APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a will contest by the decedent’s children. Counsel for the contestants and counsel for the executrix engaged in settlement negotiations on behalf of their clients. The executrix submitted a motion to enforce the settlement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the Probate Court granted the motion and entered an order of voluntary dismissal of the contestants’ claims with prejudice. The contestants appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant, Roger Scott Herbison, entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted
sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted aggravated sexual exploitation
of a minor in exchange for an effective four-year sentence, suspended to probation, and the
Defendant’s placement on the sex offender registry. As a part of his plea, the Defendant
sought to reserve a certified question of law, concerning whether probable cause existed
for issuance of a search warrant, which was the subject of an unsuccessful suppression
motion. Because the Defendant did not properly reserve a certified issue for review, we
are without jurisdiction to review the merits of the Defendant’s claim, and we dismiss his
appeal.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Antonio Donte Jenkins, a.k.a. Antonio Donte Gordon Jenkins, of second degree murder and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; (2) failing to declare a mistrial after a State’s witness testified that the Defendant had an outstanding warrant; (3) allowing portions of a witness’s testimony from the juvenile transfer hearing to be read into evidence; (4) allowing evidence that had not been presented during trial into the jury room during deliberations; and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. We respectfully conclude that the jury should not have been instructed on criminal responsibility and that the error was not harmless. For this reason, we vacate the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder and remand for a new trial. Finally, although we also affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for reckless endangerment, we remand for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that this sentence is not currently aligned consecutively to any other sentence.

The petitioner, Rodney Earl Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Roger Jay Hollowell, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court’s order
revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve in confinement the
balance of his sentence for his guilty-pleaded conviction of possession of .5 grams or more
of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, McArthur Bobo, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction
relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Johnathan Issac Gradell Allen, Defendant, pleaded guilty to arson and was sentenced to four-and-one-half years’ incarceration. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not sentencing him to an alternative sentence and by imposing an excessive sentence. Defendant also claims that the State’s negligent handling of certain sentencing documents caused an unreasonable delay in his transfer from the jail to prison thereby delaying the date of his parole hearing. After a thorough review of the record, applicable law, and the briefs, we affirm.

The petitioner, Justin L. Kiser, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
which petition challenged his five convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping,
alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Deshaun “Bushwick” Tate, of first degree
premeditated murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal, his motion for new trial, and his motion to suppress
witness identification. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parents of Jayla S. appeal the termination of their parental rights. Jayla was removed from her parents’ custody because Jayla tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) subsequently filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. Following a two-day trial, the trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven, including the ground of severe child abuse. Finding it also to be in the best interest of Jayla that her parents’ parental rights be terminated, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Kellum Williams, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping and resulting sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to: (1) sufficiently emphasize at trial the theory that the victim died in Montgomery County rather than in Robertson County, as testified to by the State’s experts; (2) seek an independent expert “to test samples from the crime scene”; (3) raise as a defense that venue of the trial should have been in Robertson County instead of Montgomery County; and (4) more extensively question witnesses to demonstrate Petitioner’s “non-participation in the events leading to [the victim’s] death.” Petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to relief based upon cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an action to recover amounts due under a promissory note. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees of one-third of that amount, and prejudgment interest on both the compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the individual defendants are individually liable on the obligation and that the ad damnum clause permitted the plaintiffs to recover $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. We vacate the attorney’s fees award and remand for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees award only. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this action.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence as barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution
after finding the plaintiff could not establish that the defendants had initiated the issuance
of a criminal warrant without probable cause and with malice. Discerning no error, we
affirm the trial court.

Defendant, Isaiah Harris, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence
for four counts of attempted second-degree murder and two counts of felony reckless
endangerment and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.
Following our de novo review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

A taxpayer who rented hygienically-clean textiles to its customers challenged the revocation of three industrial machinery tax exemption certificates that it had previously been issued. An administrative judge determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption because the taxpayer’s operations did not constitute “manufacturing” as they were not necessary for processing tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The chancery court reversed after concluding that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. As the majority notes, an administrative judge determined that the taxpayer’s sanitizing operations in this case do not constitute “manufacturing” as they are not “processing” tangible personal property. The administrative judge reasoned that a taxpayer is required to show that its activity fundamentally changes or transforms the property from the state or form in which it originally existed. Applying that standard, the administrative judge found that the state or form of the linens has not been changed or altered by the cleaning, as they remain the same linens before and after.

Petitioner, Clint Earl Sims, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, three counts of vandalism less than $1,000, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of violating an order of protection. Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude Petitioner’s appeal is untimely, the interest of justice does not favor waiver of the untimely notice, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

Employee Patrece Edwards-Bradford filed a petition for benefit determination seeking permanent disability benefits for an alleged back injury. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim, finding that she had not rebutted the presumption of correctness afforded to the causation and impairment opinions of her authorized treating physicians, and was therefore not entitled to permanent disability benefits. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

In 2020, the Defendant, Riki Kale Moss, was indicted for violation of the implied consent law, driving under the influence (“DUI”) by impairment, and DUI, per se. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of his vehicle. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, and the State filed a motion to reconsider on the grounds that law enforcement had probable cause to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. The trial court issued a revised order denying the motion to suppress, and a jury convicted the Defendant of DUI by impairment and DUI per se. The Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Christopher David Pace, entered a partially open plea in which the length of his
sentence was agreed upon. The trial court would determine the manner of service at a
separate sentencing hearing. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred because
it relied only upon a “Specific Data Report” in sentencing Defendant. Alternatively,
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request
for alternative sentencing. The State concedes that it was reversible error for the trial court
to sentence Defendant without a presentence report. We find that the trial court erred in
failing to consider the validated risk and needs assessment as required by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-210(b)(8). However, we conclude that the issue is waived. We
further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
request for alternative sentencing. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A foster mother filed a petition to terminate parental rights and adopt a minor child. This appeal concerns the rights of a putative father who signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity asserting that he was the biological father of the minor child. We have determined that the foster mother had standing to challenge the VAP, and we affirm the trial court’s decision disestablishing the putative father’s status as legal father.

Mother appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition for civil contempt and
awarding Father a money judgment and his attorney’s fees. Because the trial court failed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from
which to make a ruling. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand
with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all issues in this case.

Tennessee’s Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 34-6-201 to -218, includes a provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who rely in good faith on health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -208. Tennessee’s Health Care Decisions Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 68-11-1801 to -1815, includes a similar provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who comply in good faith with health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -1810. The health care decision in this case is the execution of an arbitration agreement with admission to a nursing home. The agreement was signed by an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care executed several years earlier. After the resident’s death, his estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home on negligence theories. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, we hold that the nursing home does not meet the requirements for limited statutory immunity from civil liability under either the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act or the Health Care Decisions Act. Consequently, the trial court did not err in considering evidence on whether the principal had the requisite mental capacity to execute the durable power of attorney for health care. We overrule the holding on the immunity provision in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-6-208, in Owens v. National Health Corporation, 263 S.W.3d 876, 889 n.4 (Tenn. 2007), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court, reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Court of Appeals.

The plaintiff purchased a home at an auction. The home was sold “as is.” The plaintiff
sued the defendant marketing firm which had advertised the property for auction, alleging
that it had actual knowledge of mold issues but did not disclose them to bidders, and that
it misrepresented the acreage of the real property. The plaintiff’s claims for breach of
contract, fraudulent concealment, and reckless misrepresentation proceeded to a jury trial.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s proof, which the
court denied, but did not renew its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the proof.
After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant did not file a post-trial
motion seeking a new trial. On appeal, we conclude that the defendant waived its right to
contest the trial court’s denial of its motion for a directed verdict by failing to file a motion
asking for a new trial as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e). We
further conclude that the defendant waived appellate review of whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the fraudulent concealment, breach of contract,
and reckless misrepresentation claims by failing to renew its motion for a directed verdict
at the close of all proof in the jury trial. We grant the plaintiff’s request for reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.