APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Donald Wayne McCall (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner in this parenting dispute appeals the trial court's order entered September 17, 2015. Having determined that the order at issue is not a final order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant, Timothy Demond Lambert, appeals from the trial court's dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of Defendant's motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An auctioneer filed suit against a recreational vehicle dealer for injunctive relief and damages; the dealer counterclaimed for fraud and other causes of action. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the dealer. Distribution of funds held by the court clerk was held in abeyance. This appeal is a post-judgment dispute as to whether the trial court erred in allowing the purchaser of a recreational vehicle at the auction to intervene after the trial court entered its judgment on the jury verdict to seek the return of money deposited with the court clerk, and whether the trial court erred in dismissing the dealer’s counterclaim against the purchaser and awarding the purchaser the return of his purchase price. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the purchaser to intervene, but that the trial court erred in failing to allow the dealer to conduct discovery to determine whether the purchaser contributed to the loss in value of the vehicle.

The petitioner, Curtiss Carlos Talley, pled guilty in 2002 to aggravated assault and was sentenced to serve five years concurrently with a federal sentence which, apparently, was later imposed. Twelve years later, in 2014, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asking, as we understand, that the court “vacat[e] his state judgment/conviction on the merits and in the interest of justice.” The trial court determined that he had failed to state a claim for coram nobis relief, and we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment. Defendant Linda Elam conveyed property owned by her individually to Defendant Trust. This property was then pledged as collateral to secure a construction loan for the Trust. Defendants Fred and Linda Elam then obtained another loan in their individual capacities. Appellee’s predecessor in interest obtained ownership of the Defendants’ individual loan and brought suit seeking to have the conveyance of the property to the Trust declared void. On the Appellee’s first motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the conveyance of the property to the trust to be valid. On Appellee’s second motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the property owned by the trust had been pledged as collateral for the second loan made to Defendants Fred and Linda Elam. Appellant, Fred Elam, appealed in his individual capacity. We conclude that Appellant cannot prosecute the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

This is a construction case. Appellee, Cecil McNatt, contracted to build and obtain the required licensing for an assisted living facility for Appellant Jane Vestal. The facility was constructed and licensed according to the parties' contract. Following completion, Appellant refused to pay the balance of the contract amount, citing the Appellee's lack of a contractor's license and numerous construction defects. Appellee filed suit against Appellant for breach of contract, and Appellant counterclaimed for violations of the Contractors Licensing Act and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court concluded that Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act or the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, dismissed Appellants' counterclaims, and awarded Appellees a judgment in the amount of $96,280.11. We conclude that trial court erred in concluding that the Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act, but we affirm the judgment to Appellee, with some modification of the amount awarded.

The plaintiff in this action and the decedent were formerly husband and wife. Before they married, the decedent husband and the plaintiff executed an antenuptial agreement, which provided, inter alia, that the decedent would maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy with the plaintiff as beneficiary until his death. When the parties divorced in 2009, the divorce court determined that their antenuptial agreement was enforceable, including the life insurance provision. Although the decedent appealed certain issues in that action regarding alimony and arrearages, the divorce court's determination regarding enforceability of the antenuptial agreement and the life insurance provision contained therein was not appealed. Furthermore, no relief was sought pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. At the time of the decedent's death in 2014, he had not maintained the required life insurance, and the plaintiff filed a claim against the decedent's estate for $500,000. The personal representative of the estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court allowed the claim to proceed, concluding that the issue regarding the life insurance provision in the antenuptial agreement had been previously litigated in the divorce action, which judgment had since become final and nonmodifiable. The personal representative has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant-medical providers after the exclusion of the plaintiff‟s standard-of-care expert due to failure to comply with discovery requests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, an employee of the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), was demoted in his employment position after a city accident investigator found that the petitioner had failed to report an accident involving a city vehicle he was driving while on duty. The petitioner sought to appeal the City's decision through the Administrative Procedures Division. Upon the City's motion to dismiss the appeal, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the petitioner's appeal had been untimely filed and dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review with the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's administrative appeal.

I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling a prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State.

The appellant, Michael Lee Priest, pled guilty in the Sequatchie County Circuit Court to robbery in case number 2013CR84 and received a four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  As a result of his guilty plea, the trial court revoked a four-year sentence of probation for aggravated assault in case number 2012CR136.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve both sentences in confinement.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine his mother about conduct that occurred as a juvenile and by not granting his requests for alternative sentencing.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Fulton Wells, was initially charged with first degree (premeditated) murder, and he later pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was coerced. He also argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to have a hearing to suppress his written confessions; failed to obtain more time for him to consider the plea agreement; failed to interview the petitioner's neighbor; failed to investigate the crime scene; and failed to explain adequately the law or to listen to the petitioner. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal of the denial of Appellants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal arises from an insurance claim for storm-related damage to the property of the plaintiffs. The case was resolved on a motion for summary judgment. According to the plaintiffs, the trial court erred by giving effect to the decision of the appraisal panel because the policy's appraisal provision is unenforceable. The plaintiffs contend the policy's appraisal provision constitutes an agreement to arbitrate subject to Tennessee's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-5-301, et seq.). The plaintiffs further argue the appraisal provision does not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-5-302(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which requires agreements to arbitrate over issues relating to property used as residences must be signed or initialed by the contracting parties. We affirm the trial court's findings

This case grew out of the administration of the estate of John J. Burnette. G. Michael Luhowiak, successor administrator of the estate, filed a motion seeking approval of fees and expenses and asking the trial court to assess those charges against John G. McDougal, the previous administrator. The trial court adopted a master's report granting the successor administrator the requested relief. The court denied the previous administrator's motion to alter or amend. The previous administrator appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment because the court failed to hold a hearing and failed to independently assess the merits of the master's report. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Joseph Jordan, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, two counts of false imprisonment, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses; that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the testimony of a witness did not open the door to his prior conviction for domestic assault; that the trial court erred in restricting the testimony of a second witness to impeach the victim; that the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding the mens rea of recklessness for the crime of rape; that the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication; that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its opening statement; that it was plain error to allow the victim to testify that the defendant was incarcerated; and that his convictions should be reversed under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tammy Marie Harbison, entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 in the Lawrence County Circuit Court.  As a Range I, standard offender, she received a three-year sentence, which was suspended following service of six months in incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for full probation.  Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment sentencing the Defendant-Appellant to serve her three-year sentence on supervised probation.

William Lance Walker (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Petition was denied after a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner asserts for the first time that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call for the sequestration of witnesses during the Petitioner’s suppression hearing.  We conclude that the Petitioner has waived this claim by failing to include it in the Petition and by failing to present any proof about this claim at the post-conviction hearing.  Additionally, we conclude that, even if the issue were not waived, the Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged deficiency.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Anthony R. Smith, Jr., filed a motion to dismiss his indictment for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, which was granted by the trial court.  The State appealed the dismissal.  Upon our review of this matter of first impression, we determine that the definition of “felony” provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-110 controls the determination of whether an out-of-state conviction constitutes a “felony drug offense.”  We reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Roger Joseph, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his instant petition, he contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. While acknowledging that the petition was filed well outside the statute of limitations, he claims that he has shown that due process requires the tolling of the statute based upon his mental condition. Based upon that assertion, he contends that the summary dismissal of the petition was erroneous. Following review of the record, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine prohibits our review of that issue and affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Isen Berry, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that he had violated the conditions of his community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James Jordan Leggett appeals claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.