APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Marco Luciano Cianfarani, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and possession of a weapon by a person with a prior felony conviction, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (weapon possession by a convicted felon). The Defendant was sentenced to serve an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated rape and aggravated assault convictions, (2) the trial court erred in permitting the testimony from a witness of whom the defense received late notice, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the Defendant’s prior assault of the victim, and (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jurors to continue deliberating after being notified that one juror disagreed with the other eleven. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Donald H. Runions, appeals the Lewis County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his multiple convictions for violation of the Child Protection Act, rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to lodge an objection or move for a continuance due to the Petitioner’s absence from certain pretrial evidentiary hearings; (2) failing to present a sound trial strategy based upon adequate preparation; and (3) failing to allow the Petitioner to testify on his own behalf at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal is the latest development in a protracted custody and visitation dispute between
Loring Justice and Kim Nelson. After the Juvenile Court for Roane County (“the Juvenile
Court”) entered a judgment awarding Ms. Nelson custody and severely restricting Mr.
Justice’s parenting time, Mr. Justice filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County
(“the Trial Court”). He alleged various claims against Ms. Nelson and the lawyers and law
firms that represented her in the Juvenile Court. Ms. Nelson and her attorneys filed motions
for sanctions, alleging that Mr. Justice’s complaint violated Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. Months later, Mr. Justice filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. After
entering an order of dismissal, the Trial Court granted Ms. Nelson and her attorneys their
Rule 11 motions and ordered Mr. Justice to pay their attorney’s fees and expenses. Mr.
Justice has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment
in all respects.

A Shelby County jury found Defendant, Billy Ray Turner, guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of life in prison plus forty-one years. On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the trial court improperly prevented Defendant from impeaching a witness when it excluded a conversation between the witness and the victim’s ex-wife; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the State to ask a witness leading questions; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a speaking objection by the State; (4) Shelby County was not the proper venue for the attempted first degree murder case; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Hershel Wayne Grimes, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. This court affirmed his conviction on appeal. State v. Grimes, No. M2000-01531-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1670188, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2007). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended, that alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State had suppressed exculpatory evidence. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not calling as witnesses Steven Groves, Tracy Marie Pressley, Billy Ray Griffith, and Billy Eugene Caldwell; and (2) the State failed to disclose exculpatory information in the form of a letter written by Special Agent Larry Davis to U.S. District Judge Sparks. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Andy F. Nunez, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life plus five years. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the trial court’s decision to quash subpoenas for information on plea agreements, and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Nunez, No. M2019-00473-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 4734916, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2021). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, filed by the plaintiff, Michael Halliburton, seeking to recuse the trial
judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Mr. Halliburton,
and finding no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against several healthcare providers
following the death of her husband. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the
defendants request review of the trial court’s denial of their motion for a protective order
to prohibit further inquiry into a meeting held between the defendant hospital and the
decedent’s family. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Spenser Curtis McGuiggan, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve in confinement the balance of his six-year sentence for sexual battery of a minor. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Brown, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. He also asserts that (1) the trial court erred in admitting text messages that were not properly authenticated; (2) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it failed to disclose records related to an investigation of the victim’s mother; and (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cody Lee Wilson, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court jury convictions of sexual battery, rape, and two counts of incest, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Zion Robinson, for rape of a child, a
Class A felony. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner entered an open guilty
plea to the substantially reduced offense of sexual battery, a Class E felony. Following a
sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s requests for judicial diversion and
probation and sentenced Defendant to serve two years incarcerated. Additionally, the trial
court ordered Defendant to register with the Sex Offender Registry. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. We conclude
that Defendant has waived appellate review of his sentence by failing to prepare an
adequate record and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand this
case, however, for the entry of a corrected judgment form reflecting the indicted offense of
rape of a child.

The father of two children learned that the mother eventually planned to relocate to Florida. The father opposed the relocation and applied for a temporary restraining order to disallow the mother from leaving the state. He further requested modification of the permanent parenting plan entered at the time of the divorce (a default judgment). In response, the mother filed a counter-petition requesting permission to relocate out-of-state. The paternal grandparents filed a petition to intervene in the action to establish visitation. The court conducted a best interest analysis to determine whether it was in the children’s best interest to relocate with the mother. Concluding that it was in the children’s best interest to relocate, the court entered a modified parenting plan, which provided a period of co-parenting time for the father to be supervised by the grandparents and set forth a parenting schedule reflective of the distance between the parties upon the mother’s relocation. The father and the grandparents appealed. We affirm the judgment allowing the relocation. The trial court’s order regarding the grandparents’ visitation petition, however, is unclear. Accordingly, we vacate the modified parenting plan and remand this matter for specific findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-307 and for a ruling whether the visitation by the grandparents will be separate from or derivative of the father’s time.

This appeal involves a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to set aside the attorney's fee provision contained within a final divorce decree. The trial court denied the motion without hearing evidence from the parties or stating the basis for its decision.  Because we are unable to adequately review the matter due to the trial court's lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law and the lack of evidence in the appellate record, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings. 

The Petitioner, Anthony Tremayne Cartwright, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated assault and domestic assault, for which he received consecutive sentences of fourteen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. He alleges that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present witnesses deprived him of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Rico Reed, of one count of aggravated sexual
battery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison. On appeal,
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there
was no evidence produced at trial that the contact was for sexual arousal or gratification.
After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A temporary injunction restrained a former employee of an accounting firm from committing acts of harassment against the firm or any of its principals, employees, or agents. An Internet news article reported the former employee’s perspective on his history with the firm. The former employee posted a link to the article on his Facebook page and circulated the article to clients of the firm and others. The firm filed a petition for criminal contempt, alleging that the former employee violated the restraint on acts of harassment against the firm. The trial court held the former employee in criminal contempt for willfully disobeying the injunction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Defendant, Gregory S. Clark, appeals from his guilty pleaded convictions for
aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony.
See TCA §§ 39-13-102 (aggravated assault) (2018) (subsequently amended), -14-403
(aggravated burglary) (2018) (subsequently repealed and replaced by T.C.A. § 39-13-1003
(Supp. 2021)). The Defendant agreed to an effective six-year sentence as a Range I
offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, the
Defendant contends that the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kelly Lee Pitts, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction
relief from his attempted first degree murder and possession of a firearm during the
commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony convictions and his effective
forty-eight year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the post-conviction
court erred by summarily dismissing the petition after determining it was untimely and
(2) he failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Carpenter, of intentionally
evading arrest in a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year in
confinement. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (3)
the trial court erred when it allowed the State to impeach the Defendant with a prior
conviction; (4) the trial court erred when it denied his request to sit at counsel table; and
(5) the trial court erred when it admitted the audio portion of the body camera recordings
of the incident. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Madison County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Cornell Poe, for driving on a
revoked license, unlawful use of a license plate, improper registration, and violation of the
financial responsibility law. The defendant filed a suppression motion, arguing the lack of
signage on the one-way street deprived him of due process. The trial court granted the
defendant’s motion, and the State appealed, asserting the defendant’s seizure was
supported by probable cause. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and
pertinent authorities, we agree with the State, reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for further proceedings.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant physician in a health care liability action asks us
to review two pretrial orders. In the first, the trial court excludes evidence that a nonparty
physician was the cause-in-fact of the claimant’s injuries because the defendant never
amended his answer to include that allegation, as required under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure as applied in George v. Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1996).
Because he does not allege that the nonparty physician was negligent, the defendant asks
us to modify our holding in George and reverse the trial court’s order. We respectfully
decline to do so. In the second pretrial order on appeal, the trial court considered Tennessee
Code Annotated section 29-26-119, a provision that partially abrogates the common law
collateral source rule in health care liability actions. It held that section 29-26-119 does
not abrogate the collateral source rule under the facts of this case. We agree with the trial
court that the collateral source rule remains in effect in this case. We affirm both of the
trial court’s pretrial rulings.

This interlocutory appeal involves two pretrial orders. I concur with the holding
and analysis of the majority as to the first pretrial order involving Rule 8.03 and George v.
Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1996). However, I respectfully dissent from the
majority’s holding and analysis as to the second pretrial order involving Tennessee Code
Annotated section 29-26-119 and the collateral source rule. This issue requires the Court
to interpret the meaning of section 29-26-119. I would hold that, when section 29-26-119
governs damages in a health care liability action, the statute’s clear language contemplates
only “actual economic losses suffered . . . paid or payable,” thereby abrogating the
collateral source rule. Thus, I would reverse the trial court’s pretrial order.

This appeal arises from a divorce after a very brief marriage. The parties had one young son at the time of the divorce. The trial court declared the parties divorced, named the mother primary residential parent, largely adopted her proposed parenting plan, and calculated child support after imputing income to the mother based on a finding of voluntary underemployment. The father appealed and raises three issues, primarily arguing that he should be named primary residential parent or at least have additional parenting time. The mother raises a host of issues regarding various other provisions of the parenting plan. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court as modified.

In 2020, Ebony Robinson (“Defendant”) pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by
intoxication, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and driving without a license. The trial
court imposed a ten-year sentence largely suspended to probation with periodic weeks of
confinement for the first three years. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that a 2017
amendment to the probation eligibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-
303, prohibits defendants who are convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication from
receiving any form of probation. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State and
reversed the trial court, ordering Defendant to serve the full sentence in confinement. The
intermediate court concluded that the amended probation statute expressly prohibits
probation of any kind, including periodic or split confinement, for criminal defendants
convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. After reviewing the relevant statutes, this
Court affirms the Court of Criminal Appeals and holds that the clear and precise language
of the 2017 amendment to the probation eligibility statute prohibits all forms of probation
for a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. Accordingly, we affirm
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.