APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the termination of parental rights as to both Mother and Father, and I join nearly all of Justice Kirby’s opinion for the majority. In particular, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case presents circumstances that call strongly for application of the prior-construction canon. I would hesitate to apply the canon if only one or two intermediate appellate courts had interpreted the language at issue. Here, however, the Court of Appeals had issued at least eight opinions interpreting “knowing” in a uniform manner before the General Assembly’s reenactment of that language. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding “the uniformity of . . . judicial precedent construing the [statutory] definition significant”); Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2023) (noting that the force of the prior-construction canon is “stronger when the lower courts uniformly adopt a particular interpretation of an oft-invoked statute”); cf. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (declining to apply canon where “widespread disagreement exist[ed] among the lower courts”).

At issue is the validity of an amendment to a revocable trust. The specific issue is whether the Settlor’s attorney-in-fact was authorized to execute an amendment to the Robert McKeel Bone Living Trust. The trial court held that the amendment was valid. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm.

A patient brought a health care liability action against a hospital after she developed a pressure wound during her hospital stay. The hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that the patient’s standard of care expert was not competent to testify under the Health Care Liability Act. Alternatively, it sought to narrow the remaining claims through a partial summary judgment. The trial court disqualified the expert witness and granted the hospital summary judgment on all claims. The court’s decision was based, in part, on grounds not raised in the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the expert was competent to testify and the trial court erred in ruling on additional grounds not raised by the movant, we vacate the judgment in part.

Defendant, Charles Randolph Johnson, was convicted by an Anderson County Jury of one
count of possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin within 1,000 feet of a drug free
school zone; possession of more than 14.175 grams of marijuana with intent to sell or
deliver; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective thirtyyear
sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant appears to argue that (1)
the length of time between his trial and the hearing on his motion for new trial violated his
right to due process; (2) the search warrant was invalid; (3) the untimely “constructive
amendment” of the indictment rendered it invalid; (4) the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Hickman, of rape of a child, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to forty years in prison. On
appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to submit a rebuttal closing argument.
After our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case stems from an unpaid promissory note secured by real property that was sold in foreclosure. Wheelhouse Partners, LLC (“Wheelhouse”), the beneficiary under a second deed of trust on the subject property, sued Wilson & Associates, PLLC (“Wilson”), the substitute trustee under the first deed of trust on the subject property, and James G. Akers and Deborah L. Akers (the “property owners” or, together with Wilson, “Defendants”). Wheelhouse alleged that the foreclosure sale produced excess funds sufficient to satisfy its second deed of trust and promissory note after satisfying the first deed of trust, but that Defendants refused to deliver such funds to Wheelhouse. Wheelhouse also alleged breach of contract against the property owners. Wilson interpleaded the surplus funds into the court and, following a successful motion for summary judgment, Wheelhouse was awarded the balance of its promissory note as well as its attorney’s fees. Mr. Akers appeals. Because his appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, his issues are waived and the lower court’s judgment is affirmed. Because Wheelhouse’s deed of trust clearly provides for an award of attorney’s fees and Wheelhouse properly requested its appellate attorney’s fees, we award Wheelhouse said fees.

The Petitioner, Raymon Muhammad, filed a post-conviction petition in the Shelby County
Criminal Court, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and
resulting life sentence. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner
appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue before us is whether the voluntary dismissal of a defendant in a multi-defendant case that is governed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) may be set aside and the claim against the dismissed defendant reinstated on the motion of a plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The plaintiff in this case initiated a healthcare liability action against a physician, a hospital, and two other defendants. Before any responsive pleading was filed by any defendant, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming only the physician as a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal that dismissed all of the defendants except the physician, and the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal the following day. In his answer to the amended complaint, the physician argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed under the GTLA because the hospital, which was his employer and a governmental entity, was not a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend in which he sought to set aside the trial court’s order voluntarily dismissing the hospital from the action. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The trial court later dismissed the hospital from the action with prejudice and granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the physician. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the order of voluntary dismissal. Upon our review of this case, we do not reach the question of whether the voluntary dismissal order could be altered or amended pursuant to Rule 54.02. Because the plaintiff removed the hospital from the lawsuit when he filed his amended complaint, the plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal and the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal were of no legal effect. Accordingly, there was no valid order of voluntary dismissal to alter or amend. As a result, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues it deemed pretermitted as moot.

The Defendant, Timothy Travis Jenkins, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding that the Defendant violated his probation. The Defendant’s probation began in 2019, when he was convicted of sale of methamphetamine and given a six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. In 2022, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, the Defendant’s third, which alleged multiple violations. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Keith S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, Abraham S. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“the juvenile court”) terminated Father’s parental rights based on several statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support; abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability to assume legal and physical custody. The juvenile court concluded that one alleged ground for termination, substantial noncompliance with permanency plan, was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s ruling as to all but one ground for termination. Because the record contains scant evidence of help offered to Father regarding housing, we conclude that abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the juvenile court’s ruling as to the other statutory grounds, and we affirm the ruling that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interests.

Petitioner, Cory Lamont Batey, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely because he was actively misled by his appellate counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the
grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3)
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial
responsibility of the child. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the
children. We reverse the trial court’s finding of abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home, but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Angela Buchanan, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) her convictions were based on inadmissible Rule 404(b) evidence; (3) she received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (4) the trial court, in violation of Tennessee law and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, failed to inform her that she could make a statement of allocution at sentencing. 1 We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from an incident in which the nude body of a resident at an assisted living facility was exposed on a video call via telephone when an employee of the healthcare facility engaged in a personal call while assisting the resident in the shower. The resident, by and through her conservator/daughter (“Plaintiff”), sued the owner and operator of the healthcare facility, Life Care Centers of America d/b/a Life Care Center of Tullahoma (“Defendant”), asserting a claim of “Negligence Pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act” and a generalized claim for invasion of privacy with allegations of “Gross Negligence, Willful, Wanton, Reckless, Malicious and/or Intentional Misconduct.” Relying on the undisputed fact that the resident was unaware and never informed that the incident occurred, Defendant moved for summary judgment due to the lack of a cognizable injury or recoverable damages. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that actual damages were not an essential element of her claims and, in the alternative, moved to amend the complaint to specifically assert a claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon the resident’s seclusion and a claim for negligent supervision. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint on the ground “that damages for invasion of privacy . . . cannot be proven as it would be impossible to suffer from personal humiliation, mental anguish or similar damages since [the resident] is unaware that the incident happened” and denied the motion to amend the complaint on the basis of futility. Plaintiff appealed. We have determined that the gravamen of the complaint states a claim for invasion of privacy based upon the distinct tort of intrusion upon seclusion. We have also determined that actual damages are not an essential element of a claim for invasion of privacy based on the distinct tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Thus, Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment. Moreover, granting leave to amend the complaint would not have been futile. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision to summarily dismiss the complaint, reverse the decision to deny the motion to amend the complaint, and remand with instruction to reinstate the complaint, grant the motion to amend the complaint, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case arises from the demise of a short-lived business venture. For three years, two of
the parties owned and operated a wellness center from the same location as an existing
medical clinic. When disputes arose, the plaintiff (co-owner of the wellness center) sued
the defendants, asserting twelve counts in his complaint and seeking judicial dissolution of
the company. The plaintiff died during the course of the proceeding, and the executor of
his estate was substituted as the plaintiff. A special master held a three-day hearing
regarding fifteen issues, and the trial court adopted the majority of his findings. The trial
court then held a seven-day bench trial. Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants on all counts and judicially dissolved the company upon agreement of the
parties. The plaintiff appeals, raising very limited issues regarding his claims for unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and judicial dissolution. We affirm and remand for
further proceedings.

The Defendant, Robert Vernon Gouge, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child,
one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The
trial court imposed an effective sentence of ninety-nine years. On appeal, the Defendant
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of aggravated
sexual battery in count four and his conviction of rape of a child in count five.1 He also
argues that his effective sentence of ninety-nine years is excessive. We respectfully
disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Uniform Commercial Code provides a mechanism for secured creditors to give notice to the world of their security interest in debtors’ property as collateral for debt by filling out a form for a financing statement and posting it on the website for Tennessee’s Secretary of State. In this case, that system was weaponized. Collectively, the defendants filed over a hundred bogus financing statements on the Secretary of State’s website regarding over forty Tennessee residents, including judges, mayors, public officials, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and ex-spouses. The online financing statements falsely claimed liens for the defendants’ alleged security interest in the victims’ property as collateral for millions of dollars in fictitious debt. All were done for the apparent purpose of vexing and harassing the victims. All of the defendants were convicted of multiple counts of filing a lien without a reasonable basis, a Class E felony, and forgery of at least $250,000, a Class A felony. We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the forgery convictions. We hold that the defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the apparent value associated with the fraudulent financing statements was over $250,000. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Michael Marcell Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate robbery;
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and attempt to perpetrate
aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently
amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-12-103(a) (conspiracy) (2018); 39-13-402(a)
(2018) (aggravated robbery); 39-12-101(a) (2018) (criminal attempt). The trial court
sentenced the Defendant to life for first degree murder and to six years for each of the two
remaining convictions. The court imposed the sentences concurrently to each other but
consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in another case. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (3) the court erred in
excluding hearsay evidence, (4) the court erred in admitting a photograph exhibit because
it was not properly authenticated, and (5) the cumulative effect of multiple trial errors
requires relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother was not present when the trial court found that four grounds for termination were
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination was in the best interest of
the child. The trial court denied the oral motion to continue made by Mother’s counsel.
Mother appeals the denial of the continuance, as well as the findings of grounds and best
interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm (1) the trial court’s denial of Mother’s
motion for a continuance; (2) the finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, and
persistence of conditions; and (3) the finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights was
in the best interest of the child. We conclude that the trial court failed to make appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the ground of failure to manifest an
ability and willingness to assume custody of the child and vacate that ground. Accordingly,
we vacate in part and affirm in part.

This case involves a complaint before the Tennessee Claims Commission.  After a year of no action on the part of the claimant, the State moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.  The Claims Commission granted the motion, and the claimant now appeals.  For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the dismissal of the claimant’s case. 

The Petitioner, Darius Alston, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's denial
of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree premeditated
murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated
robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm and his sentence of life imprisonment. On
appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect
of counsel's multiple instances of deficient performance. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendants’ convictions for forgery. I agree with the majority that the Defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-114(b)(1)(B). I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support sentencing the Defendants for forgery as a Class A felony. Based on the text of the applicable statutes, I would hold that the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the UCC-1s had a fair market value of at least $250,000. 1 I would reverse the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals as to the value associated with the Defendants’ forgery convictions.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights as to two children, based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, failure to remedy persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child.  The trial court granted the petition, finding that the Department proved all alleged grounds by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.  We affirm.

The defendant limited liability company terminated the plaintiff’s employment as Chief
Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer and revoked his 120 voting and common
membership units in the company. The plaintiff brought a claim against individuals
belonging to the company’s board of managers, alleging that the defendant board members
had breached their fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing by revoking his 120
membership units. The plaintiff sought no less than $120,000.00 in compensatory
damages, the value of the 120 membership units as of May 5, 2021, and $480,000.00 in
punitive damages. On July 13, 2022, the board of managers adopted a corporate resolution
ratifying the plaintiff’s ownership of 120 membership units in an effort to resolve the
plaintiff’s claim against the individual board members. Consequently, the defendant board
members filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, contending that the
plaintiff’s claim against them was rendered moot by the corporate resolution. The trial
court granted the defendant board members’ motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim
against them based on the doctrine of mootness. On appeal, the plaintiff posits that the
board members failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that they had rendered his
claim moot. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the defendant board members
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the corporate resolution fully redressed
the plaintiff’s claim for relief against them. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Appellant, Luis Santiago, entered a guilty plea to
attempted aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and aggravated stalking and received a
total effective sentence of seven years and two months with the manner of service to be
determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Appellant’s request for probation and ordered the seven-year-two-month sentence to be
served in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of separate judgment forms reflecting
dismissal of counts two, four, and five.