APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Cassidy Johnson, was convicted of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the trial court erred in admitting the forensic interviews of the victim and another witness; and that the trial court improperly excluded evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Edward Church, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of rape of a child in Counts 1-3, five counts of aggravated sexual battery in Counts 4-8, and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in Counts 9-10.  Upon motion by the State, Counts 9 and 10 were stricken from the indictment.  Upon the State’s election of offenses, Count 3 was amended to allege aggravated sexual battery.  A jury found Defendant guilty as charged on all counts.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 60 years to be served at 100 percent.  Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences.

Petitioner, Darrell Kennedy, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape and two counts of theft of property, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-one years in confinement. He filed a request pursuant to The Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 seeking retesting of various swabs that were analyzed in 1993. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jodi N. Teets, appeals her Robertson County conviction for assault.  Her single issue on appeal is a claim of insufficient evidence of bodily injury to sustain a conviction for an assault.  Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court‘s grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. In the proceedings below, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that false and defamatory statements made about him by the defendants, along with the defendants‘ subsequent lawsuit against him, caused him to suffer severe physical and emotional distress and incur $150,000 in attorney‘s fees. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint after determining that it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Having reviewed the amended complaint and thoroughly considered the arguments raised on appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Jacob A. Wright, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of kidnapping.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant rented property managed by Appellee. Appellee filed a forcible entry and detainer action in the Shelby County General Sessions Court and was awarded possession of the rental property and past due rents. Appellant did not appeal this judgment. Rather, Appellant filed a separate civil warrant in general sessions court, seeking to be restored to possession of the property. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that the question of possession of the property was res judicata based on the general sessions court‘s prior adjudication. The general sessions court granted Appellee‘s motion, and Appellant, relying on the civil warrant filed in the second general sessions‘ case, appealed to the Shelby County Circuit Court. Again, Appellee moved for dismissal. The trial court granted Appellee‘s motion, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to address the question of possession of the rental property as this question was res judicata. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Appellant, Melody Danielle Corum, entered guilty pleas to seven counts of aggravated burglary, seven counts of theft of property, one count of tampering with evidence, and one count of vandalism, for which she received the agreed-upon effective sentence of twelve years, suspended after time served.  Appellant’s probation was revoked after she was convicted of an additional theft of property offense; the trial court reinstated her probation and added a consecutive four-year sentence, suspended to probation, to her probationary term, for an effective sixteen-year term of probation.  The State obtained the instant probation of violation warrant alleging that appellant was found to be in possession of controlled substances, that she admitted using controlled substances, and that she had failed to pay restitution as required.  Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered her sentence into execution.  Appellant appeals the revocation, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion.  We affirm.

The petitioner, Charles Joiner, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession with intent to sell and deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to sell and deliver 4,356 grams or more of marijuana, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, for which he received an effective sentence of 16 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Raymond A. Klein (“the Defendant”) proceeded to trial on one count of aggravated sexual battery and was convicted as charged.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, John Eugene Grigsby, was convicted of attempted second degree murder and reckless endangerment.  Appellant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed, holding that appellant had failed to state a colorable claim.  On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion.  Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Timothy Lamont Thompson, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault after a jury trial.  The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole and fifteen years, respectively. After an unsuccessful direct appeal process, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief thereafter.  Appealing the denial of relief, petitioner raises the following allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel:  (1) failure to request a second preliminary hearing or to explain why this was not possible; (2) failure to schedule a polygraph examination for petitioner; (3) failure to coordinate a physical line-up; (4) questioning petitioner’s religious beliefs; and (5) failure to withdraw from petitioner’s case upon request.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Garner S. Gordon, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated assault.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tevin Dominique Lumpkin, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. He received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, LeDarius D. Maxwell, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Madison County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated assault and attempted second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of 24 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother filed a post-divorce petition seeking an increase in child support. Father opposed the petition, insisting that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court found that there was a significant variance between the current obligation and the obligation set by the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. The trial court further found that Mother was not voluntarily underemployed and ordered an increase in Father’s child support obligation. Father appealed. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mother is not voluntarily underemployed, we affirm.
 

The defendant, Roy Cherry, appeals the termination of his judicial diversion, arguing that he was denied his fundamental due process right to confront the witnesses against him and that the trial court did not make required findings of fact regarding the evidence it relied on in its decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating the defendant's diversion.

In 2000, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and, apparently, a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine, receiving concurrent sentences of eight years and three years. In 2014, apparently now in federal custody, he filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion, claiming that the second offense was committed while he was free on bond for the first, thus requiring the sentences to be served consecutively. He asked, in his pro se motion, that the convictions be vacated and the indictments set for trial. However, at an evidentiary hearing, after counsel had been appointed, the defendant asked that he be resentenced in the two cases to consecutive terms. The trial court found that the manner of service of the sentences had not been a material component to the guilty pleas and resentenced the defendant, as requested, to consecutive terms for his two state convictions. The defendant then appealed, asserting that the trial court had erred in concluding that the manner of service of the sentences was not a material part of the guilty pleas and arguing that he was entitled to a new hearing on his motion. Following our review, we reverse the trial court’s order that the sentences be served consecutively and reinstate the original judgments for concurrent sentences.

The defendant, Eddie Minter, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to consecutive terms of fourteen years and eighteen years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence. On appeal to this Court, the defendant contends, inter alia, that the admission into evidence of an autopsy report through the testimony of a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy violated his right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant also argues that the warrantless search of his home by officers who entered the home after the first responding officer constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, so the trial court should have suppressed the evidence seized in that search. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the autopsy report is not testimonial under Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), so its admission into evidence did not violate the Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. We further hold that, where the responding officer’s initial entry into the home was justified by exigent circumstances, the subsequent entry into the home by other officers constituted a mere continuation of the initial officer’s lawful entry into the home. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was in plain view and within the scope of the exigent circumstances search. Finally, we hold that the admission into evidence of items that were not in plain view, even if erroneous, constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Kenneth Thompson Anderson (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that he was denied pretrial and post-judgment jail credits.  After a hearing, the habeas corpus court denied relief.  Upon review, we conclude that habeas corpus relief is not available in this case.  The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and the trial court's order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we discern no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Petitioner, Alvin George Rye, sought post-conviction relief in Montgomery County following his no contest plea to one count of attempted rape of a child.  The petition for relief was dismissed after a hearing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a divorce case. Due to the deficiencies in Defendant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived any consideration of any issues on appeal. The appeal is dismissed.