APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 2016, the Petitioner, Mack Mandrell Loyde, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life without parole. In 2018, this court affirmed his convictions and remanded for resentencing. State v. Loyde, No. M2017- 01002-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1907336, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018). In 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the denial of which was affirmed on appeal. Loyde v. State, No. M2022-01132-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 5447386, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2023). In 2023, five years after his convictions and sentence became final, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed the instant petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was summarily dismissed as beyond the one-year statute of limitations. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period based on an affidavit from an individual, Brandy Oldaker, who claimed to have been involved in the underlying offenses and who denied the Petitioner was involved. The Petitioner claims the affidavit is newly discovered evidence of his innocence.¹ Upon review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Shane Dwight Bingham, appeals from his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s flight from police; and (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, James Leon Parker, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion for resentencing pursuant to the Drug Free Zone Act (“DFZA”).
Defendant was convicted in 2008 of several drug-related offenses, including one count of
sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school (Count 6) and one count
of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school (Count 7). The
trial court merged Counts 6 and 7 and imposed a sentence of 25 years on those counts,
which the court ordered to run consecutively to his effective eight-year sentence in the
other counts, for a total effective sentence of 33 years. In 2022, Defendant filed a pro se
motion for resentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h), and the
trial court appointed counsel. While Defendant’s motion was pending in the trial court,
Governor Bill Lee granted Defendant executive clemency, ordering that Defendant’s 25-
year sentence in Counts 6 and 7 be commuted, which allowed Defendant to immediately
become parole eligible on those counts. Based on Governor Lee’s commutation order, the
trial court determined that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing and dismissed
Defendant’s motion “without a hearing due to that ineligibility.” Defendant appeals that
dismissal and asks this Court to review it under as a writ of certiorari. Following our
review, we grant certiorari and reverse and remand for a hearing on Defendant’s motion.

What began as a public records request ended with the trial court imposing sanctions upon the requester for violations of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court concluded that the public records requester violated Rule 11 by including a false statement and deceptive exhibit in her Public Records Act Petition, by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry before filing her Petition, and by having an improper purpose in connection with her anticipated speech regarding any public records that she might obtain via the Public Records Act. The trial court imposed multiple sanctions upon the requester including a $5,000 penalty, a requirement to associate counsel in any future pro se filing within the judicial district, and a dismissal with prejudice of her Petition. We conclude the trial court properly determined the requester violated Rule 11 by including a false statement and deceptive exhibit in her Petition. Given the context of the Public Records Act, we conclude, however, that the trial court erred with regard to its conclusion that the requester made an inadequate inquiry prior to filing her Petition and had an improper purpose in connection with the requester’s anticipated use of any documents she obtained. We also conclude the monetary penalty imposed by the trial court violates the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Because of our other findings, we vacate the trial court’s imposition of all three sanctions, and remand for determination of an appropriate sanction in light of our decision.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Michael Taylor, for first degree
premeditated murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, and violation of an order of
protection. The Defendant, at his jury trial, was convicted of the lesser included offense of
second degree murder as well as the charged offenses of unlawful possession of a weapon
and violation of an order of protection. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court
imposed an effective twenty-five year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial
court provided an incomplete and misleading jury instruction on self-defense that
prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Because the self-defense instruction was error
and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the particular facts of this
case, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand this case to the trial court for a
new trial on all counts.

In this post-divorce custody and contempt action, the trial court held the defendant father in criminal contempt for violating the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court sentenced the father to serve 186 consecutive days in jail. The trial court also limited the father’s parenting time with the parties’ minor children and awarded the mother her attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the action. The father timely appealed to this Court, arguing that he lacked adequate notice of the criminal contempt allegations and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. The father also argues that the trial court erred in limiting his parenting time under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. The issues related to inadequate notice are waived because the father raises those issues for the first time on appeal. Father’s argument regarding his parenting time is waived for the same reason. We also conclude that the trial court’s sentence for the father’s criminal contempt is appropriate under the circumstances and does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Finally, we award the mother her costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred in defending this appeal.

Eugene Smith, Defendant, entered best interest pleas to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery with sentencing left open to the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence of six years on each count, imposing consecutive sentences, and denying alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A father was found to have committed severe child abuse in a dependency and neglect case. The Department of Children’s Services subsequently filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights based on the previous finding of severe child abuse. Father asserts that the trial court erred in failing to continue the termination proceedings in his absence, in finding a ground for termination of his parental rights, and in determining that termination was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Parents, on behalf of their children who are public school students, and an education-focused parents’ rights organization brought suit against the Williamson County Board of Education, arguing that the Board’s adoption and implementation of a particular curriculum violates Tennessee law. The Plaintiffs argue the curriculum violates a state law restricting the use of Common Core textbooks and instructional materials in public schools and violates another state law that bars the teaching of certain prohibited concepts in public schools. The School Board moved to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion on two justiciability grounds. The trial court concluded that the parents and the parents’ rights organization lacked standing to maintain either claim. The trial court also concluded that the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to their prohibited concepts claim and had not done so. The Plaintiffs appealed. With the exception of a family that left the county public school system and has not expressed in their pleadings an intent to return, we conclude that trial court erred in finding the Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the prohibited concepts claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We reverse, however, the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ Common Core claim and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Benjamin Cloe Byrer, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The Defendant was sentenced to nineteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother sought to move to another state with her minor child. The child’s father opposed the move and petitioned to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The mother responded with a counter-petition seeking approval of the move and a modified parenting plan. Using the best-interest factors applicable to child custody disputes, the court granted the mother permission to relocate and modified the parties’ parenting time accordingly. On appeal, the father argues the parental relocation statute applied and, regardless of which best-interest factors were used, the evidence preponderates against the court’s best-interest finding. We affirm.

The Defendant, Malik DeWayne Hardin, appeals the denial of his motion for resentencing
for his guilty-pleaded conviction of possession with the intent to sell less than .5 grams of
cocaine in a drug free school zone, which resulted in a sentence of twelve years at 100%
as a Range II offender. The Defendant asserts that the trial court issued a fundamentally
illegal ruling and palpably abused its discretion by comparing the sentence the Defendant
received pursuant to his negotiated plea agreement to the sentence he faced if convicted of
the greater charged offense and concluding that he would not receive a lesser sentence
under the 2022 amendment to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. The Defendant therefore
requests that this court, in the interest of justice, convert his improperly filed Rule 3 appeal
into a common law writ of certiorari and reverse the ruling of the trial court. Because the
Defendant has not shown that his case warrants review pursuant to a writ of certiorari, we
dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Daniela Valderrama, filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Ms. Valderrama’s petition for recusal appeal fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 10B, section 2.03. Due to Ms. Valderrama’s failure to comply with Rule 10B, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a divorce action involving, inter alia, the classification of property, equitable valuation and division of marital property, and support for an alleged disabled adult child beyond the age of 21. After our exhaustive review, we find that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determinations in this matter. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respect.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude his experts and to grant summary judgment to the defendant. Because plaintiff has appealed a non-final judgment and the record on appeal is incomplete, we dismiss this appeal.

Plaintiff alleged that actions of defendant tow truck driver led to John Doe driving into plaintiff’s vehicle and causing injury. Towing company and driver moved for summary judgment based on the lack of evidence as to the cause of John Doe’s actions. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment for lack of evidence that towing company or driver was the cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A condominium owner appeals from a final judgment awarding past due fees and assessments to a homeowners association. Because the owner did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

This is an appeal of a termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son. Ashley D.
(“Petitioner”), who has maintained custody of Matthew D. (“the Child”) since he was four
months old, sought termination of the parental rights of Natalie D. (“Mother”).1 The
Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) found that clear and convincing
evidence established the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support and that it
was in the best interest of the Child that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother
appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

This is the petitioner’s second petition to recuse based on the same allegations. Therefore,
we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

A tax group performed tax credit services on a contingency fee basis for a corporation that owned several hospitals in California. Four and half years after the corporation completed a transaction referred to as a “spinoff,” the tax group informed the corporation that the spinoff triggered a reorganization provision of the parties’ contract that entitled the tax group to a fee for unused tax credits related to one of the hospitals involved in the spinoff. The corporation filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that no fee was owed because the spinoff did not trigger the contract’s reorganization provision. After conducting discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the tax group’s motion and granted summary judgment to the corporation after concluding that the parties’ conduct prior to the dispute showed that they intended the term “reorganization” to have a tax-based meaning that corresponded to the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of the term and that the spinoff did not constitute a reorganization under that definition. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The cabinets delivered from a Turkish company for a Tennessee construction project did not meet United States formaldehyde standards and could not be used as they were. The construction management company filed an insurance claim. The insurance company denied the claim and the construction management company sued. The trial court found for the construction management company and the insurance company appealed. We have determined that the trial court’s order was not final and, therefore, dismiss the appeal and remand the matter for further consideration.

In this termination of parental rights case, Brian T. and Samantha T., the maternal grandparents of Rori H., appeal the trial court’s ruling that termination of the parental rights of Rori’s father, Brennan H., is not in the child’s best interests. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding as grounds for termination that the father abandoned the child by failing to pay support in the four months preceding the petition. Having found no grounds for termination, we do not reach a best interests determination. Ultimately, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for termination. We remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-117(b)(4). Finally, we conclude that the father is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The Petitioner, Carlos Stokes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifty-four years. He contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and requests that this court appoint a special judge to preside over this case on remand. We conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations. As a result, the judgment of the coram nobis court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. We decline to appoint a special judge for subsequent proceedings.