improved real property located in Cumberland County.
Following a bench trial, the trial court ordered that the title of the property be fully vested
in the petitioner. The trial court also ordered the respondent to vacate the premises within
ten days. Following a damages hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding to the
petitioner $8,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in attorney’s fees. The
respondent has appealed, and the petitioner has raised an issue alleging that this is a
frivolous appeal. Because we are unable to discern from the trial court’s judgment any
consideration of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5
factors (“RPC 1.5 factors”), we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for the
trial court to make a new determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award to the
petitioner based on the RPC 1.5 factors. We deny the petitioner’s request for damages on
appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Plaintiffs filed this inverse condemnation suit against numerous defendants, alleging that
their involvement with a construction project on an interstate highway resulted in increased
surface waters and flooding of Plaintiffs’ home and property. The trial court dismissed all
of the claims at various stages of the litigation. In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed the
dismissal of multiple claims, but we vacated the trial court’s grant of judgment on the
pleadings for two defendants because the trial court’s order stated that its decision was
based on “the entire record” and cited an exhibit to the complaint. See Harvey v. Shelby
Cnty., No. W2018-01747-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3854297, at *4-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
16, 2019). We remanded for consideration pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
56. Id. at *6. After some limited discovery on remand, the trial court granted motions for
summary judgment filed by the two remaining defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, James William Mabe, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. The trial court
found that clear and convincing evidence established four grounds for termination of
parental rights including (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) persistent conditions; (3)
substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and (4) failure to manifest an ability
and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found clear and convincing
evidence established that termination was in the children’s best interests. The appellant
challenges the trial court’s findings as to both the existence of grounds for termination and
the conclusion that termination was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cededrick Ivory, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury
for first-degree premeditated murder in the shooting death of Anthony Travis (count one),
the attempted first-degree murder of Malik Muhammad (count two), and unlawful
employment of a firearm during the commission of first-degree murder (count three). Prior
to trial, the State dismissed counts two and three. The Appellant was convicted as charged
by a Shelby County jury of first-degree premediated murder (count one) and sentenced to
life in prison. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues for our review: (1)
whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of first-degree premeditated
murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the prosecutor to correct the
testimony of a state witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the dates of
prior charged offenses during the cross-examination of two state witnesses. Upon our
review, we must remand this case for entry of separate judgment forms reflecting a
dismissal of counts two and three. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.