APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Eric Williams, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions
of aggravated assault and assault, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and that the trial court erred by classifying him as a Range II, multiple offender.
Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kenneth Benard Hudspeth, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and two counts of aggravated rape. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(2) (Supp. 1998) (subsequently amended) (felony murder in perpetration of rape); 39-13-210 (1997) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder); and 39-13-205 (1997) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape). After the appropriate merger, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his police statement, and (3) the court erred by ordering consecutive service of his sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the filing of a detainer warrant in general sessions court. The
plaintiff sought to remove the defendant and her mobile home from his real property. The
general sessions court granted possession of the real property to the plaintiff but ordered
him to pay for the removal of the mobile home. The defendant appealed to the circuit
court. The circuit court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief requested and
awarded him possession of his real property. However, contrary to the general sessions
court, the circuit court ordered the defendant to remove her mobile home from the
plaintiff’s real property at her expense. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Demetrice Livingston, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury
of second degree murder and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to
twenty years at 100% in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his
sentence in a drug case for which he had been sentenced to probation. The Defendant
raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his
conviction; (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (3) whether the
State made an improper closing argument by referencing facts not in evidence and making
a comment that impermissibly bolstered the testimony of a State’s witness. Based on our
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for the trial court to enter an
amended judgment imposing a concurrent sentence.

In this lawsuit between former law partners, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees.
The instant appeal involves Appellees’ attempt to collect their judgment. The trial court
held that Appellant’s qualified rollover IRA is not exempt from garnishment, attachment
and execution under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 26-2-105, 26-2-111(1)(D), 26-2-
26, and 56-7-203. The trial court also determined that a recreational vehicle was not held
as a tenancy by the entirety and was subject to attachment and execution as Appellant’s
individually-owned property. We reverse.

The Defendant, Jarrett Michael Tolley, pleaded guilty to multiple theft- and fraud-related
charges in the Washington County Criminal Court, for which she received a sentence of
seven years' incarceration suspended to fifteen years on community corrections. The
sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a sentence of two years' incarceration
imposed in an unrelated case in Carter County, which resulted in a sentence of six years on
community corrections, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years to be served on
community corrections. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court denied. On
appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action filed in 2018. The wife appeals from the trial
court’s order finding her guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. Because one count of
criminal contempt was alleged as civil contempt, we vacate the trial court’s finding of
criminal contempt on that count. We affirm the finding of criminal contempt on the second
count. We vacate the punishment of community service and remand for determination of
an appropriate punishment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-103.

The Defendant, Donnie Marquis Tharpe, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
probation revocation of the five-year, split-confinement sentence he received for his guiltypleaded
convictions for aggravated assault and evading arrest. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance
and by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in
confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on April 5, 2023. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

This is the second appeal in this matter involving a motor vehicle collision that occurred on October 23, 2019, in Nashville. Upon remand, following dismissal of the first appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of a final judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual tortfeasor and subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against his underinsured motorist insurance carrier. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his negligence claim, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the tortfeasor. We further vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim against his automobile insurer. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a personal injury action arising out of a car accident in a state parking lot. The original defendants raised the defense of comparative fault by the State of Tennessee, and the plaintiff filed a notice of claim in the Division of Claims and Risk Management and, later, filed a complaint in the Claims Commission. After the Claims Commission transferred the matter to circuit court, the State moved to dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the court granted the motion. We affirm the trial court’s ruling because, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, the complaint initiating a suit against the State was filed in the Claims Commission after the expiration of the 90-day grace period provided by the statute. Furthermore, we find the plaintiff’s argument that the State waived the statute of limitations defense unpersuasive.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Jerome Hardison, of first degree
premeditated murder. The Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the trial court erred by
denying the Defendant’s motion to recuse the trial judge; (2) the trial court erred by denying
the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the execution of a search
warrant on his residence; (3) the trial court unconstitutionally limited the Defendant’s
ability to cross-examine a witness; (4) the trial court erred by admitting expert ballistics
testimony at trial; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to prove the Defendant’s identity
as the perpetrator. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeffrey George Tulley, Defendant, pleaded guilty to three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, three counts of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. At sentencing, the trial court imposed three concurrent sentences of eleven years on the drug counts and a consecutive four-year sentence for the firearm counts, as a Range I offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of the chancery court’s affirmance of the decision of the administrative law judge granting a Line of Duty Disability (“LODD”) pension to a Memphis Firefighter. The appeal hinges on a question of law concerning the meaning of Memphis Code of Ordinances § 25-1(27), which states that an employee is eligible for a LODD pension if:

[A] physical . . . condition arising as the direct and proximate result of an accident sustained by a participant, . . . while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place . . . which totally and permanently prevents him or her from engaging in the duties for which he or she was employed by the city. The determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two qualified physicians.

City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, § 25-1(27) (emphasis added).

Three qualified physicians testified, but only one of them found that both factors were established. In ruling in favor of the firefighter, the administrative law judge and the chancellor both held that it was not necessary that each qualified physician state that the injuries were caused while in the actual performance of duties for the City at a definite place and time and that he was permanently disabled from continuing in his chosen role as a consequence of that injury. The City of Memphis insists that this was error, contending that “the ordinance clearly requires at least two physicians to opine that the employee sustained a work-related injury which caused his/her disability.” Based on the plain language of the ordinance, we agree with the City’s interpretation of the evidentiary requirements for a LODD pension; we therefore reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the decision of the Pension Board of the City of Memphis, which denied the application for a LODD pension.

The Defendant-Appellant, Eula Beasley, entered a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated robbery (count one) and possession of a firearm with a prior conviction for a crime of violence (count two), for which he received an eight-year sentence for each count with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff made a claim for the return of bond money he paid to a private bonding company to secure his release from jail for charges that were pending and then nolled nearly 22 years before the filing of the present cause of action. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court held that the complaint, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences, fails to articulate any facts or legal authority showing a right to relief against the defendant. Further, the court determined that if the gravamen of the claim is a tort action for conversion, the claim was also properly dismissed because it would have accrued long ago and is therefore barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by a former CEO seeking funds owed to him from his company and two of its subsidiaries. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Darrin Walker, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of
first degree murder. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged and
sentenced to concurrent life sentences. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for diminution of real property value,
alleging that the defendant’s steam pipe exploded, causing toxic debris, including asbestos,
to fall on the plaintiff’s real property. The plaintiff’s claims included strict liability for
ultra-hazardous activity, ordinary negligence, negligence per se, public nuisance, trespass,
continuing private nuisance, and medical monitoring. The trial court dismissed the entire
amended complaint without prejudice pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
12.02(6) after finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with the Tennessee Asbestos
Claims Priorities Act. The trial court also dismissed the claims for strict liability,
negligence per se, trespass, and medical monitoring with prejudice. Upon review, we
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the entire complaint without prejudice, as well as the
dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence per se, trespass, and medical monitoring claims with
prejudice. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the strict liability claim with prejudice.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights, arguing that the trial court erroneously found that grounds
existed for termination and that such termination was in the child’s best interest. Having
carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

A Jefferson County jury convicted the defendant, William David Phillips, of four counts
of reckless homicide, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of felony reckless
endangerment, for which he received an effective sentence of fourteen years, eleven
months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial
court erred in imposing an excessive sentence, denying probation, and imposing
consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for a corrected
judgment form in count three.

The defendant, Luther Ray Mabe, Jr., appeals his Hawkins County Criminal Court jury
convictions of aggravated robbery and theft of property valued at more than $1,000, for
which he received an effective sentence of 10 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery
conviction and argues that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the correct grade of theft for
which the defendant was convicted and merging the theft conviction into the aggravated
robbery conviction.

I fully concur with my respected colleagues’ reasoning and judgment as it relates to
the Defendant’s sentencing issue. Regarding the Defendant’s sufficiency challenge,
however, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that the facts at trial do not
support the State’s theory on appeal regarding when the shotgun was taken. Specifically,
I believe that the facts at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
demonstrate that the Defendant had not completed the taking of the shotgun at the time that
the Defendant and the victim struggled over control of the rifle.