APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, William Michael Bowers, of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the trial court violated his right to confrontation by allowing a witness to testify via video rather than in person; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in holding
the Appellant properly preserved the issue of whether the trial court violated his right to
confrontation by allowing a witness to testify via Zoom rather than in person. I believe the
Appellant has waived the confrontation clause issue for failure to specify at trial whether
he was objecting based on the federal constitution,1 the state constitution,2 or both. Given
the lack of a properly developed record, I would have concluded that the issue was not
entitled to plenary review and declined review for plain error. Accordingly, I dissent.

In this breach of contract dispute between an engineering consulting firm and a real estate development company, we review the trial court’s holding that the real estate development company breached the contract between the parties as well as the court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the engineering consulting firm. We affirm the court’s decision in all respects. Because the parties’ agreement states that the prevailing party in litigation arising from or related to the contract shall be entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, we remand the case to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to award the engineering firm its reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this appeal.

Plaintiffs sued for injuries and damages allegedly resulting from an automobile accident.
The trial court dismissed one of two defendants based on the statute of limitations.
Although the complaint was filed within one year of the accident, the original summons
went unserved, and plaintiffs did not obtain issuance of new process until over a year after
the issuance of the previous process. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that, because the
automobile accident resulted in a criminal prosecution, the time period for issuance of new
process under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3 was extended. We affirm.

The Defendant, Timothy Michael Crabtree, was convicted in the Henry County Circuit
Court of aggravated assault and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years
in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because the evidence fails to show the victim suffered serious bodily injury and
that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cedric Konard Mitchell, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his ten-year
sentence for two counts of domestic assault and one count of aggravated assault in case
numbers 14908 and 15052. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking
his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in
confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Tracey Lynn Carter, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of attempted aggravated assault, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and public intoxication. He received an effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant alleges that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated assault; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; and (3) the trial court erred in denying a sentence of split confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal arises from a divorce. After trial, the trial court entered a final decree of
divorce with an attached Permanent Parenting Plan regarding the parties’ minor child. The
determination of child support was left blank. A supplemental order purported to
“bifurcate” the issue of child support and transfer the case from the Roane County IV-D
office to the Anderson County IV-D office. The father appeals. Since the issue of child
support was never resolved or adjudicated, there is no final, appealable judgment. The
appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Former client sued his former attorney for legal malpractice and fraud. The trial court initially dismissed all claims, but was reversed on appeal as to the fraud claims. The trial court then held a bench trial and found in favor of the defendant attorney. In a second appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of all fraud claims except a fraud claim related to the hourly rate charged under the parties’ written contract. That claim was remanded to the trial court for purposes of consideration of the factors outlined in in Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1998). On remand, the trial judge denied the plaintiff’s efforts to disqualify him from the case and to enlarge the scope of the trial. A bench trial was eventually held, despite the plaintiff’s multiple efforts to postpone. After a late motion to continue was denied, the plaintiff did not attend trial. Following the bench trial, the trial court once again ruled in favor of the defendant attorney, resulting in the dismissal of all claims against him. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Mr. Raghu Singh, guilty of two counts of
driving under the influence and one count of reckless driving. The trial court sentenced
the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, after service of
ten days in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally
insufficient to sustain his convictions for driving under the influence. He also asserts that
the trial court erred (1) in finding that the State had established a proper chain of custody
for his blood sample; and (2) by denying a motion to suppress statements he made at the
scene. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother filed a petition alleging civil and criminal contempt against the father of her child
due to unpaid child support. After several continuances, including based on Mother’s
request for an in-person hearing, the juvenile court heard the matter remotely via ZOOM.
At the start of the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request for a continuance for an
in-person hearing. The trial court also ruled that it had the authority to choose whether
Mother would prosecute her action as civil contempt or criminal contempt. The trial court
ruled that Mother’s petition would be treated solely as a civil contempt matter, but then
refused to punish Father for his past willful failure to pay child support because he had
made a purge payment. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Charles D. Perry, of two counts of rape
of a child, and the trial court entered an agreed effective sentence of fifteen years of
incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the prosecution was time-barred
because it was commenced outside the statute of limitations; (2) his verdict was not
unanimous; (3) the trial court deprived his right to present a defense by limiting expert
testimony; (4) the trial court erred when it admitted character evidence in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions; and (6) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles him to a new
trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Jason White, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues: (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself; (2) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner a full and fair post-conviction procedure; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in numerous areas; and (4) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court, but remand the case to the post-conviction court for the entry of amended judgments that properly reflect the offenses for which Petitioner was indicted and convicted.

Appellant, Mark T. Stinson, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court
that was entered on January 27, 2023. We determine that the January 27, 2023 order does
not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to “Set
Aside, Amend and/or Correct Improper and Unlawful Judgments.” The Defendant argues
(1) that her judgments are void due to noncompliance with the statutes and rules governing
the entry of judgment forms and (2) that she is entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Criminal Procedure 36. Following our review, we have determined that we lack
jurisdiction to hear the Defendant’s voidness arguments and that the Defendant has waived
review of her Rule 36 claim. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, William Patrick Robinson, appeals pro se from the Circuit Court of
Carroll County’s dismissal of his third request for post-conviction relief. Following
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Nicholas Kentrell Dickerson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s
orders revoking his probation and imposing his original sentences for various drug
convictions and a felony evading arrest. The Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking his probation because (1) the alleged violations were based on new
charges that were subsequently dismissed, and (2) the remaining violations were technical
in nature and not a valid basis for full revocation under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-311(e)(1)(A) (2022). Upon our review, we affirm.

The Appellant, Eleanor Grace Hoffman, filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of her purse during a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant was convicted as charged by a Warren County jury of simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant’s application for judicial diversion was granted, and she was sentenced to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twentynine days suspended to supervised probation after service of ten days’ imprisonment. A probation violation order was entered, and the Appellant conceded to violating the terms of probation before the trial court. The trial court revoked her probationary judicial diversion sentence, entered judgments of conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and ordered the Appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment, with the possibility of furlough to an inpatient drug treatment facility after service of ninety days’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Alternatively, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking her diversionary probation and ordering service of her original sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and revocation of the Appellant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Appellant, Jason Lee Schutt, of alternative counts of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-408(b)(1)(F), -417(a), -417(c)(2)(A). The trial court properly merged the above counts, and following a sentencing hearing, the Appellant was ordered to serve nine years and six months in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the alleged controlled substance was not verified by chemical analysis as hydrocodone, and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Horace L. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Amayzha L. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Determining that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Child was removed from Father’s home or physical or legal custody, we reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, Joseph Marquis Jeffries, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and one count each of domestic assault, interference with emergency communications, trafficking for a commercial sex act, promotion of prostitution, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately explore racial bias during voir dire and (2) failing to seek additional time for the Petitioner to consider the State’s plea agreement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Dan E. Durrell, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a dispute arising from services provided by the appellee, CIC Services, LLC (“CIC”), a creator and manager of “captive” insurance companies, to the appellant corporation, SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”).  SRM hired CIC to form and manage two captive insurance companies to serve SRM in risk management, and the parties memorialized their relationship in two management agreements, one for each of the newly formed captive insurance companies.  When CIC subsequently ended its contractual relationship with SRM for cause, SRM demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements.  The arbitrator dismissed all of SRM’s claims.  CIC then demanded a second arbitration, seeking attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration and stating claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement against SRM.  The second arbitrator ultimately awarded to CIC $261,487.04 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the indemnity clauses in the parties’ management agreements, and $137,337.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs because CIC was the substantially prevailing party in the second arbitration.  When SRM did not respond to CIC’s demand for payment of this award, CIC moved for confirmation of the award in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”).   SRM responded by filing a motion with the trial court to modify or vacate the award.  After the parties fully briefed the issues, the trial court confirmed the award in full and concomitantly denied SRM’s motion to modify or vacate.  SRM timely appealed.  Upon review, we  affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, determining that because appellant Suresh Prabhu voluntarily participated in both arbitrations without raising objection to the potential attachment of liability against him as an individual, Mr. Prabhu and SRM have waived objection to the attachment of individual liability to Mr. Prabhu.  We further determine that the trial court properly denied SRM’s motion to vacate the award because the second arbitrator acted within her discretion to direct the arbitration procedure and SRM has failed to show any of the criteria necessary to meet the high standard for vacatur pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act or the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the
grounds for terminating her rights. Rather she argues that the evidence was less than clear
and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a review of both the
statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.