APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, currently serving a life sentence as the result of a 1984 conviction for armed robbery, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, claiming that the sentencing court erred in finding him to be a “persistent offender.” His motion was denied without a hearing, and he appealed. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the motion.

The Petitioner, Randy Bea Anderson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief arising from his guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, and one misdemeanor count of theft of property valued at $500 or less.  On appeal, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An insurance company which issued a commercial general liability policy to the owner of a lawn care business sought a declaratory judgment that the policy did not provide coverage for a claim brought by the parent of a child who was injured by the gate on a trailer which was used to transport lawn care equipment. The company appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Having determined that the insurance policy does not provide coverage for the claim at issue, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the insurance company.

Terry Eugene Fisher, Jr. (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to nine years’ probation.  Thereafter, the Defendant’s probation was revoked based on the accrual of new charges, including a charge for a homicide that occurred prior to the Defendant’s being placed on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked probation based on criminal conduct that occurred prior to the Defendant’s being placed on probation.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Darrian White, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that he was released on bail prior to committing several offenses and that his sentences are illegal because the trial court ordered them to be served concurrently rather than consecutively. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a Final Order and Judgment in a case arising out of a dispute over real property located in Roane County, Tennessee. There was no court reporter present for the trial. The Chancellor recused himself from the case post-judgment but before the record was prepared and transmitted for this appeal. The Circuit Court Judge accepted the case by interchange for purposes of resolving the parties' dispute regarding a statement of the evidence for inclusion in the record. The Circuit Court Judge concluded that he was unable to resolve the parties' dispute pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and granted a new trial. As a result, there is no longer a final judgment in the proceedings below, and this Court no longer has jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from the termination of Father’s parental rights. The minor child was removed from his parents, placed in state custody, and adjudicated dependent and neglected after the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received a referral alleging that Father and the child’s mother were using and possibly manufacturing methamphetamines in the home. Thereafter, DCS developed permanency plans with the goal of reuniting the family. The mother died shortly thereafter of a drug overdose. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights alleging that Father failed to comply with most of the permanency plan’s requirements, that he failed numerous drug screens, failed to provide a suitable home. It also alleged that the abandoned the child by only visiting the child three times and merely providing token support for the child after she was taken into state custody. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights finding that DCS has proven the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and abandonment, and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. We affirm.

LaShonda Moneak Williamson, the Appellant, appeals the summary denial of her Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence that she claims was imposed as the result of a coerced guilty plea.   Because the Appellant’s motion failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This is an easement case. Appellants, the servient land owners, appeal the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, the former owners of both the dominant and servient tracts of land. Based on the fact that the disputed easement was recorded prior to the sale to the Appellants, the trial court determined that there was no dispute as to any material fact and that Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The petitioner, Tourie Bryant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He pled guilty to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and received a six-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to properly communicate with the petitioner; and (2) failing to “properly articulate” that the petitioner was waiving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress by pleading guilty and failing to provide the petitioner with an opportunity to review the plea agreement terms prior to his acceptance.  Following a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Jeffrey Owen Smithson (“the Defendant”) appeals from his convictions for first degree felony murder, theft over $1,000, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  The Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based upon a witness’s testimony that the Defendant had been recently released from prison; and (3) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police as not voluntarily given.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Craig Beene, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus.  Because the petitioner failed to follow the procedural requirements governing the writ of habeas corpus and failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Amilcar C. Butler, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  On appeal, he argues that he illegally received concurrent sentences when he should have received consecutive sentences.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Valdez Domingo Wilson, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell more than twenty-six grams of a substance containing cocaine, possession with intent to sell not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana, possession with intent to sell less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant received a total effective sentence of ten years in confinement. As part of the plea agreement, appellant reserved a certified question of law that challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence discovered in his vehicle and home. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.

The defendant, Horace Dunlap, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Because the defendant’s sentences have expired, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Dwight David Foster, pleaded guilty to possession of less than point five (.5) grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; simple possession of buprenorphrine, a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He received the agreed-upon effective sentence of five years as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he certified a question for our review. Upon the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, William Whitlow Davis, Jr., violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant. The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant cross the double yellow center lane lines with the two left wheels of the Defendant’s car. The Defendant subsequently was charged with driving under the influence and a traffic violation. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. We hold that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, Linzey Danielle Smith, violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant.  The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant once cross and twice touch the fog line marking the outer right lane boundary on an interstate highway.  After being pulled over, the Defendant was charged with alternative counts of driving under the influence.  The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of her traffic stop.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment.  We hold that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore met constitutional requirements.  Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.  

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Rhyunia Lamont Barnes, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison.  The Petitioner appealed, arguing that there was newly discovered evidence.  This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction.  State v. Rhyunia Lamont Barnes, No M2010-00631-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1358717, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 24, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2002).  In 2009, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which the coram nobis court summarily dismissed on the basis of it being untimely filed.  This Court affirmed that judgment.  In 2015, the Petitioner filed this, his second petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that he had newly discovered evidence in the form of an ATF report that exonerated him as well as some emails between his attorney and the prosecutor that indicated his innocence.  The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was untimely filed and that the allegations contained therein, even taken as true, did not prove his innocence or that the result of his trial would have been different.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis erred when it summarily dismissed his petition and that he is entitled to coram nobis relief.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Eddie Lee Murphy, Sr., appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder and his life sentence.  The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Calvin Rogers, was convicted of first degree felony murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and felon in possession of a handgun. He was ordered to serve an effective sentence of life without parole plus fifty years. On appeal, he argues the unconstitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare him ineligible for the death penalty, that the State should not have been allowed to present proof of a prior consistent statement of one of the victims, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Ronnie Lee Johnson, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

The defendant, Cassidy Johnson, was convicted of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the trial court erred in admitting the forensic interviews of the victim and another witness; and that the trial court improperly excluded evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.